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Putting English Verb + out Constructions into 
Perspective 
Éva Kovács 
1 Introduction 
Verb + particle constructions (also called ’multi-word verbs’ or ’phrasal 
verbs’) represent a very interesting and challenging group of lexical items in 
English as most of them are non-compositional in their meaning. This may 
be the reason why the traditional grammatical (morphological and 
compositional semantic) approaches (cf. for example, Bolinger 1971, Fraser 
1976) proved to be inappropriate for their description, and their usage was 
generally regarded to be arbitrary. Even modern theoretical linguists and 
lexicographers started to deal with them intensively only from the beginning 
of the 80s. 
It was cognitive grammarians such as Lindner (1982), Lakoff (1987) 
and Rudzka-Ostyn (2003) who took up the challenge of the alleged 
arbitrariness of prepositional/particle usage. They demonstrated that the 
meaning of most prepositions/particles is highly structured and motivated by 
metaphors in our conceptual system. Thus in this view, English verb + 
particle constructions are also analysable, at least to some degree. 
To justify the above claim, I set out to examine English verb + out 
constructions. My primary aim is on the one hand, to demonstrate that the 
meanings of out, one of the most common particles in English multi-word 
verbs, form a network of related senses; and on the other hand, to explore 
what metaphors are involved in the conceptualisation of their abstract 
meanings. 
2 The role of metaphors in conceptualisation 
First of all, it seems to be appropriate to highlight what role metaphors play 
in cognitive semantic analyses and thus in the analysis of the meanings of 
English verb + particle constructions. As stated by cognitive linguists (cf. 
Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2005), metaphors are not 
just superfluous, though pleasant rhetorical devices, but an indispensable 
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property of our thinking and conceptualisation. They assume that our 
language is highly metaphorical, which uses thousands of expressions based 
on concrete, physical entities in order to express high-level abstractions. In 
this view, we structure abstract concepts (love, happiness, anger, fear, time, 
wealth, and desire, etc.) on concrete, physical bases (human body, buildings, 
machines, animals, and plants, etc.). In other words, conceptual metaphors 
always combine two domains: a concrete, well bounded, ‘source domain’ 
and an abstract, ‘target domain’. To illustrate what kind of correspondences 
or mappings there are between a source domain and a target domain, let us 
have a closer look at one of our basic feelings: love (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, Kövecses 2005). We often conceptualise love via the following 
metaphors: 
 
LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE 
There is incredible energy in their relationship. 
I could feel the electricity between them. 
LOVE IS A PATIENT 
This is a sick relationship. 
Their relationship is in really good shape. 
LOVE IS MADNESS 
I’m crazy about her. 
She drives me out of my mind. 
LOVE IS MAGIC 
She cast her spell over me. 
The magic is gone. 
LOVE IS WAR 
He is known for his many rapid conquests. 
She is besieged by suitors. 
 
As far as English multi-word verbs are concerned, the meaning of their 
majority is also abstract, which is one of the basic reasons why it is difficult 
to understand and master them. If we, however, understand the metaphors 
underlying these abstract meanings, it will make it easier for us to 
understand and use them properly. 
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3 The semantic properties of verb + out constructions 
Before examining what role metaphors play in the semantic analysis of verb 
+ out constructions, let us look at some syntactic and semantic properties of 
these multi-word verbs. 
As mentioned above, English multi-word verbs are the combination of a 
verb and a particle, in which the latter functions either as a preposition or an 
adverb. What is more, the majority of verb + particle constructions are 
polysemous in their meaning. For example, come out can mean leave a 
place, but in most cases its meaning is figurative or more or less figurative, 
as illustrated by the following examples: become known (the truth), stop 
being fixed somewhere (baby tooth), be removed from something such as 
clothing or cloth by washing or rubbing (dirt), be spoken, heard or 
understood in a particular way (as a criticism), become available to buy or 
see (a book or a film), start to appear in the sky (the sun, moon, stars), 
become easy to notice (difference), open (flower), etc. As evident from the 
above examples, the verb can also have a literal, physical meaning, i.e. 
motion, but abstract meaning as well. When the verb in the construction is 
used metaphorically, it is usually clear. The particle can, however, have 
abstract meanings as well, i.e. their literal meanings are extended to abstract 
non-visible domains such as thoughts, intentions, feelings, attitudes, 
relations, social and economic interactions, etc. and is not so easy to 
perceive. In fact, we can, however, often discover a clear link between the 
concrete and the abstract meanings of the particles as well. The prototypical 
meanings of the particle usually denote place or direction while their abstract 
meanings are based on these concrete, literal meanings. 
Let us take the concrete meaning of out: ’getting out of a closed, well-
bounded area’, for example fly out, fall out. Besides, it often refers to 
growth, i.e. something becomes wider spreading on a bigger area or lasting 
longer, such as stretch out (his hand), string out the debate. 
Furthermore, out can also mean that something gradually reaches its 
final state, e.g. die out (become extinct), wipe out (destroy something, kill a 
lot of people). Out can also refer to communication between two people, i.e. 
the information leaves one of them and reaches the other, e.g. sob out his 
grief or it can also denote that a secret, an unknown piece of information 
becomes known, like in worm the secret out of sy. 
It might seem that these meanings form a network of unrelated senses 
but if we examine the meanings of out in the above examples more closely, 
we can discover a systematic relationship between these meanings (cf. 
Macmillan Phrasal Verbs Plus 2005: 298–300). 
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4 Metaphors in the analysis of the semantics of verb + out constructions 
As mentioned in the introduction, Lindner (1981) was one of the first 
linguists who provided a cognitive analysis of the particles out and up using 
the relation of trajector-landmark. In cognitive linguistics, the landmark is 
understood as a reference point, whereas the trajector as a moving entity. 
Lindner analysed the meanings of these particles with the help of the so-
called prototype theory, and demonstrated what kind of extensions they have 
into the abstract domain. She, however, failed to show the interactions of 
what kind of metaphors their meanings are motivated by. 
After this, using Lindner’s analysis as a starting point and the diagram 
for the meaning network of out in the Macmillan Phrasal verbs Plus (2005), 
let us see what kind of metaphors are involved in the conceptualisation of the 
meanings of some English verb + out constructions. In the view of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s metaphor theory (1980), we conceptualise the phenomena of 
our world as objects, materials or containers with boundaries and an in-out 
orientation. A wide range of domains, objects, sets, activities, even states, 
are metaphorically conceived as containers. 
The conceptualisation of abstract categories as containers can provide 
an explanation for the different meanings of out in the English verb + out 
constructions. Thinking of the spatial, prototypical meaning of the particle 
out, we have the image of a closed, well-bounded container, from which an 
entity, an object or a person moves out, as illustrated by the following 
common examples: go out, break out, fall out, the meaning of which is based 
on the metaphor PHYSICAL OBJECTS WITH BOUNDARIES ARE 
CONTAINERS. 
The metaphor OUR HOME/AN INSTITUTION IS A CONTAINER 
FOR ITS MEMBERS can be recognised in the examples such as eat out, 
dine out, go out, stay out, sleep out, camp out invite out, take out, or drop 
out, boot out, kick out, throw out, turf out, chuck out, and freeze out etc. 
where it means leaving a place, i.e. eating somewhere other than at our 
house, usually in a restaurant or removing somebody from a place, i.e. 
causing somebody to lose his home/club membership/job. 
Sets, groups of objects and people can also be viewed as containers in 
which there are members or elements. In some cases, members can be 
rearranged or given a new position, in others the member does not remain 
inside the set or group but it or part of it is removed out of it, with sometimes 
nothing left, for example pick out (a shirt), empty out (your bags), sort out 
(your papers), cut out (a picture, several paragraphs), strip out (information 
from a financial or statistical calculation), cross out (some words), and 
score out (some paragraphs),etc . Beyond denoting physical removal of an 
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object from a group, out can also refer to the cognitive process of 
distinguishing, choosing objects for special purposes (praise or criticism) or 
rejecting objects from among others as they are useless or unwanted or have 
not reached a high enough standard as illustrated by the following examples: 
pick out (the best candidate), single out (somebody for special attention) 
weed out (corrupt police officers), and cut out (a person out of your will), 
etc. These expressions can be generalised with the help of the following 
metaphors: GROUPS ARE CONTAINERS, CHOOSING IS REMOVING 
AN OBJECT FROM A CONTAINER. 
In several verb + out constructions the metaphor BODIES/PARTS OF 
BODIES ARE CONTAINERS can be discovered, such as in pull out his 
tooth, spit out (food), reach out (stretch out your arm), stick out your tongue, 
cry out in pain, take money out of your pocket, and hand out the test papers, 
etc. 
The metaphor BODIES/PARTS OF BODIES (E.G. YOUR HEART) 
ARE CONTAINERS, FEELINGS ARE OBJECTS is evoked in the 
expressions, such as cry out his grief, and pour out his heart where 
expressing your feelings is very much like taking an object out of your body. 
In both cases, the object which is inside the container moves out of it, and 
can therefore be linked to one and the same image. 
Our image of our mind and human communication can be characterised 
by the following ontological metaphors: MINDS ARE CONTAINERS, 
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS WHICH FILL THEM. Accordingly, our thoughts, 
ideas are objects that fill our mind i.e. they are inside. When we 
communicate, they come out of our mind in the form of words. Thus our 
language serves as a means that passes our ideas. The meanings of the 
following verb + out constructions are conceptualised via the above 
metaphors: stammer out a few words, speak out (state your opinion firmly 
and publicly about something), slip out (a piece of information), blurt out his 
name, fling out a remark (say it quickly in a rather aggressive way), and spit 
out words (say them in an angry way), etc. 
In the cognitive view, states of existence, accessibility, and visibility, 
etc. are also seen as entities with boundaries around them, i.e. containers. 
Interestingly, the abstract states of non-existence or of being unknown can 
also be conceptualised as containers and the particle out refers to the fact that 
an object moves out of these states. Thus several verb + out constructions are 
based on metaphors such as STATES OF NON-EXISTENCE, 
IGNORANCE ARE CONTAINERS and PRIVATE IS IN/PUBLIC IS OUT. 
When we learn a secret or when a piece of information becomes known, or 
when we discover or find out a piece of information, they move out of the 
states of non-existence or of being unknown into the state of being known, 
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as illustrated by the following verb + out constructions: ferret out, nose out, 
sound out, find out, leak out, and come out, etc. When you look for and find 
something, it also becomes known, examples for which include: dig out, 
hunt out, and root out, etc. 
Similarly, when a book is published or a new product or service is 
introduced, it becomes available for the public. In other words, it gets out of 
the state of inaccessibility into the state of accessibility. In this sense, change 
of state (inaccessible to accessible) is viewed as change of location via 
STATES OF NON-EXISTENCE ARE CONTAINERS, and ACCESS-
IBLE/PUBLIC IS OUT, such as in the following examples: bring out a 
book, come out (book), rush out (produce a product quickly in a very short 
time), and roll out (a new vehicle), etc. 
In some multi-word verbs, out refers to the fact that something ceases to 
exist, disappears completely or is caused to stop existing, which is justified 
by the examples below: run out, peter out, sell out, give out, burn out, conk 
out, die out, peg out and wipe out, stamp out, root out, blow out, and phase 
out, etc. The metaphor underlying these constructions is as follows: 
STATES OF EXISTENCE/ACCESSIBILITY ARE CONTAINERS and the 
particle out refers to the cessation of this state. 
Physically viewed, a moving entity can reach its maximum boundaries. 
ENTITIES WITH BOUNDARIES ARE CONTAINERS, ENTITIES 
REACH THEIR MAXIMUM BOUNDARIES are involved in the meanings 
of some verb + out constructions, such as in: spread out/lay out the map, 
spread out their branches (trees), fan out their feathers (birds), and roll out 
the dough, etc. Some abstract expressions also reflect the metaphor AN 
ACTIVITY/SERVICE REACHES ITS MAXIMUM BOUNDARIES. Let us 
just think of phrasal verbs with out, the meaning of which is that a new 
product or service is introduced and spread by a company, for example 
branch out (a company). In some verb + out constructions like lay out your 
ideas, set out your plans, the expression of ideas and a clear and thorough 
explanation of plans are referred to while in pad out his report, flesh out and 
broaden out/open out a debate the implication is that more things or topics 
are included in the discussion. 
In some cases, the temporal extension of an activity can be observed. 
The concept of time is often conceptualised by the way of motion and space. 
Accordingly, the following mappings emerge in the case of some verb + 
particle constructions: TIMES ARE OBJECTS, EXTENSIONS OF TIMES 
ARE EXTENSIONS OF OBJECTS. To justify this, consider the following 
examples: drag out (a debate), hold out (his money, strength), last out the 
night, sit out the bad weather, and wait out the storm, etc. 
Putting English Verb + out Constructions into Perspective 9 
5 Conclusion 
Summing up, the following results have emerged from the above analysis. In 
the light of Lakoff and Johnson’s metaphor theory (1980), I have tentatively 
suggested that the conceptualisation of abstract categories as objects, 
containers with boundaries can provide an explanation for the different 
meanings of out in English verb + out constructions. Analysing the meanings 
of some verb + out constructions in this view, I have found the following 
mappings between a source and target domain: OUR HOME/AN 
INSTITUTION IS A CONTAINER FOR ITS MEMBERS (e.g. go out), 
GROUPS ARE CONTAINERS (e.g. pick out), BODIES/PARTS OF 
BODIES ARE CONTAINERS (e.g. pull out), MINDS ARE CONTAINERS 
(e.g. slip out), STATES OF NON-EXISTENCE ARE CONTAINERS (e.g. 
bring out), STATES OF EXISTENCE ARE CONTAINERS (e.g. wipe out), 
ENTITIES WITH BOUNDARIES ARE CONTAINERS (e.g. spread out) 
and TIMES ARE OBJECTS (e.g. drag out). 
As might be evident from the above analysis, the meanings of English 
verb + out constructions also form a network of related senses and they are 
analysable, at least to some degree. Thus English multi-word verbs are not 
just an arbitrary combination of a verb + a particle but their meaning is 
structured and motivated by metaphors in our conceptual system. It is also 
justified by the fact that in the case of novel verb + out constructions, some 
senses of out mentioned above can be discovered even if it is combined with 
a new verb or with an existing verb in a new construction. As evidence for 
this observation, consider the following relatively new multi-word verbs 
used in informal language (McCarthy & O’Dell 2004: 164): 
 
be partied out (tired of going to parties because you have been to too 
many) 
After a whole week of birthday celebrations, I feel totally partied out. 
bliss out (become or make someone become totally happy and relaxed) 
They blissed out on music. 
chill out (relax completely, or not allow things to upset you) 
Chill out! Life’s too short to get so stressed. 
veg out (relax by doing nothing) 
I wish I had loads of money – I’d go and veg out in the Caribbean. 
pig out (eat an extremely large amount of food, much more than you 
need) 
She felt like pigging out for once. 
google out (discover information by means of a thorough research) 
I had googled out a relevant website. 
10 Éva Kovács 
The reason why we understand their meaning easily is that these new 
expressions remind us of existing verb + out constructions in which the 
particle out contributes one special meaning to the verb. 
In my paper I hope to have proved how significantly cognitive 
linguistics has been and will be able to contribute to a better understanding 
and a more effective mastering of multi-word verbs, a notoriously difficult 
aspect of the English language. 
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Exploring Teachers’ Pedagogical Beliefs as a 
Way to Help Teachers Develop a Critical 
Reflective Attitude  
Adrienn Károly 
Introduction 
Recent pedagogical research findings seem to confirm the view that 
investigating the issues of language teaching and learning only on the basis 
of observable features of teacher behaviour leaves a lot of questions 
unanswered. As a result of the apparent limitations of such an approach, 
recent research focuses not only on what teachers do but also on the 
cognitive processes that underlie teachers’ classroom behaviour. How 
teachers behave in the classroom is always in relation to what they think and 
believe, so there’s no point in separating the two. According to Clark and 
Peterson, “the process of teaching will be fully understood only when these 
two domains are brought together and examined in relation to one another” 
(1986:256). The judgements and decisions that teachers make in and out of 
the classroom are always influenced by cognitive theories that teachers 
construct for themselves.  
István Nahalka (1997) argues that there is no practice without inner 
theoretical models. The cognitive dimension was not so important for 
behaviorists, but by the end of the 20th century a new approach has emerged 
in educational research. This new constructivist approach emphasizes the 
construction of knowledge as the basis of the learning process, and views 
learning as an active, dynamic process in which learners actively construct 
their knowledge by integrating it in an already existsing mental system, 
which helps them understand and interpret new information. In case of 
dissonance, learners might even reformulate their inner cognitive structures. 
These active processes occur not only in learners’ but also in teachers’ 
minds: they construct their own theories and beliefs that consciously or 
subconsciously control their behaviour. Teachers are all participants of a 
lifelong learning process. Williams and Burden – based on von Glaserfeld’s 
(1995) approach to learning – say that teachers should present learners with 
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problems to be explored rather than facts to be accepted without thinking 
(1997:48) 
In ELT the concept of pedagogical ’belief’ – a key idea in constructivist 
learning theory – has come into favour in recent years. Calderhead (1996) 
identifies the types of teacher beliefs which are most commonly explored. 
These are beliefs about teaching, learning and learners, subject matter, self 
as a teacher or the role of the teacher. A lot of educational research has 
revealed that teacher training courses do not prepare students to be able to 
cope with all the problems arising in real-world teaching situations. In 
constructivist theories of teacher development the keyword is construction 
and re-construction of personal theories related to teaching. In fact, the real 
learning process for teachers starts when they leave formal teacher training 
institutions. According to Nahalka (1997) the real learning process means 
that as a result of several factors, all the conscious or subconscious 
constructions and beliefs which teachers operate from undergo a change. 
It is easy to see the importance of research concerned with the 
relationship between teachers’ beliefs and their teaching practice. It would 
be ideal if teachers were aware of these constructs and had the ability of self-
reflection, which could establish a basis for professional development. 
Bartlett argues that instead of ’how to’ questions teachers should move to 
’what’ and ’why’ questions. He says: 
Asking ’what’ and ’why’ questions gives us a certain power over our 
teaching. We could claim that the degree of autonomy and responsibility 
we have in our work as teachers is determined by the level of control that 
we can exercise over our actions. In reflecting on ’what’ and ’why’ 
questions, we begin to exercise control and open up the possibility of 
transforming our everyday classroom life. The process of control is called 
critical reflective teaching. (1990:205) 
It is also important for teachers to consider the historical, social and cultural 
context in which their teaching is embedded. Willams and Burden later 
argue that a key element of the constructivist approach is that ’teachers 
become aware of what their own beliefs and views of the world are, which 
leads us into the notion of the reflective practitioner (1997:53). In the first 
part of this paper I will examine the concept of ’belief’, then I will try to 
identify the possible sources of teacher beliefs, and finally I will present 
some models which can be used to elicit teachers’ pedagogical beliefs.  
The concept of teachers’ beliefs 
People’s behaviour is always influenced by their beliefs. If we think 
someone is lying to us, we will act accordingly, irrespective of whether this 
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belief is true or not. Before considering the sources of beliefs I think it is 
important to clarify what this concept really means. In spite of the increasing 
popularity of the concept of belief, there are many definitions of it, and 
researchers often use different terms interchangeably, which results in a 
terminological ambiguity. For example, Pajares (1992) collects more than 
twenty terms defining the same concept. Therefore, it is very important to 
clear the meaning of the underlying notion. According to Borg there are four 
common features of the definitions of ’belief’. First, as opposed to 
’knowledge’ – which is true in an external sense – ’belief’ is a mental state, a 
proposition accepted as true by the individual holding the belief. Second, 
beliefs guide people’s thinking and behaviour. Next, some beliefs are 
conscious although individuals are more often unconscious of their beliefs. 
Finally, beliefs are value commitments and therefore have an emotional 
aspect (2001:186). 
Nespor also mentions four main features which distinguish beliefs from 
knowledge. He says that beliefs are existential presumptions, which means 
that they are ‘propositions or assumptions about the existence or non-
existence of entities’. For example, a teacher might assume that a student is 
lazy. The danger in that is that a temporary feature might be considered as 
absolute, which has serious pedagogical consequences. The second feature, 
alternativity means that beliefs often represent an ideal reality for the 
teacher. In this respect beliefs help teachers define pedagogical goals and 
tasks. Perhaps the most important criterion identifying beliefs is the affective 
aspect. Beliefs are personal evaluations and feelings about something or 
somebody. Finally, whereas knowledge is stored semantically, beliefs are 
‘composed mainly of episodically stored material derived from personal 
experience or from cultural or institutional sources of knowledge 
transmission’ (1987:318–320). 
However, it is not always easy to distinguish between knowledge and 
belief. It may happen that someone believes he knows something, or says he 
believes something but does not act accordingly. Pajares (1992) tries to clear 
up the ambiguity surrounding this term, and concludes that the difference 
between knowledge and beliefs is more in degree than in kind. Woods comes 
to the same conclusion and introduces a more general concept: ’BAK’, 
which stands for ’beliefs, assumptions and knowledge (1996:195). 
Before examining the sources of beliefs, it is important to mention their 
functions. What are these mental constructions used for? Nespor (1987:320) 
claims that teachers fall back on their beliefs in case of ambiguous or 
difficult situations, when their knowledge is not available or not sufficient to 
understand and deal with a situation. According to Pajares, in teaching there 
are no complete begginers since everyone has some preconceptions (beliefs 
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or knowledge) about the teaching and learning process. These preconcep-
tions can help teachers establish their identity and form social relationships. 
Pajares sees beliefs as the most important tools to interpret, plan and make 
decisions regarding new approaches, techniques or activities used in the 
classroom (1992:325). 
Sources of teachers’ beliefs 
In his book Socialization of teachers (1977) Lacey investigates the process 
of how teachers’ beliefs develop, and he sees this process as a process of 
socialization, which refers to “the development of sets of behaviours and 
perspectives by an individual as he confronts social situations” (1977:30). 
This process of socialization has many stages, from which teachers’ beliefs 
and knowledge originate. Pajares points out that it is crucial when beliefs are 
formed because early experiences have a very strong influence on the 
formation of beliefs later. He writes that “the earlier a belief is incorporated 
into the belief structure, the more difficult it is to alter, for these beliefs 
subsequently affect perception and strongly influence the processing of new 
information” (1992:317). The first beliefs develop from personal experiences 
at primary school or to use Lortie’s term “apprenticeship of observation”. 
These early childhood memories are connected to a person or a significant 
situation. Even very young students can tell the difference between good and 
bad teachers who serve as models for the child. Lortie remarks that young 
students are not guided by pedagogic principles; their learning is intuitive 
and affected by the students’ individual personalities (1975:62). Johnson 
says that early experiences sometimes have a controversial effect on 
students. He reports that students who are exposed to a certain approach or 
method in early childhood find it very hard not to use at least some elements 
of it no matter how critical of it they are. After the actual teaching 
experience, one student even admits: “It’s like I just fall into the trap of 
teaching like I was taught and I don’t know how to get myself out of that 
mode” (1994:450). This is a very interesting statement confirming the 
powerful influence of early school memories; a process which often happens 
subconsciously.  
Teachers’ beliefs can derive not only from early school experiences but 
also from outside the school. The role of family, friends, their values, or 
significant events cannot be overlooked. After reviewing earlier research 
Zeichner és Gore (1990:335) comes to the conslusion that in the classroom 
teachers often relate to students in a way that mirrors their early parent-child 
relationships. Beliefs formed in early childhood are very deep-rooted and are 
difficult to change.  
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The third stage in the development of teachers’ beliefs is connected to 
formal teacher training. Some early researchers such as Lortie (1975) or 
Lacey (1977) mention that very often there is no continuity between what 
students learn about teaching and how they actually teach. He found that 
teacher training courses have little influence on the development of 
prospective teachers’ beliefs as they usually reinforce already existing 
theories. One explanation could be the strong effect of early school 
experiences mentioned previously. Zeichner and Gore write that most 
teacher training courses are segmented, with a confusing message to 
prospective teachers. The authors claim that in many teacher training 
institutions there is a ‘hidden curriculum’ which contradicts the message of 
the actual methodology courses (1990:344). Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance to coordinate all courses in formal teacher training so that they 
are based on the same or similar principles. Peacock (2001:193) suggests 
that a reflective element incorporated into the syllabus will lead to changes 
in prospective teachers’ beliefs. Deep-rooted beliefs need to be brought to 
the surface and critically examined if the aim of teacher training is real 
professional development, which is a key concept in construcivist pedagogy.  
Certainly, the last stage of teachers’ socialization is when they start 
working as a teacher and have first-hand experiences. According to Lortie 
(1975), this is the period when beginning teachers can test their implicit or 
explicit theories and beliefs in a real environment when dealing with 
everyday problems. In this stage, there are two factors that can contribute to 
changes in beginning teachers’ theories: experienced colleagues and the 
students themselves. As many researchers claim, by becoming critically 
reflective teachers can achieve an improvement of teaching. Bartlett writes 
that the idea of reflection means that there is constant interaction between 
the teacher and the context in which teaching is embedded (1990:204). 
Beginning teachers form their identity and adopt a certain approach as a 
result of this dynamic process. They try to meet the expectations of society, 
the school, the colleagues and the students. However, this can only be 
achieved if they constantly challenge, evaluate and test their beliefs and 
assumptions about teaching and learning.  
Instruments to elicit teachers’ beliefs 
As I have previously mentioned, it is not easy to explore beliefs, as some of 
them may be unconscious. Donaghue points to another factor: the issue of 
self-image. Consciously or unconsciously, teachers project a certain image 
of themselves, so they may not always be honest if they have to speak about 
their own beliefs (2003:345). Furthermore, theory and practice, that is what 
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teachers think and what they do is not always congruent. To elicit beliefs 
Doff suggests an activity in which teachers have to give five important 
characteristics of good and bad teaching (1988:122). However, Donaghue 
(2003) argues that these questions are too general and familiar to teachers, so 
the answers may not be sincere. According to Edge (1992), the key word in 
professional development is co-operation between teachers. Roberts suggests 
a visualization activity, in which participants have to give a metaphor to 
discuss the roles of teachers and learners (1998:310-311). Again, the 
responses do not necessarily mirror what participants think. The technique 
that I would like to discuss now is based on Kelly’s personal construct 
theory (1955). George Kelly was a humanistic psychologist who attached 
importance to the cognitive elements in human personality. He viewed 
individuals as intuitive scientists trying to make sense of the world around 
them. People have anticipations and expectations, just like scientists have 
hypotheses. People constantly formulate and test their hypotheses, and then 
form their own personal constructs. With the help of these constructs people 
try to understand and control events and situations. Personal constructs are 
continuously tested against reality and will change or be adapted with 
experience (Szakács and Kulcsár, 2001). Kelly says that personal constructs 
can be viewed as attributes which are always bipolar – we can never believe 
in something without denying something else. For example, if we claim that 
someone is clever, we implicitly deny that this person is unintelligent. 
Constructs are formed by recognizing a pattern in the events – similarities or 
differences – happening to the person. Therefore, at least three situations or 
things are necessary to the formation of a personal construct: two of these 
are perceived as similar and the third one is different from them (Carver and 
Scheirer, 2003). Kelly’s theory seems to mirror the idea of reflection in the 
teaching process as teachers have to be aware of their beliefs and 
consciously reflect on them if they want to develop. As Pope and Keen say: 
...individuals, students and teachers alike, [have] to be adaptive, personally 
viable and self-directive. Such self-direction or self-organization can only 
come about if the individual makes an effort to explore his viewpoints, 
purposes, means for obtaining ends and keeps these under constant review 
(1981:118).  
In order to elicit personal constructs, Kelly devised a special technique 
called the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT), which can be used not only in 
clinical psychology, but also in pedagogy. It is not a traditional test, it is a 
scientific, self-discovery research tool. Pope and Keen write that RGT is a 
‘psychological mirror, which should help the individual, rather than the 
investigator, to understand his world’ (1981:155). It is important to 
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emphasize that using the RGT, the investigator cannot influence a teacher’s 
thinking by naming his own constructs. When using the RGT, the subjects 
have to compare three elements (for example, three people known to the 
subject). They have to decide which two elements are similar and which one 
is different and how. The result is the subjects’ personal constructs, which is 
recorded on a grid, and they can analyze the next triad. The result is a grid 
showing the subjects’ personal constructs. In 2000 the RGT technique was 
piloted with English teachers coming to the UK from different European 
countries for a development course in teaching methodology. 83% of the 
people answering an end-of-course questionnaire about the repertory grid 
instrument found that the RGT activity helped them reflect on their beliefs 
about teaching. Trainers reported that the activity generated discussion and 
provided an insight into participants’ beliefs (Donaghue 2003:350). 
Therefore, I believe this activity can prove to be useful not only on in-
service teacher development courses but also in teacher training.  
Conclusion 
I this paper I have given an overview of the current research trends 
concerned with teachers’ beliefs. The practical aim of research is to raise 
teachers’ self awareness and to encourage them to adopt a critical and 
reflective attitude to teaching, which is a key to real learning and 
professional development. In the first part of my paper I have examined the 
definition of the term ‘belief’, then I have discussed the possible sources of 
pedagogical beliefs. Finally, I have outlined a theory and a practical device, 
which can be used in teacher training courses to achieve the goal of 
independent, conscious self-reflection.  
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On the Translation of Neologisms 
Albert Vermes 
1 Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the solution of a not at all trivial translation 
problem, which is how neologisms in Chapter Nine of Douglas Adams’s 
Life, the Universe and Everything, such as flollop or globber, which are 
instruments of verbal humour so characteristic of this novel, are rendered in 
the Hungarian translation. The analysis is made in a relevance-theoretic 
framework with the help of a conceptual apparatus worked out formerly for 
the study of proper names and other culturally bound expressions (see, for 
instance, Vermes 2003). 
2 Theoretical background 
In ostensive-inferential linguistic communication, communicators produce a 
stimulus that points to their communicative intention, and the audience of 
the communication, by combining this stimulus with a context, tries to infer 
the communicator’s informative intention, that is, the message.  
According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), all ostensive-inferential 
communication is based on the principle of relevance, which states that 
every act of ostensive communication communicates the assumption of its 
own optimal relevance as well (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 158), where 
optimal relevance means that the processing of the stimulus results in such 
contextual effects (that is, assumptions) that will prove worthwhile for the 
audience’s attention and working out these assumptions will not require the 
audience to invest unnecessarily great processing effort.  
An assumption is defined as a structured set of concepts. The meaning 
of a concept is constituted by two elements: a truth-functional logical entry 
and an encyclopaedic entry, which contains various (propositional and non-
propositional) representations linked with the concept (e.g. personal or 
cultural beliefs). The concept may also have a lexical entry, containing 
phonological, morphological, syntactic and categorical information about the 
natural language item associated with it (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 83-93). 
These lexical, logical and encyclopaedic pieces of information are stored in 
memory. 
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The content of an assumption is a function of the logical entries of the 
concepts it contains, and the context of its processing, at least in part, is 
provided by the encyclopaedic entries of these concepts (Sperber and Wilson 
1986: 89). The context may also contain assumptions resulting from the 
processing of earlier utterances during the given act of communication as 
well as assumptions which are activated in the audience’s cognitive 
environment by the linguistic or other sensory stimuli. A cognitive 
environment is a set of assumptions which an individual is capable of 
representing at a given time and can thus be seen largely as a function of the 
individual’s background assumptions and physical environment (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986: 39). 
Translation in this framework can be considered as a communicative act 
which in a secondary context communicates such an informative intention 
that has the closest possible interpretive resemblance with the original under 
the given circumstances. The principle of relevance is manifested in 
translation as a presumption of optimal resemblance: the translation is 
presumed to interpretively resemble the original and the degree of this 
resemblance is in accord with the presumption of optimal relevance (Gutt 
1991: 101). In other words, the translation must resemble the original in such 
a way that it provides for contextual effects which are comparable to those 
provided for by the original and it is formulated in such a way that it will not 
require an unjustified amount of processing effort from the audience to work 
out the intended interpretation. The task of the translator, then, is to decide 
which assumptions of the original can be preserved in the translation in 
accordance with the principle of optimal resemblance and how they can be 
rendered. 
3 Translation operations 
I distinguish four translation operations, which were introduced in some 
earlier studies on the translation of proper names and culture-specific 
expressions under the names of transference, translation proper, substitution 
and modification. Leaving behind the area of culture-specific expressions as 
such, it seems more appropriate to use the terms total transfer (TT), logical 
transfer (LT), encyclopaedic transfer (ET), and zero transfer (ZT) since 
these seem better suited to reflect the nature of these operations in a more 
general range of linguistic utterances. The operations are defined by the four 
possible configurations of the logical (L) and encyclopaedic (E) entries 
associated with lexical items, depending on which of them is/are preserved 
in the translation. Thus the operations can be described in the following way: 
TT [+L, +E]: The target text item has the same relevant logical and 
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encyclopaedic content as the original. LT [+L, −E]: The target text item has 
the same relevant logical content as the original but the encyclopaedic 
content is different or irrelevant. ET [−L, +E]: The target text item has the 
same relevant encyclopaedic content as the original but the logical content is 
different or irrelevant. And ZT [−L, −E]: The target text item has logical and 
encyclopaedic contents different from those of the original. It is easy to 
notice that what I call operations here are in fact semantic relationships 
between source and target text items, which can be realised by different 
techniques in different situations, as we will see in the discussion of the 
findings. 
4 The translatability of neologisms 
If the notion of untranslatability is taken in the narrow sense, applying 
Catford’s category of linguistic untranslatability (Catford 1965: 94), then 
neologisms must be considered as untranslatable elements. In a sense, any 
linguistic sign is untranslatable into another linguistic system, even into 
other signs of the same linguistic system. However, Catford himself notes 
that the borderline between translatablility and untransatability is not clear-
cut: we rather need to talk about easier or more difficult cases of 
translatability (Catford 1965: 93). According to Albert (2005: 43), 
“untranslatability is a theoretical […] category, an inherent characteristic of 
the code, la langue, while its counterpart, translatability is a practical 
category, an inherent characteristic of the text, of the discourse.” In a given 
context, then, everything can be regarded as translatable, and translatable in 
different ways: “untranslatability in a certain respect is equal to manifold 
translatability” (Albert 2005: 38, my translation, italics as in original). 
Thus the question is not why a neologism is not translatable but how it 
is translatable in the given context. This obviously depends on several 
factors, such as the type of the text, the aim of the translation, the intended 
target reader, the function of the neologism etc. In the literary text analysed 
here it can be observed that the primary function of neologisms is to enhance 
the humorous effect of the text: they serve as instruments of verbal humour 
(VH). According to Lendvai (1999: 34), “the role of VH is the breaching of 
norms, which causes a humorous effect (laughter in most cases). VH, at the 
same time, can be considered as a linguistic experiment in which the speaker 
‘tests’ the semantic effects elicited from the audience by this divergence 
from the norm. With the help of such ‘experimental results’ an experienced 
communicator uses VH to achieve certain, basically pragmatic, aims 
(informal relationship, irony, sarcasm, parody, satire etc.)” (my translation). 
What a translator needs to do, then, is to establish the pragmatic purpose of 
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VH, that is, to find out what assumptions the communicator wanted to 
convey through it, and then to decide whether in the given communication 
situation it is possible to convey these assumptions to the target reader and, 
if yes, in what way. 
Now we need to clarify in what way the use of neologisms may be a 
breaching of norms, or in other words, what is the real nature of neologisms. 
According to Newmark (1988: 140), non-existing or, rather, non-established 
lexical items, neologisms, may be defined as items newly produced or 
associated with new meanings. These latter are mostly not culture-bound and 
are not technical terms, and can be translated by an existing target language 
word or a brief functional or descriptive expression. Newly coined words, 
writes Newmark, according to a well-known hypothesis, are never 
completely new: they are either formed by morphological means or are 
phonaesthetic or synaesthetic. Most of these today are brand names and, as 
such, can be carried over into the target text in their original form. Generally 
speaking, in imaginative literature any neologism needs to be re-created: 
derived forms from the equivalent morphemes of the target language, 
phonaesthetic forms from phonemes of the target language which afford an 
analogous effect (Newmark 1980: 142-143). 
Thus, Newmark distinguishes four major groups of neologisms: (a) new 
proper names, (b) existing lexical items with new meanings, (c) 
morphologically formed new lexical items, and (d) new phonaesthetic 
lexical items. The translational solutions offered by Newmark: (a) 
transference, (b) translation by an existing target language word or 
paraphrasing, (c) morphemic translation, and (d) phonemic translation. 
5 The findings 
The list below is a “dictionary” of Squornshellous Swamptalk, an imagined 
language in the novel, containing items related to the swamp-dwelling 
“mattresses” living on the planet Squornshellus Zeta 
(http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=952470): 
 
flollop (v.) Jump around, in an excited kind of way.  
flur (v.) To display astonishment and awe.  
flurble (n.) A sympathetic gesture, sigh or comment.  
floopily (adv.) In the manner of something which is floopy.  
floopy (adj.) Something along the lines of being jumpy and/or 
enthusiastic.  
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globber (v.) This is the noise made by a live, swamp-dwelling mattress 
that is deeply moved by a story of personal tragedy. It could be an equivalent 
to a gasp.  
glurry (v.) The equivalent of getting goosebumps or a shiver when 
getting excited or thrilled by something.  
gup (v.) Mattresses gup when they are excited. Could be related to 
glurry and willomy.  
lurgle (v.) Could be the equivalent of “pissing ones pants”, or other 
display of fear and loathing.  
quirrule (v.) To ask or question in a mattresslike manner.  
vollue (v.) Its usage appears to be equivalent to “say”.  
voon (v.) Something mattresses say (or wurf) when they are 
emotionally moved by something, in both a positive and negative manner. In 
some contexts it can be compared to our “Wow”.  
willomy (v.) See glurry.  
wurf (v.) To say or utter. Mattresses are known to wurf “Voon” when 
commenting on something profound. 
 
Contrasting these with their equivalents in the Hungarian translation and 
complementing the list with new proper names in the novel, we can compile 
the following “Squornshellous Swamptalk – Hungarian dictionary”: 
 
flodge: toccsan 
flollop: zsuppog 
floopily: csullogva 
floopy: csullogó 
flurble: gurgulázás 
flurble : gurgulázik 
flur: csöp 
globber: megnyeccsen, nyeccsen 
glurry: 1. borzong 2. nyeccsen 
gup: felcuppan 
Hollop: Hollop 
hyperbridge: hiperhíd 
ion-buggy: ionbricska 
lurgle: szörcsög 
 
mattress: matrac 
mattresslike: matracos 
Maximegalon (University): 
Maximegalon (Egyetem) 
quirrul: hüledezik 
Sanvalvwag: Sanvalvwag 
Squornshellous Zeta: 
Squornshellus Zéta 
vollue: kartyog 
voon: fúú, ufff 
willomy: 1. remeg 2. micsong 
wurf: mond 
Zem: Zem 
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Table 1: Translation operations applied to neologisms in the translation of the novel 
 TT LT ET ZT 
  Hollop: Hollop  
  Sanvalvwag: 
Sanvalvwag 
 
  Zem: Zem  
  Squornshellous: 
Squornshellus 
 
PROPER 
NAMES 
Maximegalon: 
Maximegalon 
   
EXISTING 
LEXICAL 
ITEMS 
WITH NEW 
MEANINGS 
 mattress: 
matrac  
  
 hyperbridge: 
hiperhíd 
  
 ion-buggy: 
ionbricska 
  
MORPHO-
LOGICALLY 
FORMED 
LEXICAL 
ITEMS  mattresslike: 
matracos 
  
  flollop: zsuppog  
  floopily: 
csullogva 
 
  floopy: csullogó  
  flur: csöp  
  globber: 
nyeccsen 
 
  glurry: nyeccsen  
  vollue: kartyog  
  willomy: 
micsong 
 
   flodge: toccsan 
   flurble: 
gurgulázás 
   glurry: borzong 
   gup: felcuppan 
   lurgle: szörcsög 
   quirrul: 
hüledezik 
   voon: fúú, ufff 
   willomy: remeg 
NEW 
LEXICAL 
ITEMS 
   wurf: mond 
 
The translation operations applied in the translation of the different 
types of neologisms are summarised in Table 1. We can observe that proper 
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names are rendered by encyclopaedic or total transfer, lexical items with 
new meanings and morphologically formed items by logical transfer, and 
newly coined lexical items partly by encyclopaedic and partly by zero 
transfer. These findings are discussed in detail in the next section. 
6 Discussion 
Examining the semantic structure of neologisms in the source text, we find 
the following. Items in category (a) are relevant primarily through their 
encyclopaedic content, although there is one (Maximegalon) which has 
logical content of a descriptive nature. The only item in category (b) conveys 
new logical content in the text. The complex or derived items in category (c) 
preserve the logical content of their component parts because they are all 
non-idiomatic. Finally, although items in category (d) may obtain some 
logical content within the context of the text, this is incidental, and they 
communicate primarily through the encyclopaedic content provided by their 
sound symbolism. 
6.1 Proper names 
These belong to three subgroups. The first one contains the names Hollop, 
Sanvalvwag and Zem, which have no identifiable logical content (L = Ø), but 
do have encyclopaedic content or, to be more precise, this content arises 
during the processing of the item: E = {(1)}, where (1) This name only exists 
in this novel. Here the translator’s task was to preserve (1), which was 
achieved by simply transliterating the names. 
In the second subgroup there is one name: Squornshellous. Here L = Ø 
and E = {(1), (2)}, where (2) This is the name of a planet. In order to 
preserve (2), the ending of the name was changed into ‘–us’ because this 
Latin ending often occurs in astronomical names and thus its use makes (2) 
more easily recoverable for the target reader. This reduces the necessary 
amount of processing effort and thus increases the relevance of the 
expression. 
The third subgroup contains the word Maximegalon, which is the name 
of a university and also of the gigantic dictionary compiled at this university. 
It has logical content: L = {MAXI, MEGA} as well as encyclopaedic 
content: E = {(1), (3), (4)}, where (3) The combination of the morphemes 
maxi and mega produces a rather excessive form and (4) The ending –on 
normally occurs in learned terms like photon, epigon, pentagon, 
phenomenon etc. As the three component morphemes of the name are also 
used in Hungarian, total transfer was made possible by a simple 
transliteration of the name. 
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6.2 Existing lexical items with new meanings 
Here we have only one element, the word mattress, which obtains new 
logical content in the context of the novel: it is the name of a swamp-
dwelling animal living on a remote planet and used for making beds for 
people. This is obviously a metaphorical extension of the original meaning 
of the word and since this kind of extension is also possible in Hungarian, all 
that the translator needed to do was transfer the logical content. 
6.3 Morphologically formed new lexical items 
In this category we have the words hyperbridge, ion-buggy and mattresslike. 
The first two are compounds, the third one is a derivative form. As the 
meanings of all three are compositional, the translator, again, needed simply 
to convey the logical content of the component morphemes. 
6.4 New lexical items 
These items divide into two subgroups. The first one contains the words 
flollop, floopily, floopy, flur, globber, glurry, vollue and willomy, which were 
rendered by encyclopaedic transfer. These forms have no logical content (or 
if they do, it only arises within the context of the novel, as a by-product of 
their processing): L = Ø. Their encyclopaedic entries contain the following 
assumptions: E = {(1), (5)}, where (5) This is an onomatopeic form. In my 
opinion, (5) arises mainly as a result of the fact that these words all contain 
the sound l which, being a liquid phoneme, gives rise to associations to 
water, or movement in water or some other similar medium, or some similar 
kind of movement. Furthermore, word-initial fl and gl combinations in 
English can be found in several words with a similar semantic content: e.g. 
float, fly, glue, glide etc. Consequently, here encyclopaedic transfer was 
possible if the translator substituted a similarly onomatopeic form devoid of 
any logical content in Hungarian: zsuppog, csullogva, csullogó, csöp, 
nyeccsen, nyeccsen, kartyog, micsong. 
In the other subgroup we find the words flodge, flurble, glurry, gup, 
lurgle, quirrul, voon, willomy and wurf, which have the same relevant 
content as the items in the first subgroup. However, these were substituted in 
the target text by existing Hungarian words. What this means is that, on the 
one hand, they have filled-in logical entries and, parallel with this, their 
encyclopaedic content was also modified, since an important assumption, 
(1), was lost. As a result, this treatment is to be regarded as a case of zero 
transfer. The fact that (1) is really a relevant assumption in this context is 
made clear by the last sentence of the chapter: “He listened, but there was no 
sound on the wind beyond the now familiar sound of half-crazed 
etymologists calling distantly to each other across the sullen mire” (p. 48, my 
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italics). In the target text: “Fülelt egy kicsit, de a szél csak a már ismert 
hangokat sodorta tova: félőrült nyelvészek kiáltoztak egymásnak a komor 
sártengeren át” (p. 57, my italics), where instead of the Hungarian equivalent 
of etymologist, the word nyelvész (linguist) occurs. The relevance of this 
sentence obviously rests on the repeated activation of (1) in the text, as a 
result of which (1) becomes a relatively stable element of the context, a 
premise. Thus the fact that in the target text (1) is activated fewer times will 
lessen the relevance of the last sentence and will thus reduce the humorous 
effect. 
7 Summary 
Evidently, the optimal case of translation is when all the relevant logical and 
encyclopaedic contents of the source text are preserved in the target text 
(total transfer). An obvious way to achieve this is when the target text item is 
a transliteration of the original (see, e.g., Tarnóczi 1966: 363). Under 
normal circumstances, however, this will greatly decrease the relevance of 
the target text, since translations are needed exactly because the target reader 
is not familiar with the source code, and often does not have access to the 
contextual assumptions required for the processing either, and in the short 
run the necessity of acquiring these would significantly increase the amount 
of effort needed in the processing. This extreme method thus cannot be 
regarded as the default case of translation but, as we have seen, certain parts 
of the source text can sometimes be rendered this way. Transliteration as a 
translation technique, however, is not only a means of implementing total 
transfer but, in some cases, also of encyclopaedic transfer, as in the case of 
names devoid of logical content. The same technique, then, can be employed 
to execute different operations in translation. 
In the case of other neologisms, even if they have no logical content in 
the usual sense, within the context of the source text some new logical 
content may arise. This fact itself can be relevant in as much as it can figure 
as a necessary premise in the context of processing. In such cases, therefore, 
the translator’s primary aim may exactly be to preserve this assumption, 
since this is what will ensure the optimal resemblance of the translation with 
the original. 
In this light, the neologisms that occur in the novel can be regarded as a 
special kind of realia expressions, existing only in the universe of the source 
text. The translation of realia expressions, to use the words of Valló (2000: 
45), is not primarily a linguistic problem but a problem of creating a context. 
In other words, the translator’s most important task is to activate certain 
contextual assumptions, which are needed in working out the relevance of 
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the given part of the text. In the translation analysed here we have seen that 
if the translator fails to realise the significance of some contextual 
assumption and does not ensure that it is preserved in the translation, then 
the relevance of the target text will decrease which, in this particular case, 
meant that the intended humorous effect was weakened. 
In order to ensure optimal relevance, the translator also needs to be 
aware of what assumptions are available for the target reader. Consequently, 
the translator needs to make decisions in consideration not only of the given 
micro-context and the macro-context of the text as a whole, but also of the 
target reader’s cognitive environment. 
Eventually, however, the final form of these decisions cannot be 
deduced from any sort of communication or translation theory, because they 
are determined by the translator’s cognitive environment. And since 
different translators will approach the same source text with different 
cognitive environments, it makes perfect sense to say that the target text is 
just one among the potential variants (Lendvai 1999: 42). 
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Appendix: The data 
The moment passed as it regularly did on Squornshellous Zeta, without 
incident. (42) 
Ez a pillanat most is eseménytelenül telt el, mint a Squornshellus Zétán 
mindig. (50) 
 
‘My name,’ said the mattress, ‘is Zem.’ (44) 
– A nevem Zem – folytatta a matrac. (52) 
 
The mattress flolloped around. This is a thing that only live mattresses 
in swamps are able to do, which is why the word is not in more common 
usage. It flolloped in a sympathetic sort of way, moving a fairish body of 
water as it did so. (44) 
A matrac körbezsuppogta. Ezt csakis a mocsári matracok képesek csi-
nálni, ezért a szó nem valami elterjedt. Együttérzőn zsuppogott, ily módon 
tetszetős méretű víztömeget mozgatva meg. (52) 
 
The mattress globbered. This is the noise made by a live, swamp-
dwelling mattress that is deeply moved by a story of personal tragedy. The 
word can also, according to The Ultra-Complete Maximegalon Dictionary 
of Every Language Ever, mean the noise made by the Lord High 
Sanvalvwag of Hollop on discovering that he has forgotten his wife’s 
birthday for the second year running. (44) 
A matrac megnyeccsent. Ezt a hangot a mocsárlakó matracoknál vala-
mi személyes tragédia szokta kiváltani. Az Összes Létező és Valaha Létezett 
Nyelv Ultrakomplett Maximegalon Szótára szerint ezt a hangot adta ki a 
hollopi Nagy Sanvalvwag Őfelsége is, amikor rájött, hogy már két éve rend-
szeresen elfeledkezik az asszony születésnapjáról. (52) 
 
Strangely enough, the dictionary omits the word ‘floopily’, which 
simply means ‘in the manner of something which is floopy’. (45) 
Különös módon kihagyták a szótárból a „csullogva” szót, melynek je-
lentése a következő: „valami csullogó dologhoz hasonló módon”. (53) 
 
‘I sense a deep dejection in your diodes,’ it vollued (for the meaning of 
the word ‘vollue’, buy a copy of Squornshellous Swamptalk at any 
remaindered bookshop, or alternatively buy The Ultra-Complete 
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Maximegalon Dictionary, as the University will be very glad to get it off 
their hands and regain some valuable parking lots), ‘and it saddens me. You 
should be more mattresslike. We live quiet retired lives in the swamp, 
where we are content to flollop and vollue and regard the wetness in a fairly 
floopy manner. Some of us are killed, but all of us are called Zem, so we 
never know which and globbering is thus kept to a minimum. Why are you 
walking in circles?’ (45) 
– Mély levertséget észlelek a diódáidban – kartyogott (hogy a „kar-
tyog” szó jelentését megértsd, végy egy Squornshellusi Mocsárnyelv c. 
könyvet bármelyik eladhatatlan könyvek raktárában, vagy akár egy Ultra-
komplett Maximegalon Szótárt; az Univerzum (sic!) nagyon hálás lesz, hogy 
megszabadulnak tőle és értékes parkolóhelyeket nyernek ezáltal), és ez 
mélységesen elszomorít. Sokkal matracosabbnak kéne lenned. Mi nyugod-
tan és visszavonultan élünk mocsarainban, ahol boldogan zsuppogunk és 
kartyogunk, és csullogva elviseljük a nedvességet. Néhányunkat megölik, 
de mivel mindnyájunkat Zemnek hívják, hát nem tudjuk, melyikőnket, és 
így a legritkább esetben nyeccsenünk meg. De miért körözöl folyton? (53) 
 
‘Voon,’ said the mattress. (45) 
– Fúú – jegyezte meg a matrac. (53) 
 
‘Consider it made, my dear friend,’ flurbled the mattress, ‘consider it 
made.’ (45) 
– Vedd úgy, hogy már bebizonyítottad, kedves barátom – gurgulázott a 
matrac. (53) 
 
The mattress could feel deep in his innermost spring pockets that the 
robot dearly wished to be asked how long he had been trudging in this futile 
and fruitless manner, and with another quiet flurble he did so. (46) 
A matrac rugói legmélyén érezte, hogy jólesne a robotnak, ha meg-
kérdezné, mióta vánszorog ilyen hiábavalóan és eredménytelenül, s ezt egy 
újabb gurgulázás kíséretében meg is tette. (54) 
 
The mattress was much impressed by this and realized that it was in the 
presence of a not unremarkable mind. It willomied along its entire length, 
sending excited little ripples through its shallow algae-covered pool. (46) 
A matrac le volt nyűgözve, és rádöbbent, hogy nem akármilyen lángész 
társaságában van. Egész hosszában végigremegett, izgalmas kis fodrokat 
keltve ezzel sekély, algás tavacskájában. (54) 
 
On the Translation of Neologisms 33 
It gupped. (46) 
Felcuppant: (54) 
 
Excitement gripped the mattress. It had never heard of speeches being 
delivered on Squornshellous Zeta, and certainly not by celebrities. Water 
spattered off it as a thrill glurried across its back. (46) 
A matracot elfogta az izgalom. Sohasem hallott még beszédeket a 
Squornshellus Zétán, pláne nem hírességek szájából. Fröcskölt a víz, ahogy 
háta végigborzongott. (55) 
 
Summoning every bit of its strength, it reared its oblong body, heaved it 
up into the air and held it quivering there for a few seconds whilst it peered 
through the mist over the reeds at the part of the marsh which Marvin had 
indicated, observing, without disappointment, that it was exactly the same as 
every other part of the marsh. The effort was too much, and it flodged back 
into its pool, deluging Marvin with smelly mud, moss and weeds. (47) 
Minden erejét beleadva felemelte téglalap alakú testét, felszökkent a 
levegőbe, és néhány percig lebegett, amíg a ködön és a nádason túli lápot 
szemlélte, és csalódottság nélkül megállapította, hogy ugyanúgy fest, mint a 
láp bármely más része. Aztán kimerülten visszatoccsant a mocsárba, tetőtől 
talpig beborítva Marvint büdös latyakkal, moszattal és gizgazzal… (55) 
 
‘There was a bridge built across the marshes. A cyberstructured 
hyperbridge, hundreds of miles in length, to carry ion-buggies and 
freighters over the swamp.’ (47) 
– A láp fölé egy hidat építettek. Egy kiberszerkezetű, több száz mérföld 
hosszú hiperhidat, hogy ionbricskák és tehervagonok közlekedhessenek 
rajta a mocsár fölött. (55) 
 
‘A bridge?’ quirruled the mattress. (47) 
– Hidat? – hüledezett a matrac. (55) 
 
The mattress flurred and glurried. It flolloped, gupped and 
willomied, doing this last in a particularly floopy way. (48) 
A matrac csöpött és nyeccsent egyet. Zsuppogott, cuppant és micson-
gott, ez utóbbit meglehetősen csullogva tette. (56) 
 
‘Voon,’ it wurfed at last. ‘And it was a magnificent occasion?’ (48) 
– Ufff – mondta végül. Emlékezetes esemény volt? (56) 
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Suddenly, a moment later, the robots were back again for another 
violent incident, and this time when they left, the mattress was alone in the 
swamp. He flolloped around in astonishment and alarm. He almost lurgled 
in fear. He reared himself to see over the reeds, but there was nothing to see, 
just more reeds. He listened, but there was no sound on the wind beyond the 
now familiar sound of half-crazed etymologists calling distantly to each 
other across the sullen mire. (48) 
Egy pillanat múlva a robotok hirtelen újból megjelentek, s mikor távoz-
tak, a matrac egyedül maradt a mocsárban. Döbbenten és riadtan zsuppo-
gott, és valósággal szörcsögött a félelemtől. Kinyújtózott, hogy a nádason 
túlra nézzen, de ott semmi látnivaló nem volt: se robot, se csillogó híd, se 
űrhajó, csak nád nád hátán. Fülelt egy kicsit, de a szél csak a már ismert 
hangokat sodorta tova: félőrült nyelvészek kiáltoztak egymásnak a komor 
sártengeren át. (57) 
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Winning with Words 
An Argumentative and Rhetoric Approach to 
Persuasion in Mass Communication 
Petra Aczél 
As Ernie Kovacs put it, “television is undoubtedly a medium, as it is not rare 
but not yet well done, either” (Briggs and Burke 2004: 235). Mass media and 
communication is of this species, something not rare but not yet well done. 
The consumer has to chew, digest the message and then feel relaxed, 
fulfilled and renewed, that is: perceive, understand, accept and finally – 
following the traces – move into the direction of the hinted and suggested 
opinion and behaviour. 
According to H. Lasswell and Charles Wright, functions of mass 
communication are surveillance, correlation, cultural transmission, 
entertainment and mobilization. Among the tasks of mass media and the 
phenomena attached to it we should list the following ones: 
 
• It is an arena, a virtual place where things happen. We may wonder 
whether things could happen outside this place, or this place is the 
reason for, stimulus for why things, events really occur. 
• It is the creator, founder, and adjuster of norms, definitions and 
images of reality, values, virtues and desires. 
• It is the source of meanings for the publicity. 
• It is the owner of public speech. 
• It is the area of social life and significant issues. 
• It is the very source of social and personal power, a device of 
persuasion and manipulation, the mover of mind and soul. 
 
Moving the soul and mind, creating an atmosphere where the ‘meeting of 
minds’ (Perelman 1982: 11) is successfully (virtually) done, is the topic of 
persuasion. 
Persuasion is originally a notion of rational argumentation and 
emotional style. It is the effect of logos, ethos and pathos: that of the ratio, 
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the character of the speaker and the aesthetics of style. Persuasion is an 
intention of the transmitting to produce a common spirit and mind in the 
audience. It is a detected fact of social psychology and it is to be defined as 
the restructuring of mind with rational and emotional elements. It is 
significant to point at the word ‘restructuring’ for it is not the news that 
moves the audience to feel a common whole, persuasion offers a new order, 
a new structure of information and thus orients but is not newsworthy. 
The third core notion of ours now is the text: a functional unit into 
which the persuasive effect was coded; the process made up of logical, 
ethical and pathetical elements. 
All these notions above, mass communication, persuasion and text, can 
be rooted back to the classical science of rhetoric. The science that has been 
handled narrowly in Hungarian linguistics for decades has enabled the 
offering of theory and method to generate and code persuasion into texts in 
order to gain power, and to move the souls and minds of the public. 
According to this, the three facets of rhetoric are text as the corpus, 
persuasion as function and effect and mass communication as its appearance. 
How is persuasive strength encoded into the text, and how is it 
performed acceptably through media appearance? Persuasion is built up by 
the classical structure and order of the text. We are usually taught to view 
texts as forms of differentiated contents, to see parts of texts forming and 
reforming the same global and linear meaning. Nevertheless, texts as 
functional units, even pieces of news, are structured upon intention offering 
a pre-context and a post-context to our understanding. In the case of news, 
“news organising”, “news structure”, “order of importance” devices, can be 
mentioned (Antal, Gazsó and Kubínyi 2005). 
Classical text organisation as a scheme, agenda was established in the 
classic Greek and made definite in the Roman silver age and no other 
structure has proved to be more effective since then. The structure is made 
up of seven parts, resolving the archetypical frame of introduction–
discussion–ending into a more detailed form. The first three parts 
(printipium, narratio, digressio) serve as motivation, the second three parts 
(propositio, argumentatio, refutatio) function as presentation and the final 
passage (peroration) is there to end up with the suggestion of application to 
the receiver. 
Persuasion research has long focused on the paradigm of attitude 
change. According to the models of these theories, attitude consists of beliefs 
about the attitude objects, each belief having some associated evaluation 
representing the perceived desirability of the attribute. The strategy to 
change one’s attitude has to take several important elements of the 
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circumstances, the context, the receiver’s self esteem, the sender’s 
authenticity and, naturally, the message, the text itself into account. 
The text, however, has a significant role in the process of attitude 
change. It is the element that activates all elements in order to sum them up 
to move into the desired direction, the targeted attitude object. The message 
itself is built up to stimulate and reflect the stages of attitude change. 
Perception is changed by the very beginning and the short narration of a text 
(1); affiliation is modified by the digression, the telling of a personal 
narrative, a story (2); opinion is altered by argumentation and the logical 
forms of premises in it (3); and, finally, action is changed through the 
elevated end of a well structured text (4). 
Numerous other theories (voluntary action, persuasion theories, variable 
oriented research) were born and are existent beside and together with the 
research of attitude change. Petty and Cacioppo’s ELM (elaboration 
likelihood model) is a model of dual process in persuasion. One route to 
persuasion depends upon issue-relevant thinking, the degree of elaboration; 
thus on the sequence of arguments. The other is called peripheral route being 
dependant upon the communicator’s credibility, likeability and the others’ 
reaction to the same message. The former, central route is identified by the 
structure of argumentation, the core of the rhetorical text. 
Argumentation or confirmation provides texts with a message of 
strength. We may argue with examples, signs and arguments in the narrow 
sense. When defining the latter, we all may face the difficulty to say what an 
argument really is and what the differentia specificas are. To put it simply, 
an argument is the strong statement of a text. In different genres of mass 
communication information is presented in a frame and it inevitably 
orientates at the same time. Facts and data as cores of information are 
presented as parts of reality, their credibility is gained not from what they 
really are, but from the pragmatic context of presentation. Therefore the 
‘fact’ of the persuasive text is the argument. An argument can be a verbal 
unit, either a sentence, utterance, or a coherent sequence of them which does 
not need any further verification.  
On what basis are arguments built? Aristotle stated that statements of 
common truth (gnome), signs necessarily pointing at a certain meaning 
(tekmerion), probabilities (eikon) and allusions (semeion) can be basic units 
of arguments and argument structures. These elements resemble certain 
phenomena in mass communication such as stereotype reduction and 
heuristics.  
Where does the argument, the verified statement gain its truth from? 
Some theories emerged endeavouring to give a relevant answer to this 
question. 
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• The fundationalist approach presumes that in each verified 
argument there is an aggregation of primary statements that serves 
as the basis of the argument built upon it. These primary statements 
are axiomatic, acquired from experience. The founding statements 
assign a tautological point over which no explanation can reach: 
“Just because”. These are the foundational claims. In mass media we 
often here commercial slogans of this foundational type, which seem 
to be sensible but turn out to be tautological: “Because you deserve 
it”, “Very-very”, “Just because” (Alston, 1993). 
• The theory of verification introduces the practice of argument 
validation that is based upon the structure of the argument itself. An 
argument is confirmed when it does not contradict anything assumed 
and is known to be true and it is faultless structurally, too (Brown, 
1998). 
• Instrumentalists reckon that a statement is true when it 
accomplishes the outlined aim attached to it, and it is false if it does 
not. The aim, the target of the statement has to be identified and has 
to be of sufficient value to validate and justify the attention directed 
towards the statement, the argument (Toulmin, 1953). Verifiers to 
support the argument can be explicit (citational, common 
knowledge, personal background, procedural and demonstrative 
verifiers), and implicit cues (sincerity, emphasis, credibility, 
accuracy, confirmation cues) (Adamik, Jászó and Aczél, 2004: 330–
332). 
• The approach of conventionalism supposes that valid statements are 
designated by commonly established features of proprieties, such as 
simplicity, elegance, reliability, clarity, and digression.  
• Social relativism and determinism, however, think that a statement 
is true as the operating element of society. 
 
According to fundationalists, the statement can be true in and about itself. 
Instrumentalists claim that an argument is true if it offers an effective 
instruction on how to act. Conventionalism, social relativism and 
determinism presume that there is a common background knowledge of 
society upon which a statement functions as a true argument (Anderson 
2005: 123–143). This latter approach brings us closer to the ancient theory of 
common places (topoi, common loci) that has functioned as basis to 
argument formation. Common places in this sense are branches of contents, 
meanings connected to either the person, the circumstances, or the reasons. 
Commonplaces are collections of shared knowledge, prejudice, and 
experience, from which statements can be formed into true arguments. 
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Commonly shared social knowledge that lets us understand jokes, and 
enables us to predict easily offers a basis to the truth of arguments, too. 
On the other hand, the truth of an argument can be the result of the 
placing of the statement in a logical form. Formal logic offers the structure 
of a syllogism with three premises, one functioning as conclusion. Any 
statement that turns out to be a concluding element of a causal verbal process 
can be thought to be true just because of its finalising role, or place. That is 
why enthymemes are so effective in persuasion. 
An enthymeme (en thumos = in the brain) is a truncated form, a 
syllogism. “Rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme which, generally 
speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs” (Aristotle 1355a). One 
premise is missing, so that the receiver, the audience has to work out the 
missing element. The hypothetic statement we the audience conclude and 
state is hidden in the logical form, it is implied. An enthymeme is a heuristic 
tool for both communicator and audience. When a renowned weekly 
magazine writes the following enthymeme about a man (formerly chairman 
of a bank) accused of misappropriation: “In Hungary, embezzlers of billions 
are sent and kept in prison. XY has not been treated like this,” we may think, 
and definitely not by accident, that XY has had no part in any embezzlement. 
The enthymeme always implies a premise, a statement that is to be thought 
and articulated by the receiver. It is outstandingly successful in persuasion 
and manipulation because implicit messages are often thought by the 
receiver as his or her own ideas and thus it flatters his/her vanity.  
Enthymemes are the very units of planned communication, campaigns 
and the whole of mass communication. The underlying, shared knowledge 
behind, form the enthymemes into rhetorical schemes in several cases. 
Acumen is a less known but often used “surface” form of argumentative 
speech. Contradictory harmony, harmonious contradiction: paradox and thus 
enjoyable: “Who should adopt the child? The parent who throws or the drag 
queen who grows?” says the headline of a news program. The underlying 
parallelism shows us how manipulation works through enjoyable verbal 
forms: it suggests that notions of parent and drag queen can be socially seen 
as equal roles and equal chances. In the spontaneous answer we may give to 
this acumen, we do fulfil the intention of the communicator, and validate the 
presuppositions of statement prior to the question made. 
The argument and its manipulating logical form, the enthymeme, can 
also work as devices to ‘switch on’ interest, inclination of understanding, 
and acceptance from the receiver’s side. Clyde Miller has identified four 
types of device: 
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• Virtue device – with which words of originally positive meanings 
are attached to the image (person, product, notion) to be built up: 
democracy, justice, beauty, etc.: “Life is Good” (Suzuki ad), “The 
Colour of Justice” (campaign of the Hungarian Socialist Party). 
• Poison device – when words with negative meanings join the mass 
media product: catastrophe, war, murder. “Make love not war.” 
(Anti-war slogan), “Stealing is sin. Illegal copying of a DVD is 
stealing. Do not steal” (home DVD propaganda). 
• Testimonial device – when the text refers to an authentic source of 
truth. Commercials and newspaper articles use this device very 
often: a reputed sportsman stands for a new vitamin pill, or a famous 
scientist protests against a social issue, a reality show participant 
takes part in a political campaign (‘everyday life politics’). 
According to Lionel Bellenger, the sender’s authority is laid upon 
the receiver to make the message alluring and desirable. 
• Together device – to show we are not alone in thinking or doing 
something (see argumentum ad populum): “Strength is in oneness” 
(political slogan), “Further together in coming and going” 
(commercial of a bank), “Our car” (Suzuki commercial). 
 
Persuasive text develops personal motivation, as it: 
 
• arouses goodwill and attention. Classical rhetorical introduction has 
three traditional functions at the beginning of a text: captatio 
benevolentiae (the capturing of goodwill), attentio (to raise 
attention) and docilitas (the promise of the topic). As we may see, 
this part of the text serves as arousal of personal motivation. 
• offers opportunity to personal identification. Digression is there in 
the structure (third part of speech – given to the structure by 
Quintilian) to help emotional identification with the speaker through 
a personal story loosely attached to the topic of speech. 
• brings forward advantages or disadvantages and excludes or 
includes opinions. Argumentation as part of the text proves by 
demonstration of advantage and disadvantage. However, as Hugh 
Rank’s model suggests, the persuader either intensifies his/her own 
strong arguments, the advantages, by intensifying the weak points, 
i.e. the disadvantages of the adverse party; or downplays his/her own 
weak arguments, the disadvantages of the standpoint, and downplays 
the strong elements, the advantages of the adverse standpoint. 
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• proves that the offered object (subject or topic) is applicable in one’s 
life. The ending part, the peroration of the rhetorical text functions 
this way. The elevated style, the aesthetically figured exclamations 
and the interrogations force the audience to apply the instructions of 
the speaker, writer. 
 
In shaping up personal motivation, repetition of the message, dramatizing, 
and the introduction of the case as a public and common issue play important 
roles. Pragmatic figures of speech and commonplaces provide this arousal 
textually. 
Media and mass communication is ready to offer solutions to the 
audience members and is successful in persuasion if: 
 
• the receiver does not have time to think, 
• a huge amount of information flows onto him/her, which is 
impossible to process, 
• the issue is not treated as significant by the receiver, 
• he/she is not well informed. 
 
Mass communication theories have attempted to describe the effect of media 
on the audience, or society. Following the traces of agenda setting, framing 
and priming could model the reasons for the success of mass media in 
persuasion when the above conditions exist (and at least some of them 
usually do exist). Much attention in the research of agenda-setting has 
focused on the concept of priming. Priming is a cognitive psychological 
concept which refers to the enhancing effects of media by offering the 
audience a prior context. It is a concept that will be used to interpret 
subsequent messages of communication. It offers a frame of reference; and 
priming, as a phenomenon of mass communication, tells the audience what 
is good or bad, what an authentic personality or a news program is like. 
Priming is definitely based upon two rhetoric text features. One is order 
(deduction or induction, natural or artificial), the other is common 
knowledge as the source of truth and level of acceptance. As agenda setting 
theorists had formerly stated, the press and the media do not reflect reality; 
they filter and shape it. The theory of priming drew our attention to the 
shaping of reality by virtues and values. This also refers to the characteristic 
of the persuasive text; it never depicts the real but belongs to what is 
probable (doxa). 
Framing is defined as a quality of communication that leads others to 
accept one meaning over another. The frame in which something is 
presented to the audience is chosen also by journalists. The created context, 
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the frame, organizes and structures social meaning. It affects and influences 
perception: the way we see, hear or experience events and patterns of 
behaviour. Framing places events within a field of meaning and thus narrates 
reality in an intentional way. Stories are frames. To explain the concept of 
framing, Fairhurst and Sarr give a comparison to the craft of the 
photographer: “consider how gifted photographers show us their view of the 
world through their photographs. They capture a viewpoint for others to 
understand and appreciate. They focus their cameras and frame their subjects 
so that by seeing their photographs, others can know what each photographer 
intended” (1996: 3). From a semiotic perspective, framing is indexical to the 
content and to the perception of the receiver of the message. 
Narration in the classical rhetorical text is of this function; it mixes real 
facts with fictitious motives, highlights certain elements while downplaying 
others in order to create a frame of perception or understanding. According 
to Fairhurst and Sarr, framing has three elements to consider: language, 
thought and forethought. To act somehow (even spontaneously) needs 
forethought, language helps to remember information and acts, it is a 
symbolic tool to transform how we view situations and thought is necessary 
to use language. 
To frame situations we shall use the following verbal means: 
• Metaphor. “Language is vitally metaphoric,” as Shelley had put it, 
and we may add that the procedures of human cognition and 
recognition are originally metaphoric, too. A. Danto compared the 
metaphor, the unique trope of immutation, to enthymeme. As the 
tertium comparationis, the field of comparison is implied in the 
metaphor, and it is we who find out why two things, notions, 
emotions events could be moulded, and on what basis, it is also we 
who conclude the deliberately missing premise of the truncated 
syllogism. Metaphor in cognition is analogous with enthymeme in 
dialectic thinking and both frame a new idea by logical or cognitive 
comparison. 
• Stories (anecdotes, myths and legends). When using a personal 
story, or a vivid anecdote, we fix certain elements in the audience’s 
mind, as narratives offer memorable structures and thus persuade. 
• Slogans. The gaelic ‘sluagh-ghairm’, cry for battle has become the 
instant form of messages in the modern ages. Slogans using 
alliteration, ambiguity, pun, rhyme and rythm imprint their contents, 
meanings into our memory and mind. Similarly to instant coffee that 
dissolves in hot water these short sentences, texts dissolve in our 
brains. They wrap up a feeling, and we are to receive it as a gift. It is 
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not understanding but remembering and repeating that keep slogans 
alive. 
• Contrast. To describe something in terms of what it is not is an old 
and well-known method of definition. It is also a technique on a 
slippery slope and of irrelevant syllogisms. “If you do not want to 
earn more and do not want to live a happier life, do not click to visit 
our website,” says an internet banner and we get a more forceful 
message frame to click than in the case of a positive, direct 
hypothetic syllogism (see peripheral route of persuasion). However, 
contrasts using negative premises are usually not relevant logically 
but persuasive rhetorically. 
Fairhurst and Sarr also enlist non-verbal possibilities of framing, such as 
traditions, rituals, ceremonies and artefacts. 
In his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), George Campbell defined rhetoric 
as “art or talent by which discourse is adapted to its end. The four ends of 
discourse are to enlighten the understanding, please the imagination, move 
the passion, and influence the will” (I.1., xii). Persuasive functions of text in 
mass communication highlight the usefulness of rhetorical methods and 
elements and turn our attention to the classical discipline that enables us 
make any medium well-done. 
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The Formation of Roman Catholic 
(Arch)Dioceses in Medieval England and 
Hungary  
Endre Abkarovits 
Cathedrals and parish churches surviving from the Middle Ages are among 
the greatest achievements of architecture attracting a lot of tourists today, but 
not many visitors are aware of their origin, rank, and function. When 
studying English arts most students show a lack of knowledge of 
fundamental ecclesiastical terms, historical background and art terminology 
not only in connection with England, but, in my experience, with their native 
country as well. Though the structure of the Church was basically similar in 
the two countries, there were fundamental differences in the size and number 
of (arch)dioceses and parishes. In this paper I will concentrate mainly on the 
territorial formation of the hierarchy of the Roman (Latin) Church in the 
eleventh century, which was a decisive period in both England and Hungary, 
and will conclude with a short description of the present situation.  
1 Why Should We Teach about the Hierarchy of the Church? 
In the Middle Ages the dominant religion was Roman Catholicism in both 
England and Hungary. During the Reformation various Protestant 
denominations won many converts in both countries. In England the kind of 
Protestantism represented by the Anglican Church (the Church of England) 
became the state religion, but Roman Catholicism has also survived until the 
present day. In Hungary, although some Protestant churches (Calvinist, 
Lutheran, Unitarian) were and are important, the Roman Catholic Church 
has remained dominant until the present day. In both countries the new 
denominations took over many buildings of the Roman Catholic Church and 
transformed them according to their liturgy and taste. Medieval Roman 
Catholic churches were richly decorated as they served as ‘the poor people’s 
bible’, most of whom were illiterate, and the frescoes, painted altarpieces, 
sculptures helped them to understand the stories in the Bible. Protestantism 
was against such rich decoration, and Protestants whitewashed or destroyed 
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the earlier frescoes, dismantled the Medieval winged altars, and also 
destroyed many sculptures. We should make it clear, however, that in 
England the destruction of many churches was not only the result of 
Protestant zeal, but many of them were damaged during the Civil War, or 
fell prey to neglect in later centuries. Today you cannot find a single 
Medieval winged altar in an English cathedral, and there are only a few 
fragments of frescoes, which have survived under the whitewashed surface. 
In the territory of historical Hungary archaeologists are still uncovering 
frescoes from their Medieval Pre-Reformation period in Protestant churches. 
Unlike England many Medieval altarpieces have survived in those parts of 
historical Hungary that were not occupied by the Turks. In some churches 
there are more than ten winged altars, e.g. in Bártfa – Bardejov, Lőcse – 
Levoča in Upper Hungary, today’s Slovakia. In contrast, if you enter one of 
the famous Medieval English cathedrals today, you will find blank walls, no 
Medieval panel paintings and relatively few sculptures. Most tourists do not 
realize that these great achievements of architecture did not look so austere 
in their heyday; they used to be Roman Catholic churches and were richly 
decorated. This is one of the reasons why we have to make our students 
realize that these churches have undergone dramatic changes since the 
Middle Ages. 
Another experience that lead me to teach about Medieval church 
architecture and the hierarchy of the church was that I came to realize that 
when I took groups of students to England, they were not familiar with 
elementary art historical concepts and they also lacked the basic vocabulary 
both in English and in their native tongue in the field of church architecture. 
They often failed to understand the guide or missed the best parts of the 
cathedrals if they visited them on their own. Words like ‘temple’, 
‘cathedral’, ‘basilica’, etc. can also cause problems for Hungarian students of 
English because of language interference. ‘Temple’ is often used incorrectly 
as Hungarian ‘templom’ means a Christian church, while in English it is 
used to refer only to pagan buildings. ‘Basilica’ denoted originally a secular 
building in ancient Rome. This building type was taken over by Christian 
architecture. In architectural sense it denotes a church that has a higher and 
wider central vessel (the ‘nave’) and two or four lower and narrower side 
vessels (the ‘aisles’). But a church that has this architectural arrangement 
does not usually have the rank of a ‘basilica’. In Christianity this term was 
originally applied to only the seven most important churches of Rome. Later 
the Pope had the right to give this title to exceptionally important churches 
anywhere. Officially they are the ‘basilica minor’ type. Consequently, using 
the word ‘basilica’ for a church is not a matter of size. We have a similar 
problem with ‘cathedral’. When I ask my students to give examples of 
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English cathedrals, they often give Westminster Abbey in the first place, but, 
however important a church it is, it has not been a cathedral (except between 
1540 and 1550). Students often suppose that any church that is big and 
important could be a cathedral. But again having the rank of a cathedral is 
not a matter of size or importance, but of its status in the hierarchy of the 
Church. To take the example of my own town, Eger cathedral, which was 
first built on the fortress hill and later on today’s site, has been the centre of 
the Eger diocese at least since 1009. It was a bishop’s church for many 
centuries, and was elevated to archbishopric only in 1804, but the church 
was given the title basilica only in 1970. 
When I try to find out about language interference in connection with 
‘cathedral’, and ask what they mean by ‘katedra’ in Hungarian, e.g. when the 
teacher asks a schoolchild to go to the ‘katedra’, it turns out that some 
students have the raised platform in mind, others think of the desk of the 
teacher, and only a few of the chair. But actually the word refers to the chair, 
and the chair in the case of a church is that of the bishop or archbishop. The 
presence of the Hungarian word szék in székesegyház or Szentszék is also 
puzzling for students, and they often do not know what the latter means, or 
that its English equivalent Holy See is, see meaning diocese, as the pope is 
also the bishop of Rome. Thus, only churches where a(n arch)bishop has his 
chair (or rather throne) can be called cathedrals, these churches are 
practically the seats of the district of the (arch)bishop, consequently they are 
normally important and huge buildings. These districts of the bishops are 
dioceses, the bigger units of the territory of the Church, which are divided 
into smaller units, called parishes. In the Middle Ages cathedrals were 
typically products of towns and many of them were big enough to house the 
population of a whole town, but as the towns grew, they had to be divided 
into districts with their own church, the parish church. 
It would be difficult to speak about English art history, and within that 
the history of English architecture without clarifying such basic concepts. 
Besides this it is also interesting to compare the structure of the Roman 
Catholic Church in our countries because of the basic similarities: the 
dominant church was the Roman Catholic in both Medieval England and 
Hungary, and the size of the population was almost the same. Does it mean 
that the hierarchy was also the same as to the number of dioceses and 
archdioceses? This is what we are going to have a look at next. 
But before that we have to make it clear what we mean by the Middle 
Ages. It is widely accepted that this period lasted approximately from the fall 
of the Roman Empire to the discovery of America. In an even more 
simplified way we can roughly consider the millennium between 500 and 
1500 as the Middle Ages. The first half of this period is often described as 
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the Dark Ages, partly because of the constant wars and destructions during 
the Age of Migration, and partly because of our lack of knowledge about this 
age. It is, however, the second half of these thousand years, and within that 
especially the eleventh century that determined the future territorial and 
hierarchical system of the Catholic Church in both countries. In Hungary 
after the first efforts of converting Hungarians to Christianity in the tenth 
century, real change was brought about by the first Hungarian king, Saint 
Stephen, crowned at the beginning of the new millennium. In England, 
though Christianity has a longer history, however, the Norman Conquest of 
1066 was a watershed in this history, not only because the whole upper 
clergy was replaced by a new Norman priesthood, but also by the renewed 
building activity. No truly great church is known from the pre-Norman 
period. From the Conquest onwards, however, about one hundred cathedrals 
and thousands of parish churches have been built in England. The ruling art 
styles in England and Hungary in the period between 1000 and 1500 were 
Romanesque (called Norman in England) and Gothic, but the Renaissance 
also began to spread in the 1470s in Hungary, mainly in the royal court, 
while the Gothic style still flourished in the 16th century, especially in the 
more remote parts of the country. Renaissance arrived in England with 
considerable delay as the 15th century was the age of the War of Roses. 
2 The Establishment of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary 
The most widely accepted date of the settlement of Hungarians in the 
Carpathian Basin is 896. They were pagan at that time. Their conversion to 
Christianity began during the reign of Géza in 953 first by Greek 
missionaries in Transylvania, then by Western monks and priests from Sankt 
Gallen (founded by Celtic-Irish monks) and Passau in Western Hungary. 
Prince Géza himself was baptised in 972 or 973, but he was as much a pagan 
as a Christian during the rest of his life; he said he was rich and powerful 
enough to serve two gods. The first Benedictine monastery was also founded 
at the time of Géza in 997 in Pannonhalma, originally called St Martin’s 
Hill, the present name dating from the 19th century. It is still the most 
important monastery in Hungary (and has the status of a diocese), and was 
named after St Martin, because he was born in Roman Pannonia, in the town 
of Savaria (Szombathely). The construction of the monastery was completed 
by Géza’s son, Stephen, who became the first truly Christian king of 
Hungary. He was baptized by Adalbert, bishop of Prague, and married 
Gizella, who came from Bavaria with a retinue of Catholic priests and 
knights. She may have contributed to the foundation of the first bishopric in 
Veszprém. Stephen was crowned in 1000, or on 1st January 1001. He 
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realized that Hungarians could survive in their new homeland only if his 
country became a Christian state, and they adopted the existing political 
system of Western Europe. In the field of religion he had to choose between 
Roman and Byzantine Christianity, and he chose the former, while some 
other leaders like the vajda (voivod) of Transylvania adopted Greek 
Orthodoxy. It was also symbolic that he asked the pope and not the 
Byzantine emperor to send him a crown. The German emperor Otto III 
supported him in his efforts and Stephen must have used German forces in 
consolidating his power and establishing order. He established the 
archbishopric of Esztergom in 1001, which has remained the centre of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Hungary ever since. Just as the pope is the bishop 
of Rome, the archbishop of the diocese of Rome, and the primate of Italy, 
the archbishop of Esztergom has these ranks in his town, diocese and 
Hungary but, of course, unlike the pope, he has never been a patriarch. 
Though the political and religious centre of the country was in Esztergom, 
from 1018 Fehérvár (today’s Székesfehérvár) began to play a role which is 
similar to that of Westminster. The royal court began to reside here (just like 
the English one in Westminster), and though it was not the seat of an 
archbishop (similarly to Westminster Abbey), many Hungarian kings were 
crowned and buried at Székesfehérvár, and had their royal chapel and 
treasury (including crown jewels and relics) there for centuries until the 
Turks destroyed the place in the 16th century. It is a sad thing that in this 
way, unlike most European royal houses, the tombs of the majority of 
Medieval Hungarian kings have not survived, or cannot be identified as the 
skeletons of kings buried at Fehérvár were mixed up during various 
excavations with few exceptions, like Béla III, who was reburied in Buda’s 
Matthias Church. The remains of kings buried elsewhere had no better fate 
either. Though the royal residences were located in different towns during 
the rest of the Middle Ages (besides Esztergom and Fehérvár also in 
Visegrád and Buda), Fehérvár preserved its role as a sacral centre of 
Hungary, the population of which was around one million at the turn of the 
millennium. Stephen’s Fehérvár was meant to play a similar role that was 
played by Aachen at the time of Charles the Great. 
In the hierarchy of the Church the uppermost rank was held by the 
archbishop of Esztergom, who was primate of Hungary, though this latter 
title was mainly used after the Middle Ages. Saint Stephen founded ten 
bishoprics in Hungary: Esztergom, Eger, Kalocsa, Csanád, Várad, Erdély 
(Translvania), Pécs, Veszprém, Vác, and Győr. There are very few data 
about the foundation of the dioceses. Sometimes we may draw conclusions 
from the choice of the patron saint and from other circumstances. (See 
Appendix I) The exact date of foundation has survived only in two cases: 
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Pécs – 1009 and Csanád – 1030-31. Eger is likely to have been founded 
between 1001 and 1009. According to the latest research Vác was founded 
by King Peter Orseolo (1038-1041), and Bihar (later Várad) by András I 
(1046-1060). The archbishopric of Transylvania had no permanent seat in 
the initial period, but by the end of the 11th century Gyulafehérvár (today’s 
Alba Iulia) became its centre (Fedeles, 6). Some of the bishoprics 
(Veszprém, Győr, Esztergom) may, however, have existed before St 
Stephen’s coronation, and from among them he chose Esztergom as the 
future centre of the Hungarian Church. It became the first Hungarian 
archdiocese on the basis of the decision of the Synod of Ravenna in 1001. 
Kalocsa also became an archbishopric soon after, but the exact date is 
debated (1006, or 1009, even 1030) (Thoroczkay, 15). Esztergom and 
Kalocsa remained the two archdioceses in Hungary until the end of the 
Middle Ages, while further bishoprics became archbishoprics in later 
centuries: Eger – 1804, Veszprém – 1993. Veszprém was always strongly 
associated with the Hungarian queens. While the king was crowned by the 
archbishop of Esztergom, the queen by the bishop of Veszprém. Saint 
Stephen cared not only for the establishment of cathedrals and monasteries, 
but also of parishes. Every ten villages were obliged to build a church jointly 
and chapters were established not only in the centres of bishoprics 
(székeskáptalan), but also elsewhere (társaskáptalan). Fehérvár was the first 
of the latter. The members of the chapter were the canons; their head was the 
dean. With the growth of the number of parishes it became a practice that 
several neighbouring parishes joined into a bigger unit (esperesség).  
The new foundations were also given land, and the peasants had to give 
one tenth of their harvest (a tithe) to the Church. Monasteries were founded 
either by the king – Stephen also founded several other Benedictine 
monasteries at Zalavár, Bakonybél, Pécsvárad, Zobor – or by clans. The 
latter kind was not approved by the Holy See, but remained practice in 
Hungary until the twelfth century. Monks and nuns lived their way of life 
according to certain regulations, often their own. The head of a monastery 
was usually an abbot. One of the best-known monasteries, Tihany Abbey 
was founded by András I in 1055, and the original foundation document still 
survives and contains the first written text in Hungarian. 
The first king of Hungary, Stephen was canonized in 1083 at the 
initiative of King Ladislaus I (who was also canonized in 1192). Stephen I 
was the first ruler in the world who became a saint of the Roman Catholic 
Church. He was also canonized by the Orthodox Church in 2000, in this way 
Saint Stephen is respected uniquely in both parts of the Christian world. 
Another interesting fact is that perhaps no other royal family has given so 
many saints to the Catholic Church as the Árpád Dynasty (1000-1301).  
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The eleventh century was the time of the schism of the Church between 
the Greek Orthodox East and the Latin West. The Eastern and Southern 
borders of historical Hungary became the divide between the two great 
branches of Christianity - this divide line still exists. Transylvania, which 
had been rather under Greek influence in the tenth century, became part of 
the Latin West in the eleventh, though in later centuries Greek Orthodoxy 
played an important role in the communities of Romanians and Serbs. 
The eleventh century, which was as decisive in Hungarian as in English 
history, was also the age when the Church attempted to reform itself in 
whole Europe. Until then priests, even bishops, had been allowed to get 
married. From the end of the eleventh century several synods declared that 
priests should live in celibacy. It was also the age of struggle about 
investiture between kings and popes. Just like in England, in Hungary kings 
did not always ask for permission from the pope when appointing new 
bishops or other leaders of the clergy. However, it seems, popes were often 
more tolerant in the case of Hungary. The agreement of the pope was rather 
formal, the real choice was in the Hungarian king’s hands. Archbishops and 
bishops were real political factors; they also had secular power, they had 
lands, castles, and vassals. It was important for the king that they should be 
loyal to him through getting their power from him and becoming his vassal 
in this way.  
At times of struggle for royal succession potential kings often turned to 
Byzantium for support. In one case Géza I got a crown from the Byzantine 
emperor in 1074, the acceptance of which normally meant the status of a 
vassal to the emperor, but he managed to avoid becoming a vassal. This 
Greek crown was combined with a Latin part at the end of the twelfth 
century according to the most widely accepted theory, and they formed 
together the crown of later Hungarian kings until the 20th century. 
Ladislaus I (Saint Ladislaus) had the cathedrals of Várad (Oradea) and 
Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) built. When Hungary annexed further territories 
at the end of the eleventh century, Croatia became a new diocese with 
Zagreb under Ladislaus I. Nyitra in Upper Hungary (today’s Slovakia) also 
became the seat of a new bishopric created in a region of the former 
Esztergom diocese at the beginning of the twelfth century. In the following 
centuries further bishoprics were created in territories held by Hungarian 
kings for shorter or longer periods. 
3 The Roman Catholic Church in Medieval Britain 
Christianity arrived in Roman Britannia in the third century and became 
more wide-spread in the fourth century, but only in that part of the British 
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Isles that was occupied by the Romans, i.e. the one practically corresponding 
to the territory of modern England. At the synod of Arles in 314 the bishops 
of York, Lincoln, and London attended, testifying to the existence of a 
church hierarchy at this time. However, when the Romans had to withdraw 
from Britain at the beginning of the fifth century, this development was 
broken, and the country was soon invaded by pagan Anglo-Saxons. In this 
respect, the history of the Christian faith on the soil of later Hungary was 
similar. Christianity was also present here in the Romanized Western part of 
later Hungary, called Pannonia, to which, among other things, the Early-
Christian tombs in Pécs testify, which are a World Heritage Site today. As 
the Romans withdrew from Pannonia, waves of various pagan peoples 
arrived here as well. The difference between Britannia and Pannonia was 
that in the former Christianity did not stop being practised completely, but 
was driven into the Western parts of the Isles (Cornwall, Wales), and to 
Continental Britannia minor (Bretagne).  
Ireland and Scotland were never invaded by the Romans. Christianity 
began to spread there in the fourth and fifth centuries through missionaries 
from Britannia and Gallia. But these missionaries were not very successful, 
and the real conversion of the Irish is rather due to the activity of St Patrick, 
who may have been born in Scotland around 389, then spent much of his 
youth as a slave in Ireland, and became a monk later in Gallia. In the end he 
was authorized by the pope in Rome to convert the Irish. He must have 
arrived in Ireland for this purpose around 432, where he managed to convert 
almost the whole country with the help of his disciples. The centre of his 
activity was Armagh, which became later an archbishopric. He not only 
converted the Irish, but also founded bishoprics and monasteries. Arts and 
sciences began to flourish in these institutions.  
The organisation of the Celtic Church in Ireland and elsewhere in the 
British Isles was special as there were practically no towns in Ireland. By the 
sixth century the centres of church and spiritual life were monastic 
communities and bishops were just members of these monastic communities, 
subordinated to the abbot. The veneration of the Scripture is shown by the 
great number of richly decorated holy books in Irish-Celtic monasteries in 
Ireland and Northern Great Britain; the most famous ones being The Book of 
Kells, The Book of Durrow, and The Lindisfarne Gospels. The spirit of the 
Old Testament greatly influenced moral life and public confessions were 
substituted by private ones. This practice was spread throughout Western 
Europe by Irish missionaries who founded many monasteries in Gallia, 
Germania, and Italia.  
The conversion of the pagan Anglo-Saxons began from two directions 
in the sixth century. Pope Gregory the Great (Gregory I) sent Augustine to 
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the Southern part of Britain, who arrived at the estuary of the Thames in 597. 
In 601 he managed to convert Aethelbert, King of Kent, whose wife, being 
the daughter of the Frankish king, had already been baptized. This was 
followed by the baptism of the whole population of Kent. In the meantime 
Augustine had been ordained a bishop in Arles and in 601 the king endowed 
him with Canterbury, which became the seat of his Church. Augustine began 
to organize the hierarchy of the church from Canterbury founding one more 
bishopric in Kent: Rochester. Kent was followed by Essex, where the centre 
of the diocese became St Paul’s Cathedral in the Roman forum of London. 
Other parts of England were converted only after Saint Augustine’s death. 
Another outstanding archbishop of Canterbury in the early period was the 
Greek Theodoros between 669 and 690. He established six new dioceses, so 
there were 16 of them on his death. Though the Church in England had very 
strong relations with Rome, it was after all a national church, over which the 
king had considerable influence.  
While the missionaries of Rome started the conversion of the Anglo-
Saxons from the South, the Irish-Celtic Church worked from the North. 
Columba founded a monastery on the island of Iona in 563, from where he 
began to convert the Picts of Scotland. Irish priests were monks, even the 
bishops lived in monasteries. As they lived a simpler way of life, Irish 
bishops were more readily accepted by ordinary people than the bishops of 
the South, who lived in royal courts. In the end the Roman and Celtic 
Churches had to agree about whose organisational forms and doctrines 
would prevail in England. ‘Agreement’ was reached at the Synod of Whitby 
in 663 in favour of the Roman Church and Rome extended its authority over 
all Christians in Britain. 
The state of the English Church before the Norman Conquest is often 
described as inferior to the Church in Normandy; corruption and the 
ignorance of the lower clergy are mentioned as typical features. Edward the 
Confessor was, however, canonized and he had the same power in England 
as William in Normandy. He appointed bishops and abbots, and he had 
Westminster Abbey built. After the Norman invasion William reorganized 
the Church in England. Similarly to the way he appointed the archbishop of 
Rouen, the six bishops of Normandy and heads of the monasteries in his 
homeland from among his friends and relatives, he replaced almost the 
whole Saxon upper clergy with his own people. Lafranc, archbishop of 
Canterbury, who had come from Italy and studied Bede’s history of the 
Church in England, was his faithful ally. He considered himself the primate 
of England, although the archbishops of York had never given up a similar 
aspiration. With the help of forged documents Lafranc managed to prove his 
claim to supervising most of the fifteen bishoprics of England and left only 
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Durham to York. Soon, with the exception of Worcester, Norman (or other 
foreign) bishops were appointed everywhere. He also moved the centres of 
several sees that had been in rural areas to urban ones. The abbots of the 35 
Benedictine monasteries which existed in England in 1066 were also 
replaced with reliable Normans. William expected all bishops and abbots of 
England and Normandy to provide armed and mounted knights for his 
service.  
Gregorian (Gregory VII’s) reforms reached Ireland at the beginning of 
the twelfth century. Until then monastic settlements, rather than dioceses, 
had characterised the organisational structure of the Irish Church. The Synod 
of Cashel in 1101 forbade divorce, clerical marriage, and lay abbots among 
other things. The two ecclesiastical provinces of Armagh and Cashel were 
established on that occasion, and in 1152 Tuam and Dublin were also 
elevated to archbishoprics. Diocesan boundaries often coincided with former 
territorial boundaries of Irish dynasties (clans). 
The right of appointing bishops belonged to the king in England until 
the twelfth century, just like in Hungary. In 1107 the king had to give up this 
right, but the upper clergy had to vow loyalty to the king. There were efforts 
in later centuries from time to time to get back this right, but when for 
example King John Lackland refused the candidate of the pope in 1213, his 
country was punished by interdictum, and the king had to give in finally. 
Britain also had less dioceses and, as a result, less cathedrals than some 
other countries; for example, Italy had 275, while England had ‘only’ 100 
during its whole history, seventeen built before the Reformation. Even so 
their quantity outnumbers that of Hungarian dioceses and cathedrals. Still, it 
is said, the English favoured fewer, but large dioceses, which resulted in the 
splendour of their cathedrals, while many such buildings were architecturally 
unimportant in France or Italy. While on the Continent monasteries and 
cathedrals represented different kinds of institutions in the Church, in 
England several cathedrals were also monasteries at the same time, with the 
bishop also serving as the abbot of the monastery and a prior being the 
effective head of the monastery (cathedral priory). In some cases, though the 
cathedral complex never housed monks, even though they may show 
architectural elements that are otherwise typical of monasteries (e.g. the 
beautiful cloisters of Salisbury); they were rather built for show. Out of the 
seventeen Medieval cathedrals eight were monastic (Winchester, Worcester, 
Canterbury, Rochester, Durham, Norwich, Ely, and Bath which replaced 
Wells). The other cathedrals were served either by Canons Regular (Carlisle) 
or Secular Canons (London, York, Lichfield, Hereford, Lincoln, Chichester, 
Sarum – Salisbury.) London, York, Lichfield, Hereford, Exeter, Wells were 
Saxon foundations, Lincoln, Chichester, Sarum were those of William I. 
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Henry VIII added six more sees in the 1540s, but then no more new dioceses 
were established between 1546 and 1836. This shows again how lasting the 
arrangements of the eleventh century proved to be. 
4 Developments in Hungary since the Middle Ages in the Field of the 
Territorial Organization of the Roman Catholic Church 
The central part of historical Hungary was occupied by the Turks for 150 
years from the mid 16th century. Some of the areas in the South that had been 
most densely populated before the Turkish invasion were left now without 
population. It is estimated that the population was reduced to three millions 
at that time. When the Turks were driven out of the country at the end of the 
17th century, the Austrian ruler invited new foreign settlers to the country. In 
this way the ethnic and religious composition of the country was changed 
dramatically in these two centuries.  
During the Turkish occupation some of the church centres could not 
function at all, or they had to move provisionally to regions not occupied by 
the Turks. Eger could be a typical example of what hardships the Church had 
to go through at that time. As Eger was occupied by the Turks during a 
second siege in 1596, the bishop had to move to Upper Hungary, to other 
places of the Eger diocese. First it moved to Kassa (Košice), but that part of 
Northern Hungary was already dominated by Protestantism. As all churches 
were in the hands of the Protestants in Kassa, they managed to occupy the 
cathedral only with military force in 1604, but in 1606 Prince Bocskai took it 
back from the Catholics. Then the bishop had to move to other towns of 
Upper Hungary, namely to Nagyszombat (Trnava) and Jászó (Jasov). It was 
only in 1671 that Emperor Leopold I ordered that the Bishop and the Chapter 
of Eger should win back Kassa cathedral. They could return to Eger only at 
the end of the 17th century after Hungary was liberated from the Turks 
(Vaško ed., 14–15). 
Another dramatic change occured in the twentieth century. Hungary 
was reduced to less than one third of its former territory by the Treaty of 
Trianon, which strongly influenced the territories of the former dioceses as 
well. The territorial loss has been further increased through the creation of 
new dioceses in recent years. The Eger diocese, for example, comprised one 
seventh of the territory of Hungary in the 11th century, and was almost as big 
as today’s Hungary. It preserved its size until the nineteenth century, when it 
became an archdiocese in 1804 with the subordinated new dioceses of 
Rozsnyó (Rožnava), Kassa (Košice), Szepes (Spišska Kapitula) – all in 
today’s Slovakia, and Szatmár (Satu Mare) – in today’s Romania. All these 
territories became parts of Czechoslovakia and Romania, respectively, after 
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1920. But in an interesting way Kassa remained part of the Eger Province 
until 1977, when John Paul II raised Kassa’s status to an archbishop’s seat 
with the Rožňava and Spiš bishoprics suffragans of the new archdiocese 
(Vaško ed., 34). Further areas of the former Eger diocese were joined to the 
new Debrecen-Nyíregyháza diocese in 1993, so, today its territory is only 
11500 km2. It is, however, still one of the biggest and most important 
dioceses of Hungary and it was given the rank of ‘basilica minor’ in 1970. 
Though much reduced in territory, the number of dioceses and 
archdioceses has not decreased in Hungary. At the moment there are four 
archbishoprics, Budapest-Esztergom, Eger, Kalocsa-Kecskemét, Veszprém, 
which are divided into 13 dioceses (besides the archdioceses, which are 
automatically also dioceses, these are Vác, Miskolc, Hajdúdorog (Greek 
Catholic), Debrecen-Nyíregyháza, Szeged-Csanád, Pécs, Kaposvár, 
Szombathely, Győr), plus two special dioceses: the Diocese of Pannonhalma 
Abbey and the Military Bishopric, which are subordinated to the Holy See 
directly. The present borders of the dioceses were established by John Paul II 
in 1993. As some of the dioceses have seats in two towns, besides the usual 
centre of a diocese, the cathedral, there is a co-cathedral in some towns.  
As to ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, in some 
countries the dominant denominations are the same as those of the 
Hungarians (in Slovakia, Austria, Croatia, Slovenia), while in other countries 
they are different (in Romania, the Ukraine, Serbia). There is no Hungarian 
bishop in Slovakia, though this has been demanded by ethnic Hungarians for 
decades. In Romania there has been a Hungarian Roman Catholic archbishop 
in Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) for a few years (earlier it was a bishopric), but 
in an interesting way the other Transylvanian and Western dioceses (Szatmár 
- Satu Mare, Nagyvárad - Oradea, Temesvár - Timişoara) do not belong to 
Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia), but to Bucureşti, though Nagyvárad and Szatmár 
have a Hungarian archbishop. There is also a Hungarian Roman Catholic 
bishop in the Ukraine. In other neighbouring countries the number of 
Hungarian Roman Catholics is much smaller, so the diocese they belong to 
is subordinated to the religious authorities of the capital of the given country.  
5 The Present Number of (Arch)Dioceses in the Roman Catholic and the 
Anglican Church on the British Isles 
The Church of England, which is the dominant church, has 43 dioceses, and 
correspondingly 43 cathedrals, in England and Wales. Two of these, 
Canterbury and York have been archdioceses from the very beginning, with 
the archbishop of Canterbury being the supreme head within the Church 
though formally it is the Queen. The dioceses are divided into 13000 
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parishes. Many of the cathedrals and parish churches are the oldest and 
architecturally the most valuable buildings in their town or village - as a 
result they are the most visited buildings for tourists as well. 
The Roman Catholic Church has almost 3000 parishes in England and 
Wales, which make up 22 territorial dioceses, plus there are two special 
dioceses: those of the Forces and the Ukrainian Apostolic Exarchate. As the 
buildings of the Roman Catholic Church were usually transformed into 
Anglican churches during the Reformation, their present churches are often 
more recent foundations. As mentioned above, Westminster Abbey, though 
not a cathedral, is one of the most important churches of the Church of 
England, which was, however, a Roman Catholic abbey in the Middle Ages. 
On the other hand, Westminster Cathedral is a Roman Catholic church 
today, but it was built only in the nineteenth century. 
The Anglican Church of Ireland has two provinces similarly to the 
Church of England, with archbishops in Armagh and Dublin. The Roman 
Catholic Church has four archdioceses: Armagh, Cashel & Emly, Dublin, 
and Tuam, with 26 dioceses. The Catholic Church has two archdioceses in 
Scotland: St Andrews & Edinburgh and Glasgow which are divided into 9 
dioceses (Western Isles, Argyll, Aberdeen, Dunkeld, Galloway, Motherwell, 
Paisley). 
6 Conclusion 
However great the distance between our countries may seem, there are still 
striking similarities between the history of the Roman Catholic faith and the 
institutions of the Church in Britain and Hungary. Christianity was present 
on the soil of later England and Hungary at least as early as in the third 
century. The ancestors of much of the present population of our countries 
lived elsewhere at that time, so the Anglo-Saxons were still in their ancient 
homeland in today’s North Germany and Denmark, and the Hungarians in 
Asia, but large areas of their future countries were parts of the Roman 
Empire. When Constantine the Great’s edict in 313 turned Christianity into 
an accepted religion, it spread rapidly, and also the hierarchy of the Church 
must have been set up quickly. We know not only about the presence of 
bishops from Britannia at the synod of Arles, as mentioned above, but also 
about the existence of bishoprics in Pannonia, e.g. Siscia, Iovia, Sirmium, 
Mursa, Cibalae (Glatz ed., 24). It is also interesting that Constantine was 
helped to power by legions from Britannia, and some of his successors had 
to defend the empire against Germanic tribes from Pannonia. 
With the withdrawal of the Romans both Britannia and Pannonia fell 
into the hands of pagan invaders. These invaders were, however, often 
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converted to Christianity in a relatively short period of time. In the British 
Isles, thanks to the activity of Celtic-Irish monks, Christianity was practised 
almost continuously unlike in the territory of later Hungary, though in 
Pannonia some churches from Roman times, e.g. those in Sopianae (Pécs) 
were still in use in the 9th century. This means that in spite of the various 
pagan waves of the Migration Period Christianity continued to be practised 
to a certain extent in Pannonia as well, and church life in certain periods was 
even organized. For instance, after the time of the Frankish occupation 
Transdanubia belonged to the archdiocese of Salzburg, while South 
Pannonia’s religious centre was the diocese of Sirmium, the bishop of which 
supported the pope against Salzburg, which represented Bavarian interests 
(Glatz ed., 36). 
The real breakthrough came, however, in the eleventh century. The 
Migration Period with all the destructions was over, and people also saw that 
the superstitious fears of the predicted end of the world in 1000 had been 
groundless. All over Europe a sudden growth in the construction of churches 
followed, and the hierarchy of the church was also (re)organized. In England 
it was William the Conqueror, who replaced almost all former Saxon 
bishops with his reliable Norman subjects. In Hungary, after the tentative 
attempts of Prince Géza in the tenth century, it was his son, the first 
Hungarian king, Saint Stephen, who really organized the structure of the 
Hungarian Roman Catholic Church, founding ten bishoprics and obliging 
every ten villages to build a parish church. These steps proved to have a 
lasting effect in both countries. Though some further bishoprics were 
founded by later rulers, basically the territorial structure of the Church did 
not change until the end of the Middle Ages. Canterbury and Esztergom, 
respectively, remained centres of the hierarchy of the Church for a long 
period. Besides them there was only one more archbishopric in both 
countries (York and Kalocsa), but there has always been a difference in the 
number of bishoprics. Though, in relation to France or Italy, England had 
relatively few dioceses, Hungary had even fewer, while the size of the 
population in both countries was similar throughout the Middle Ages.  
After the Middle Ages, at the time of the Reformation the change in 
England was far more drastic than in Hungary. Though the Reformation of 
Henry VIII was not started for doctrinal, but personal and political reasons, 
the Roman Church was suppressed in Great Britain and Ireland. But, 
fortunately, the majority of the buildings were taken over by the Church of 
England and the Church of Ireland, and although they were deprived of their 
paintings and sculptures, at least the buildings survive today. In Hungary it 
was not the Reformation that caused a lot of destruction, but the occupation 
of the central part of Hungary by the Turks for 150 years. In other parts of 
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Historical Hungary much of Medieval Hungarian art has survived. 
Unfortunately, most of these relics of Hungarian art history are beyond our 
present borders. 
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The dioceses of Saint Stephen (István) 
diocese/centre foundation patron saint possible circumstances of  and reasons 
for the choice of the patron saint 
Veszprém before 1002 St Michael Refers to Orthodox origin. István’s 
mother, Sarolt, who came from 
Transylvania and first settled here, was 
an Orthodox. 
Győr before 1002 Virgin Mary The choice indicates István’s 
dedication to Virgin Mary 
Esztergom 1001 St Adalbert Adalbert, bishop of Prague, may have 
baptised and educated István, and 
suffered martyrdom in 997. 
Transylvania/ 
Gyulafehérvár 
after 1004 St Michael Transylvania was converted to 
Christianity by Orthodox missionaries 
before 1004. (The bishop of ‘Turkia’ 
was their leader.)  
Kalocsa app. 1002 St Paul Apostle St Paul served as an example 
for this important mission centre. 
Eger between 1001 
and 1009 
St John The use of the name of the youngest 
apostle is unclear. This Northern area 
used to be the territory of the Kabar-
Jewish tribal chief Sámuel Aba, who 
married István’s youngest sister, and 
became king later. 
Pécs 1009 St Peter The help of Rome was needed to 
convert the mysterious Black 
Hungarians, who lived south of Pécs 
and may have been Muslims. 
Csanád 1030-31 St George Legend has it that they defeated the 
local tribal chief Ajtony, who was an 
Orthodox, with the intervention of the 
soldier saint.  
Vác ? the end of 
István’s reign 
or Peter 
Orseolo 
Virgin Mary 
Bihar → Várad ? the end of 
István’s reign 
or András I 
Virgin Mary 
The creation of the last two dioceses at 
the time of Saint Stephen is dubious. 
His dedication to Virgin Mary became 
stronger and stronger towards the end 
of his life. Before his death he offered 
his country to Virgin Mary, whose cult 
became popular in Hungary earlier 
than in the rest of Europe. However, 
Vác may have been founded by King 
Peter, and Bihar by András I. 
Figure 1 
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Figure 3. Dioceses in Today’s Hungary 
(www.uj.katolikus.hu) 
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Figure 4. The Anglo–Norman Realm (1066–1154)  
(The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain) 
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Figure 5. The Pre-Reformation Dioceses of England and Wales (13th century) 
(The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain) 
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György Kepes and Modernism: 
Towards a Course and Successful Visual Centre1 
M. R. Palmer 
ABSTRACT: The Hungarian-born American György Kepes (1906–2001) 
may not have been the most influential, or indeed most original, of artists 
and theorists, but the fact that a centre dedicated to his life and work is based 
in Eger makes him an ideal starting point from which to embark upon a 
survey and analysis of the Modern Movement.2 While this is an opportunity 
that has yet to be exploited in the 15 years since the György Kepes Visual 
Center opened at Vitkovics House, it is one that should be taken soon, before 
the Kepes family finally carries out its threat to take the collection to a more 
appreciative home.3 In this paper we would like to suggest that the students 
of English at the Károly Eszterházy College could play a significant part in 
restoring the Kepes family’s faith in Eger as a worthy custodian of the 
György Kepes Visual Center by making the collection an active part of their 
undergraduate studies.  
 
There is no doubt that the György Kepes Visual Center in Eger has been a 
massive disappointment to its supporters.4 Although the exact reasons for 
such a failure are complex, we would like to suggest that it can be explained, 
at least in part, by Kepes’s own writings.  
That the Kepes Collection can be found in Eger at all is due to the fact 
that Eger is the county town of Heves, the county of the artist’s place of 
birth, Selyp. The bequest was made, therefore, to a town, which, while 
                                                     
1 This is an abridged and adapted version of a lecture entitled “György Kepes and 
Modernism” given by the author at Vitkovics House on 13th February, 2005, as part of the 
Kepes celebrations marking the one hundredth year of his birth. A Hungarian summary of 
the lecture with an accompanying suggested bibliography can also be found on the Kepes 
Visual Center website: www.muveszetekhaza.hu.  
2 György Kepes’s name often appears in the American literature as Gyorgy.  
3 The institution is officially named Center rather than Centre. 
4 The artist’s great-nephew, András Kepes, was forced to admit recently, in the March 2005 
Internet edition of Premier magazine: “In 1991 the temporary Kepes Collection opened in 
Eger, in the Vitkovics House. Since then nothing has happened.” 
68 M. R. Palmer 
having no direct Kepes links, had considerable cultural pretentions and a 
ready supply of potential visitors. The fact that those visitors have thusfar 
decided not to visit the Kepes Collection led the local government to make 
an issue of the Center by including it in its bid to become EU Town of 
Culture in 2010. It was then that the proposal was made to move the 
exhibition into the Orthodox Synagogue at 21, Kossuth utca, with one of 
Kepes’s works installed in the courtyard behind it.5 Although press coverage 
prior, during, and indeed after the failed bid made a great deal of György 
Kepes’s perceived status as a “world-famous” artist,6 experience suggests 
that even the relocation of a permanent exhibition dedicated to the artist’s 
life-work will not improve the fortunes of the collection. This is particularly 
the case when one bears in mind what Kepes himself wrote on the subject of 
exhibitions:  
Art is outgrowing its traditional limitations. The artistic forms have 
increased in size and acquired explosive dimensions. The isolated, 
sheltered, limited space of a room at home or in the galleries or museums 
has proven claustrophobic for many dynamic, explosive explorations. 
Today, the strain is no longer limited to the physical, spatial dimension but 
includes the conceptual realm as well. Thus, the exhibition, the traditional 
medium used to create communication between the work of art and the 
public has had to be questioned. It has been questioned in all its implication 
[sic!]. An exhibition, as an anthology of individual work and personal 
achievements, no longer seems a force in the new sense of life that 
motivates creative expression. 7 
                                                     
5 The official reason given for choosing the synagogue was that it lies on one of the 
thoroughfares most commonly used by tourists when visiting the town’s most famous 
landmarks.  
6 Typical examples of rather exuberant press coverage include: S. J., “Képgyűjtemény a 
zsinagógában” (Picture Collection in the Synagogue), Népszabadság, 8th October, 2002; 
Doros Judit, “Eger a fény városa lehet” (Eger could be the Town of Light), Népszabadság, 
25th May, 2005; Sz. R., “Kepes, a fény művésze” (Kepes the Light Artist), Heves Megyei 
Hírlap, 11th January, 2006. The lack of references to György Kepes in popular accounts of 
modern art means that Herbert Read’s reference to Kepes in his A Concise History of 
Modern Painting (new and augmented edition) (London, Thames and Hudson, 1974, p. 
214), is a notable exception. Here Kepes appears in a list of leaders and disciples of the 
Modern Movement, which includes László Moholy-Nagy, Walter Gropius, Mies van der 
Rohe, Hans Richter, Lyonel Feininger, Herbert Meyer, and Marcel Breuer. It is interesting 
to note that while György Kepes has a premises dedicated to his work in Hungary, László 
Moholy-Nagy and Marcel Breuer do not. Although Pécs, the town of Marcel Breuer’s 
(1902-1981) birth has a room named after him in its arts centre, his name did not feature in 
Pécs’s successful EU City of Culture bid.  
7 Kepes, Gyorgy, “Toward Civic Art”, Arts in Society, University of Wisconsin, 1972, p. 84.  
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The Wall-less Museum and Modernism 
Such calls for the “wall-less museum” go back to the years immediately 
following the Russian Revolution of 1917 when Futurist-Constructivist poets 
such as Vladimir Mayakovsky (1893–1930) demanded: “We do not need a 
dead mausoleum of art where dead works are worshipped, but a living 
factory of the human spirit – in the streets, in the tramways, in the factories, 
workshops and workers’ homes.”8 
György Kepes was, like his Russian constructivist forebears, 
challenging the traditional boundaries of art and society in keeping with 
what he calls a “new sense of life”. Although he does not tell us in the 
above-mentioned quotation what that sense was, it was something new and 
at odds with what people were used to. In suggesting that the modern era had 
brought with it a new sense of life Kepes was not alone. Indeed, he was 
subscribing to one of the key tenets of the Modern Movement.  
For an understanding of what these tenets were one should turn to 
Nikolaus Pevsner’s Pioneers of the Modern Movement, first published in 
1936, the year Kepes moved from Berlin to London, having left Hungary in 
the first instance in 1930.9 It is a work which remains perhaps the standard 
account of the early development of the Modern Movement.10  
For Nikolaus Pevsner (1902–83) the industrial (or what Reyner Banham 
was later to call “the first machine”) age required a new art.11 The 
developments seen within the fields of technology, science and industry had 
left art and design struggling in its wake. As Pevsner points out, whereas the 
                                                     
8 Similar sentiments were expressed by those active within the Surrealist movement like 
Georges Bataille, who proclaimed in his article “The Oldest Museum: Ashmolean 
Museum”, Documents 5, 1930: “The museum is the colossal mirror in which man, finally 
contemplating himself from all sides, and finding himself literally an object of wonder, 
abandons himself to the ecstasy of art journalism” (trans. Annette Morrison, taken from the 
exhibition: Undercover Surrealism, held at the Hayward Gallery, London in 2006). When 
referring to the post-modernist architect Robert Venturi, Charles Jencks, in his Modern 
Movements in Architecture (2nd ed., Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985, p. 222), notes a 
reemergence of the idea of the wall-less museum when suggesting that “the age of travel 
and tourism” is in itself “the age of the ‘museum without walls’”, an idea therefore 
contemporary with Kepes’s, but given an altogether different meaning.  
9 Subsequent revised and partly rewritten editions were published under the fuller title of 
Pioneers of Modern Design: From William Morris to Walter Gropius.  
10 The account is almost replicated, albeit in a shorter form in the relevant sections of Pevsner, 
An Outline of European History (Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1940), and Richards J.M., An 
Introduction to Modern Architecture (Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1940). Both give an 
impression of the state of modern architecture at about the time Kepes left England for 
America in the late 1930s.  
11 See Banham, Rayner, Theory and Design in the First Machine Age (London, The 
Architectural Press, London, 1960). 
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Great Exhibition, held in London in 1851, had been held in a “Crystal 
Palace” made of iron, glass and laminated wood, which made the very most 
of the latest industrial processes, what was to be found exhibited inside, 
alongside “the most cunning inventions to facilitate the production of almost 
any object”, were mass-produced products “bulging with tasteless 
decoration, vulgar and lacking in taste”.12  
What was of greatest concern for Pevsner, however, was not the lack of 
taste, but the immorality of it all. Not only had the standards of previous 
ages slipped, but the work going on in the factories was “bleaker than ever 
before in European history”.13 In making this link between the plight of the 
worker and the quality of design Pevsner singled out William Morris for 
selection as the first of his pioneers, as much for his views on the plight of 
the industrial labourer as his “clear and sober” designs.14 It is interesting to 
note that Kepes also quotes Morris when discussing the social role of artists 
and the state of design, although it is the damage industry has caused to the 
townscape, rather than on the workforce, which is stressed: 
Cut down the pleasant trees, among the houses, pull down ancient and 
venerable buildings for the money that a few square yards of London dirt 
will fetch; blacken rivers, hide the sun and poison the air with smoke and 
worse, and it’s nobody’s business to see to it or mend it: that is all that 
modern commerce, the counting house forgetful of the workshop, will do 
for us herein.15 
Where Pevsner and Kepes depart from Morris, however, is in the belief that 
all good design is dependent on manual labour. Pevsner and many of his 
subsequent pioneers, while not necessarily rejecting the idea that the arts and 
crafts produce high quality objects, question whether manual labour of the 
creative kind Morris prescribes is in fact preferable on moral grounds, 
pointing to the laboriousness and drudgery of the handicrafts, and the 
liberating effect of the machine.  
Once Pevsner has clarified this, his account becomes a description of 
how technology has been embraced in the creation of a new art. Kepes was 
equally captivated by the possibilities of technology and its possibilities 
nearly 40 years later: 
                                                     
12 Quoted passages from: Pevsner, Nikolaus, Pioneers of Modern Design: From William 
Morris to Walter Gropius (reprinted with additions, Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1975) p. 41 
and p. 43.  
13 Op. cit., p. 45. 
14 Watkin, David, Morality and Architecture (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977). 
pp. 83–84. 
15 Morris, William, Speech delivered before the Trades’ Guild of Learning, December 4., 
1877, quoted by György Kepes in op. cit., p. 86.  
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The sculptural possibilities of reinforced concrete, prestressed concrete 
forms, plastic, stainless steel, aluminium, new techniques of welding; and 
the potentials of prefabricated units, pictorial use of baked enamel on steel, 
luminescent walls, photosensitive glass, spraying techniques ranging from 
metal spraying to color spraying, and new adhesives are only a few 
suggestions of the technology waiting to be explored.16 
Kepes and Moholy-Nagy  
To its practitioners, the machine-made modern aesthetic was expressed 
architecturally in horizontal lines, table-like roofs, great simplicity, and the 
energetic exhibition of construction and materials,17 perhaps best summed up 
by the work of the Bauhaus.18 
The Bauhaus was to have a great influence on György Kepes, and 
perhaps more importantly on Kepes’s mentor László Moholy-Nagy (1895–
1946).19 In many respects Moholy-Nagy’s arrival in Berlin in 1921, 
resembled Kepes’s nearly ten years later. Both were young unknowns from 
Hungary who soon enjoyed the help and support of leading members of the 
avant-garde. In Moholy-Nagy’s case this had been Walter Gropius, director 
of the Bauhaus, who invited Moholy-Nagy to join his staff shortly after his 
arrival in Germany.20  
                                                     
16 Kepes, Gyorgy, “The Visual Arts and Sciences: A Proposal for Collaboration” 
Architectural Record, 1965/5, p. 156.  
17 Watkin, David, Morality and Architecture quoting Pevsner, op. cit., p. 85. 
18 The Bauhaus school of art and design had three directors from the time the 
Grossherzogliche Sächsische Kunstgewerbeschule merged with the Grossherzogliche 
Sächsische Hochschule für Bildende Kunst to form the Staatliches Bauhaus Weimar: 
Walter Gropius (1883-1969), who directed it from 1919 to 1928, during which time the 
school moved from Weimar to Dessau; Hannes Meyer (1889-1954), director from 1928 to 
1930 and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969), director from 1930 to 1933, when it 
was finally closed down by the Nazis.  
19 Born in Bácsborsód near Szeged in 1895, he left Hungary shortly after the fall of the 
Republic of Councils having studied law in Budapest and completed his military service in 
1918. He arrived in Berlin, after a brief six-month sojourn in Vienna, an untrained artist 
producing portraits somewhat in the manner of Oskar Kokoschka and Egon Schiele. 
Within a matter of months, after overcoming a certain scepticism towards the Berlin art 
scene, he embraced those artistic endeavours bent on celebrating technology and modern 
forms of urban living, including elements of Dada, Futurism, the Suprematism of Malevich 
and finally Constructivism, at which point he abandoned painting altogether as an out-
dated and irrelevant undertaking.  
20 For an account of Gropius’s initial interest in Moholy-Nagy’s work see Banham, op. cit., p. 
313; Frampton, Kenneth, Modern Architecture: A Critical History (London, Thames & 
Hudson, 1980), p. 126; Passuth Krisztina, Moholy-Nagy László (Budapest, Corvina, 1982), 
p. 34.  
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Shortly after arriving in Berlin in 1921, Moholy-Nagy took his first 
steps in the direction of purely non-objective painting, when he combined 
Dada elements such as collage, montage and the use of typography, initially 
with a Constructivist interest in urban forms (bridges, railways, cables), 
ultimately creating what he called “Glass Architecture” (Glasarchitektur), 
when his paintings, prints and drawings were stripped of all reference to the 
visual world, in their attempt to reach perfection on their own purely formal 
terms.21 As he stated himself: “my belief is that mathematically harmonious 
shapes, executed precisely, are filled with emotional quality, and they 
represent the perfect balance between feeling and intellect.”22 It was in this 
spirit that Moholy-Nagy led both the Bauhaus’s preliminary course 
(Vorkurs), which he shared with Joseph Albers, and its metal workshop.23 
Nevertheless. It was Moholy-Nagy’s contribution as brain-child and co-
editor (with Gropius) of the Bauhausbücher (fourteen of these books were 
published between 1925 and 1930) that brought Bauhaus ideas and the 
importance of new technologies in art and design to the attention of people 
like the young Kepes.24  
Moholy-Nagy, however, along with fellow-Hungarian Marcel Breuer 
and other Bauhäusler of a similar artistic and less politically committed 
persuasion, was to leave the Bauhaus following Gropius’s resignation in 
1928, at a time when the Bauhaus was becoming more strictly aligned to the 
Marxist cause as espoused by Gropius’s successor, Hannes Meyer.25 
Moholy-Nagy subsequently earned his keep partly by publishing articles in 
the Hungarian journals Kepes read in Budapest.26  
It was therefore as somewhat of an outcast that Moholy-Nagy received 
Kepes in Berlin in 1930 following a brief written correspondence. It was 
there that Kepes organised exhibitions, did graphics, took photographs and 
helped design stage sets. He also participated in the shooting of Moholy-
                                                     
21 For an account of Moholy-Nagy’s formal development see Passuth, op. cit., pp. 11–78. 
22 Quoted in Banham, op. cit., p. 313. 
23 For an account of Moholy-Nagy’s years at the Bauhaus see Frampton, op. cit., pp. 126–128; 
Passuth, op. cit., pp. 41–55.  
24 Banham, op. cit., pp. 285–286.  
25 For the so-called “Battle of the Bauhaus” see Saint, Andrew, The Image of the Architect 
(New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 115–137. 
26 For example Korunk (for whom Moholy-Nagy wrote regularly from 1928), Dokumentum, 
Munka, both of which were published by László Kassák, who was a major influence on 
Moholy-Nagy before he left Hungary. For more on these journals see Passuth, op. cit., pp. 
63–67; Csaplár Ferenc, Kassák in the European Avantgarde Movements 1916–1928 / 
Kassák Lajos as európai avantgárd mozgalmakban (bi-lingual) (Budapest, Kassák Múze-
um és Archívum, 1994); Passuth Krisztina, Avantgarde kapcsolatok Prágától Bukarestig: 
1907–1930 (Budapest, Balassi, 1998). Kepes may indeed have seen Moholy-Nagy in 
person in Budapest in 1930, when the latter gave a lecture at the Ernst Museum.  
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Nagy’s five-minute film Black, White and Grey showing his kinetic 
sculpture, the Light-Space Modulator, in action.27 
Kepes in England  
For many like Moholy-Nagy and Kepes the flight from fascism took them to 
the United States via England, where, between 1935 and 1937, they enjoyed 
the hospitality of Herbert Read, utopian socialist and chief apologist of the 
Modern Movement in England.28 Like many of those who chose the west 
rather than the Soviet Union, Read believed that Utopia could be 
aesthetically generated.29 Kepes worked in Moholy-Nagy’s studio at a time 
when Moholy-Nagy was working on the sets for Alexander Korda’s film 
version of H.G Wells’s The Shape of Things to Come.30 
England, like Germany, had its critics of Modernism. Architect Sir 
Reginald Blomfield, in his 1934 essay Modernismus, was among the more 
outspoken: 
It is forgotten that unlike those countries in which the new movement is 
most popular, ours is a very old civilisation, with a character of its own, 
unique in its way, and we are not to abandon lightly instincts and traditions 
which are ingrained in our people even if not consciously realised. It is 
significant that the wildest efforts of the New Architecture are being 
perpetrated today in Finland, and of course in Russia. At Moscow there is a 
‘House of Labour’, deliberately designed by M. Golosov on the model of a 
dynamo; and largest and most dominant part of this building is designed as 
an enormous cog-wheel. Then there is that notorious observatory in 
                                                     
27 Lengyel László, The Permanent Exhibition of the Visual Center: The Art of Gyorgy Kepes / 
A vizuális központ állandó kiállítása: Kepes György művészete (Eger, Gyorgy Kepes 
Visual Center, 1992), p. 8. The silent film is occasionally on display at the Tate Modern, as 
it was during the summer of 2005. The combined effect of the modulator, the camera shots 
and the editing is that of a rhythmically dynamic three-dimensional abstract painting, 
where the play of light on the shiny metal and glass surfaces creates a twinking, dappled 
effect not dissimilar to a rippling water surface or sunlight shining through wind-buffeted 
leaves. A reconstruction of the modulator, positioned along side the film, formed one of 
the highlights of the Albers and Moholy-Nagy: From Bauhaus to the New World exhibition 
held at London’s Tate Modern from 9th March to June 4th 2006.  
28 Herbert Read describes this period, when the likes of Walter Gropius, Marcel Breuer, Eric 
Mendelsohn, Naum Gabo, and Piet Mondrian found sanctuary in Hampstead in “A Nest of 
Gentle Artists”. Nikolaus Pevsner, also left Berlin at this time, deciding instead to stay in 
England rather than moving on to the States.  
29 Hannes Mayer was one of those who left Germany for the USSR in the early thirties. 
Gropius also visited Russia in 1932 to return bitterly disillusioned. See Saint, op. cit., pp. 
128–137.  
30 Passuth, op. cit., p. 62 tells us that although Moholy-Nagy’s services were called for, the 
sets he designed were not actually used in the final version of the film.  
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Potsdam, by Herr Eric Mendelssohn, which looks like a gun turret of some 
nightmare battleship, with the lower part of it shaped like a ram, and 
windows designed to resemble the embrasures of eight-inch guns […].31 
Perhaps the most savage critique of Modernism in England, however, can be 
found in Evelyn Waugh’s 1926 novel Decline and Fall. His creation, 
Professor-Architect Otto Friedrich Silenus, was a harbinger of those 
modernist architects who were to arrive later:  
Professor Silenus – for that was the title by which this extraordinary young 
man chose to be called – was a ‘find’ of Mrs. Beste-Chetwynde’s. He was 
not yet very famous anywhere, though all who met him carried away deep 
and diverse impressions of his genius. He had first attracted Mrs. Beste-
Chetwynde’s attention with the rejected design for a chewing-gum factory 
which had been reproduced in a progressive Hungarian quarterly. His only 
other completed work was the décor for a cinema-film of great length and 
complexity of plot – a complexity rendered the more inextricable by the 
producer’s austere elimination of all human characters, a fact which proved 
fatal to its commercial success.32  
The inexperience of the young genius and his involvement in a difficult film 
mean that Professor Silenus appears to incorporate elements of both Kepes 
and Moholy-Nagy, although the intended model is more likely to have been 
Walter Gropius, whose striking presence had already been noted when 
Waugh wrote his novel.33 
Kepes’s Arrival in the United States  
When the great masters of the Modern Movement arrived in the United 
States in 1937, they were greeted with an enthusiasm not dissimilar to that of 
Mrs. Beste-Chetwynde. Within no time they were either occupying senior 
                                                     
31 Blomfield, Sir Reginald: “Modernismus” (1934), quoted in Benton, Tim and Charlotte, 
with Sharp, Dennis, eds., Form and Function: A Source Book for the History of 
Architecture and Design 1890–1939 (London, Granada, 1975). In its lowest form, such 
criticism suggested that Modernism was not only alien and intellectual, but Jewish.  
32 Waugh, Evelyn: Decline and Fall (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1937), pp. 143–144.  
33 Saint, op. cit., pp. 115–6. describes Gropius’s “lifelong charisma”, quoting Lyonel 
Feininger’s observation: “He works till three in the morning, hardly sleeps, and when he 
looks at you, his eyes are like stars. I’m sorry for anyone who can’t gather strength from 
them”. Waugh’s spiritual heir Tom Wolfe, chooses to lay into Gropius himself rather than 
resorting to a fictional creation in his From Bauhaus to Our House (London, Cardinal, 
1981). The particularly soulful image of Gropius Wolfe selects (p. 11), chin resting on 
deliberately set wrist, is accompanied by the words, “Walter Gropius, the Silver Prince. 
White God No. 1. Young architects went to study at his feet. Some, like Philip Johnson 
didn’t get up until decades later”.  
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positions within America’s foremost higher educational establishments, or 
running institutions they themselves had been instrumental in founding. 
Walter Gropius was made head of the school of architecture at Harvard, 
where he was joined by Marcel Breuer. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, the final 
director of the Bauhaus before it was closed down by the Nazis, was 
appointed dean of architecture at the Armour Institute in Chicago.34 László 
Moholy-Nagy opened the New Bauhaus in Chicago, where he invited Kepes 
to run his own department, and Joseph Albers started a rural Bauhaus, Black 
Mountain College, in the hills of North Carolina.35  
It was on such campuses that the European emigrés were given free rein 
to carry out their work. While Walter Gropius singularly failed to produce 
anything approaching his early work, Mies van der Rohe designed arguably 
America’s three greatest post-war buildings: The Farnsworth House, Fox 
River, Plano, Illinois (1946–51); 860 Lake Shore Drive, Chicago (1948–51); 
and The Seagram Building, New York (with Philip Johnson) in 1958.36 
Kepes and Abstract Expressionism 
Kepes was a particular admirer of Mies van der Rohe’s Seagram Building, 
describing it as “a beautiful crystalline structure in America’s greatest city 
                                                     
34 Mies van der Rohe had succeeded Hannes Meyer as director of the Bauhaus in 1930, and 
remained in the post until the Bauhaus closed in 1933, leaving Germany belatedly in 1937 
before making his way to America. So late in fact that Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, wife of László, 
was forced to admit in 1965 that: “When he (Mies) accepted in July 1933, after the coming 
to power of Hitler, the Commission for the Reichsbank he was a traitor to all of us and a 
traitor to everything we had fought for. He signed at that time a patriotic appeal which 
Schultze-Naumburg had made as Commissar to the artists, writers, and architects of 
Germany to put their forces behind National Socialism” (Watkin, op. cit., p. 97, fn.). 
35 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 46. 
36 This is not to say that Mies did not have his critics. The case against him is rigorously put 
by Jencks (op. cit.) in his chapter entitled: “The Problem of Mies”, where he quotes from 
Lewis Mumford’s 1964 “The Case against Modern Architecture”: “Mies van der Rohe 
used the facilities offered by steel and glass to create elegant monuments of nothingness. 
They had the dry style of machine forms without the contents. His own chaste taste gave 
these hollow glass shells a crystalline purity of form; but they existed alone in the Platonic 
world of his imagination and had no relation to site, climate, insulation, function, or 
internal activity” (p. 96). Not surprisingly Wolfe (op. cit.) is even less sparing in his 
criticisms. His illustration of Mies, puffing on a cigar, is accompanied by the words: 
“Ludwig Mies van der Rohe. White God No. 2. He put half of America inside German 
worker-housing cubes” (p. 47). Critics like Charles Jencks and Tom Wolfe also point to 
the catastrophic effects imitators of Mies and the other modernists had on the urban 
environment, while noting the irony of the fact that it was the world’s leading corporations 
who often commissioned a modern architecture which had in the meantime become 
“stripped of its social idealism”. 
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(itself a symbol of the finest thinking in contemporary architecture and at the 
same time, like the Torre of medieval Tuscany, a boastful symbol of wealth 
and power) displaying, in surroundings that state an absolute control of 
contemporary materials and techniques and perfect mastery of the new 
beauty of architectural space”.37 
To his consternation, however, inside the walls were covered with 
“images of torn and broken man. In its offices and corridors are paintings 
and sculptures shaped with the idioms in tune with the twilight spirit that 
created them: surfaces that are moldy, broken, corroded, ragged, dripping; 
brush strokes executed with the sloppy brutality of cornered men.”38  
For Kepes such unnamed, yet clearly recognisable, abstract 
expressionist works were not only ugly and indisciplined, but lacking the 
necessary optimism and social commitment (ills. 1 and 2). He continues:  
Rather than accept the creative challenges within the range of the visual 
arts, rather than learn to see a broader world, most of us, our artists 
included, divorce ourselves from common obligations, turn our backs on 
the rational, and separate man from himself, from his fellow men, and from 
his environment.39  
Interestingly, such attacks on Abstract Expressionism and talk of common 
obligations would have found sympathy east of the Iron Curtain where 
Abstract Expressionism was considered a manifestation of an anti-social 
degenerate capitalist art.40 This was something Kepes himself was keenly 
aware of, stating that striking a moral stance could have catastrophic 
consequences on the creative process:  
It is unfashionable today, if not taboo, for artists to think and act on the 
broad terms of cultural and social ideas. No doubt moralizing on art can 
lead to creative suicide, just as market-policed and state-policed art can lead 
                                                     
37 Kepes, Gyorgy, “Introduction to the Issue The Visual Arts Today”, Daedalus: Journal of 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Winter 1960 (Cambridge, Massachusetts) 
1960, p. 10. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. Interestingly Clement Greenberg, the great apologist of the abstract expressionist 
movement partly agrees, calling Rothko’s Seagram murals “disastrous” (in “After Abstract 
Expressionism”, first published in Art International, VI, no. 8, Lugano, October 1962, pp. 
24–32, quoted at length in: Harrison Charles and Paul Wood, Art in Theory 1900–1990: 
An Anthology of Ideas (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), pp. 766–769. 
40 It is interesting that Kepes appears unaware of the CIA’s role in promoting Abstract 
Expressionism as a manifestation of free artistic expression abroad. For more on American 
post-war cultural imperialism see Cockcroft, Eva, “Abstract Expressionism, Weapon of the 
Cold War” in Artforum, vol. 15, no. 10, June 1974, pp. 39–41, republished in Francis 
Frascina & Harris, Jonathan, Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts 
(London, Phaidon, 1992), pp. 82–90.  
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to the murder of artistic honesty. But the other extreme – lack of intellectual 
curiosity and rejection of commitment – leads to emaciation of artistic 
values.41  
Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried, however, while rejecting 
overdramatic existentialist interpretations of abstract expressionist works, 
were at pains to stress the movement’s intellectual curiousity and 
commitment. They saw the likes of Jackson Pollock as being the legimate 
heirs of an artistic tradition going back to Courbet and Manet.42 As for 
Pollock himself, he claimed that the way he handled paint was the 
expression of the contemporary aims of the age he was living in:  
My opinion is that new needs need new techniques. And the modern artists 
have found new ways and new means of making their statements. It seems 
to me that the modern painter cannot express this age, the airplane, the atom 
bomb, the radio, in the old forms of the Renaissance or of any other past 
culture. Each age finds its own technique.43  
While rejecting the results Kepes would no doubt have agreed with Pollock’s 
sentiments. Interestingly, looking at Kepes’s late paintings, it would be 
difficult to deny, however, that Kepes was not left untouched by Abstract 
Expressionism.44  
Kepes and Pop 
But everyone was caught unawares by the arrival of Pop Art, another 
new art arrival which Kepes greeted with scorn. In fact he had very firm 
views on popular culture in general. Prior to Pop Art’s arrival on the New 
York art scene in 1962, Kepes writes: “For the tragedy of democracy is the 
chaos of communication: the three-hundred-ring commercial circus of 
advertising, public relations, slick magazines and fatuous entertainment. To 
                                                     
41 Kepes, Gyorgy: “The Visual Arts and the Sciences: A Proposal for Collaboration,” p. 148.  
42 See for example, Greenberg, Clement, “Modern Painting” first published in Arts Yearbook, 
1, New York, 1961. Reprinted with slight revisions in Art & Literature, no. 4, Spring 
1965, pp. 193-201 additions in which form it was republished in Harrison and Wood, op. 
cit., pp. 754-760.  
43 Paraphrased from Jackson Pollock’s interview with William Wright (1950), transcript 
published in F.V. O’Connor, Jackson Pollock (New York, Museum of Modern Art, 1967), 
pp. 79–81, republished in Harrison and Wood, op. cit., pp. 574–578.  
44 The way Kepes often flicked paint onto the surface of the canvas in a tachist manner can be 
inspected at the top gallery of the Gyorgy Kepes Visual Center at Eger’s Vitkovics House 
(Széchenyi u. 55.).  
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most people, ideas and values are imparted by middlemen whose objectives 
are crassly narrow and nonsocial”.45  
Following Pop’s arrival Kepes was to add:  
A most recent group of artists has returned from abstract images to concrete 
objects in their environment. They have become fascinated by vulgar 
features of everyday life, and they have chosen them as their emblems. […] 
Their unresolved mixture of private attachment and public critical social 
commentary takes no account of the revolutionary artistic achievements of 
the earlier part of the century. […] Most of the mushrooming art 
movements seem to have forgotten the essential role of artistic creation. By 
and large, the art world has become the scene of a popularity contest 
manipulated by appraisers and impressarios who are blind to the 
fundamental role of the artistic image.46 
While we are not told here what the fundamental role of the artistic image is, 
there were many artists pursuing their formal and technical pursuits in the 
spirit of truth and integrity who were similarly perplexed at this recent 
development. One of them was Clement Greenberg the propagandist of the 
abstract expressionist movement, who was alienated by its use of 
representation, conceptual wit, and sources from “low”, commercial, popular 
culture. Indeed, he went so far as to call Pop Art a fashion, a school, a 
degenerate mannerism.47 This was a view that differed significantly from the 
views of Lawrence Alloway, who, like his fellow pop artists and theorists, 
was interested in “a vernacular culture that persisted beyond any special 
interest in skills in art, architecture, design or art criticism that any of us 
might possess”. He continues, “[t]he area of contact was mass-produced 
urban culture: movies, advertisement, science fiction, Pop music. We felt 
none of the dislike of commercial culture standard among most intellectuals, 
                                                     
45 Kepes, op. cit., 1960, p. 8. Pop Art was invented in London in the mid-1950s under the 
aegis of the Independent Group at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London. Its great 
formative event was the “This is Tomorrow” exhibition of 1956, held at the Whitechapel 
Art Gallery. As Edward Lucie-Smith describes in his: Movements in Art since 1945 
(revised ed., London, Thames & Hudson, 1975): “[…] probably the most significant part 
of “This is Tomorrow” was an entrance display provided by Richard Hamilton – a collage 
picture entitled Just What is it that Makes Today’s Homes so Different, so Appealing? In 
the picture are a muscle-man from a physique magazine and a stripper with sequinned 
breasts. The muscle-man carries a gigantic lollipop, with the word POP on it in large 
letters. With this work, many of the conventions of pop art were created, including the use 
of borrowed imagery” (p. 135).  
46 Kepes, op. cit., 1965, p. 148. 
47 Reise, Barbara M., “Greenberg and The Group: A Retrospective View” Studio 
International vol. Nos. 901 & 902, May & June 1968, republished in Harrison and Wood 
(eds.), op. cit., p. 255. 
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but accepted it as a fact, discussed it in detail, and consumed it 
enthusiastically […]”48 
What is surprising, or perhaps not considering his age, was that Kepes 
failed to see Pop’s debt to Dada, which had been an important stepping stone 
in both Moholy-Nagy’s and Kepes’s artistic development. Moholy-Nagy had 
used the collage and the montage in his early work, and looking at the 
insertion of the objet trouvées in his later paintings it appears that Kepes was 
once again prepared to accept that he had been wrongly dismissive.49  
The English artist Keith Vaughan puts the dilemmas facing the artists of 
the earlier generations, accustomed to other ways of seeing and expressing 
the worlds in which they live, in the following terms: 
After all one has thought and dreamed and longed for it turns out that toffee 
paper, cereal packages and mass media wrappings and publicity are the 
vital, significant and fertile aspects of the age we live in. I live in it too. 
And I just don’t feel that way. I feel like a stranded dinosaur – fat, lethargic, 
frightened and slow-witted. I look at my work – the result of some forty 
years’ effort and hope – and theirs – the result of 5 or 6 years at the most. 
And it’s I who feel defeated. Because all the values I’ve lived by now count 
for nothing. If this is what it was all going to lead to one need not have 
bothered. Oh I wouldn’t mind handing on to someone who saw further, had 
more talent, more youth, energy and time before him. But this. Liquorice 
allsorts and ton-up motorbikes bursting out of the canvas.50  
The Modernist Tradition Today 
Pop had an off-the-wallness, a youthful exuberence which left Kepes and 
many of his generation cold, and in doing so they failed to appreciate the 
next turn the Modern Movement was about to take. Whereas Kepes’s 
technology was aloof, cold and moralistic, Pop’s was people-centred, hot 
and sexy, as were the architectural ideas it was to unleash.  
A group of designers formed by Peter Cook and others in 1960, known 
as Archgram, were just some of those who yearned for the likes of “a 
miniaturised, mobile, cooking, refrigerating, sewage disposing, VHF and 
three-channel-televiewing, dry-cleaning and martini-dispensing services 
robot with fitted ash-trays and book rest, that will follow us around the house 
riding on a cushion of art, like an interplanetary hoover.”51  
                                                     
48 Lippard, Lucy, Pop Art (London, 1966), p.32, and quoted by Jencks, op. cit., pp. 271–2.  
49 Once again the evidence is there to see at the Vitkovics House in Eger.  
50 From Vaughan’s Journal 45–40, 7 April 1964, quoted in Yorke, Michael, Vaughan Keith: 
His Life and Work (London, Constable, 1990), p. 221.  
51 Cook, Peter in The Architect’s Journal, 1960, p. 415 quoted in Jencks, op. cit., p. 294. 
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This latter vision spurned equally wild conceptual architectural projects, 
where the services almost became more important than the building itself, as 
in Archigram’s: Computer City, Walking City, Blow-Out City, Plug-In City. 
The modernists of the previous generation were horrified. Sigfried Giedion, 
Kepes’s one-time boss at the Chicago Institute of Design wrote: 
The worst example of all (dystopias), however, appeared at a London 1963 
exhibition where a walking city was shown, with all buildings conceived as 
steel tanks moving mechanically and certainly crushing, as tanks do, nature 
and any person outside them. The example is appalling, not only because it 
represents an inhuman conception of the city of the future by a small group 
of people, but because it received wide publicity without, as far as I know, 
any corresponding protest.52  
For young architects like Richard Rogers (b. 1933) and Norman Foster (b 
1935), however, Archigram’s theoretic exercises in “populist technophilia” 
were both exciting and thought-provoking.53 As Bryan Appleyard states in 
his biography of Richard Rogers, it “represented a profound and genuine 
reassessment of the modernist movement in the light of experience and of 
emerging technologies. They were reconceiving architecture from the 
ground up, having discarded much of the burden of ideology which had 
become attached to modernism.”54  
It is within such a context, therefore, that Kepes belongs to the tail end 
of the Modernism of the First Machine Age, with its interest in exploiting 
the developments of the industrial revolution (glass, steel, concrete, 
electricity etc), rather than the beginnings of the Second Machine Age 
ushered in by the first industrial robots and related developments in science 
and technology.55 Whereas the conventional machines of the First Machine 
                                                     
52 Quoted in Jencks, op. cit., p. 291. Sigfried Giedion (1888-1968) was the powerful advocate 
of the Modern Movement, and the author of the highly influential tract Space, Time and 
Architecture (1941). Space and time were concepts often incorporated into the work and 
theories of both Moholy-Nagy and Kepes. 
53 For an account of their architectural development see Sudjic, Deyan, Norman Foster, 
Richard Rogers, James Stirling: New Directions in British Architecture (London, Thames 
& Hudson, 1986).  
54 Appleyard, Bryan, Richard Rogers: A Biography (London, Faber & Faber, 1986), p. 183 
55 Abel, Chris, “Modern Architecture in the Second Machine Age: The Work of Norman 
Foster”, in Norman Foster 1964–1987 (Tokyo, a+u Publishing, 1988), p. 13. On the 
subject of the ecological dimension of the new architecture Abel writes: “The transition 
from First to Second Machine Age came into full public focus with the Apollo programme 
that put man on the Moon. Looking back on the Earth from the alien landscape, a global 
TV public was made starkly aware that a new technological order was in effect. In the 
same way, Buckminster Fuller’s phrase “Spaceship Earth” acquired new and urgent 
meaning. Though Fuller had long preached the need for a global approach to Earth’s 
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Age which early Modernists tried to use were inflexible, working like 
clockwork to a fixed pattern to produce preconceived results, the driving 
force and symbolic machine of the Second Machine Age is the adaptable, 
general purpose computer.  
This is not to say that architects such Richard Rogers (b. 1933), co-
architect of the Pompidou Centre in Paris, and Norman Foster (b. 1935) 
turned their back entirely on the great pioneers. They had both been at Yale 
as students of Paul Rudolph, one of the first generation to have graduated 
from Walter Gropius’s Harvard School of Architecture, and Rogers himself 
acknowledges the power of landmark structures like Mies’s Seagram 
Building, albeit criticising their inability “to respond to the ebb and flow of 
contemporary life”.56  
Thus, one finds in Rogers’ buildings flexible solutions based on 
concrete and potentionally ever-changing solutions. Both the Pompidou 
Centre and the Lloyd’s Building in London, have the appearance at least of 
being open to further development through the addition of units, while at the 
same time using technology skillfully, frequently exploiting the latest 
technological developments in both the aerospace and armaments industries. 
Indeed, such high-tech buildings are like Mies’s in being beautifully crafted. 
Sometimes using standardised products, they were also to rely on new 
custom-made hand-crafted parts, made in the spirit of the Arts and Crafts 
movement from whence Pevsner began his account of the Modern 
Movement.  
Conclusion 
Thus, by following the career of György Kepes, with the benefit of all the 
resources that are available to us here in Eger we have a context in which to 
trace the history of the Modern Movement from its origins right up to the 
present day. Kepes’s controversial and forthright opinions, as well as the 
clarity and simplicity of the language in which he expressed them, not only 
make his theoretical writings ideal reading material for seminars, but a 
suitable starting point for discussions, course work and undergraduate theses. 
At a time when György Kepes’s name is being banded about by local 
government officials and politicians who have little understanding of what 
György Kepes was trying to achieve, it would be to the common good if 
Eger finally had a group of individuals who were actually familiar with 
Kepes’s writings and the movement to which they belong, and who may 
                                                                                                                            
human and natural resources, the vision of a small and frail-looking planet brought home 
to its passengers the dangers of not caring after their life-support system”. 
56 Sudjic, op. cit., p. 45 
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also, one day, be in a position to give concrete reasons for why the György 
Kepes Visual Center is worth keeping.  
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“[T]he umpteenth city of confusion” – 
Representations of Dublin in Contemporary Irish 
Poetry 
Péter Dolmányos 
The capital of Ireland plays a more than emblematic role in the poetry 
discussing Irish experience. The only metropolitan centre of the republic has 
about one quarter of the population of the country and is therefore a city of 
its own category in the hierarchy of settlements. Capitals always function as 
major political, administrative, economic and cultural centres and Dublin is 
no exception to this rule either. As a significant port it is easily accessible, as 
the leading population concentration it provides a diverse enough work force 
for various economic activities, which has considerably altered the image of 
the city in the last couple of decades. The one time backward colonial seat 
has become a bustling metropolis with all the implied changes of the 
process. The economic growth of the second part of the 20th century, 
however, has proved to be something far from exclusively positive. The 
demands for housing of an increasing population have led to reconstruction 
projects in the city – the spectacular springing up of housing estates is one 
certain sign of economic growth and the spread of suburbs proves the 
concurrent improvement of living standards in the process, at least for a 
certain segment of the population; such alterations necessarily lead to 
cultural consequences as well. Dublin has turned into a typical modern city, 
with all the ingredients of modern city life, involving not only the glamour 
of this but the less desirable elements as well – ample illustration of this is 
found in all fields of literary activity in the country, especially in such recent 
novels as those of Roddy Doyle.  
Naturally Dublin has carved out a place for itself in the recent poetry of 
Ireland – though interestingly enough, the city is only addressed by those 
who count as inhabitants of it, as if visitors were forbidden, or at least 
reluctant, to access the experience of the modern city. The city definitely 
demands a reaction from those living in it, springing from the daily necessity 
of confrontation with and survival in it. As cities are human constructs, they 
tend to take on human faces and human attributes, often with the aim of 
charming and captivating people – and as such, they tend to escape human 
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control, living a life of their own, leaving the poet with the task of 
penetrating the immediately visible face of the city for an understanding of 
its underlying essence. Dublin fosters such creative energies in the poets, 
though perhaps paradoxically or ironically, for scorning it rather than 
embracing the city. This is indicative of the critical spirit towards those 
processes and energies which have turned the city into what it is: the 
criticism of the city is at once the criticism of ideologies and of the historical 
processes initiated by the ideologies.  
Thomas Kinsella is the Dublin poet – by birth and upbringing, by 
residence and, most important of all, by imaginatively locating himself in the 
city and of the city in a number of poems. Kinsella’s earlier occupation as a 
civil servant offers him an insight into the dynamism of the transformation 
of the country and its capital city, therefore his poems provide an excellent 
guide to Dublin as it appears from the inside for a person with a grasp of 
what is actually happening to it. As a resident in the city his attachment is 
strong, yet this does not equal an uncritical stance, especially with his 
involvement in the economic resurgence of his place. With the passing of 
time the fallibility of the agents of change becomes manifest, leaving behind 
much bitterness and even more deprivation, yet Kinsella’s confession that 
Dublin is his place (cf. CP 283) marks his unchangeable rootedness in the 
city.  
Kinsella’s most comprehensive treatment of Dublin is contained in 
“Nightwalker”, a poem composed in the 1960s, the decade of the opening of 
the Republic towards the global economy. The poem is the account of a late 
night walk in Dublin, offering a rather sinister view of the city as it is 
transfigured by moonlight yet remaining essentially the same place: the 
modernising metropolis of a country desperate to attract foreign investment 
for growth, and thus slowly but surely growing alien to its inhabitants. The 
shadows of daylight items may grow threateningly bizarre at this time of the 
day but these shadows are still unable to make the speaker, a civil servant 
employed in the Department of Finance, forget about the administrative and 
economic function of the city. Interestingly enough what is depicted is not 
Dublin as a residence, a city translated into a web of streets with houses, but 
rather the city as an economic and a political unit: the abstract dimension 
dominates and the occasional cataloguing of detail comprises only familiar 
and typical items. Still, the many faces of the capital city are perhaps most 
vividly caught in this of all Kinsella’s poems, with a strong element of 
criticism directed against contemporary politics as well, which is partly self-
reflexive if Kinsella’s status as a civil servant is considered and thus offers a 
perspective on his participation in the process of modernisation too.  
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The unnumbered opening lines prepare the reader for an excursion into 
a rather awkward world. An emphasis is placed on the speaker’s awareness 
of the elements shaping human vision, the will groping for structure, the 
combat between “madness” and “reason”, the alternation of moments of 
insight with moments of blindness – the speaker thus comments on the poem 
that follows and this passage serves as partly an explanation and partly 
perhaps an excuse for the structural logic governing the process of 
composition, a logic which is rather unusual in the poetic tradition in which 
the poet is generally located. The first sentence of the first numbered section, 
“I only know things seem and are not good” (CP 76) takes this self-reflexive 
introductory passage one step further into a world where traditional ideas of 
order are not only suspended but replaced by a more distressing set of 
assumptions about the world. The beginning of the walk thus unfolds in a 
darkness that is not purely literal. Windows hiding “pale entities” (ibid) and 
people working in the underground laboratory are associated with “Near 
Necropolis” (CP 77), rendering the sleeping people even more passive and 
attributing the personnel in the laboratory magic powers, as they are 
“Embalmers” (ibid), preparing their clients for the Otherworld – yet the 
word “near” immediately introduces the tentativeness of these intentions.  
The persona is reminded of his ties to the citizens and indicates the 
temporariness of his walk. The daily routine of middle-class city-dwellers is 
arrested through the least attractive details: the early morning scratching 
while going downstairs for tea, leaving the house, waiting at the station, all 
performed with the sole purpose of doing useful work for “our businesses 
and government” (ibid). The brief summing up of the economic principles of 
the Republic culminates in the image of the Dublin statue of liberty – 
“Robed in spattered iron she stands / At the harbour mouth, Productive 
Investment” (ibid), then memories of the civil servant follow, “Spirit shapes” 
(CP 78) with a real dimension behind them – officials, ministers, people of 
power, most of them with a past, a role in turning Ireland into an 
independent country, now engaged in the labour of turning her into a 
prosperous one or perhaps in reflecting on their own images, of what they 
have become. The allegorical story of the “Wedding Group” of “The Groom, 
the Best Man, the Fox” (ibid) concludes this section – apart from the actual 
references (cf. TWM 46, footnote 2) the story functions perfectly as a 
general tale of betrayal of friends for power.  
The second section of the poem opens with casual images of lamp, light 
and shadow, and thus returns speaker and reader to the point of departure, 
the walk at night as an actual exercise. A page of the day’s paper is glimpsed 
in the gutter, with the picture of a “new young minister” in “his hunting suit” 
(CP 79). The obvious metaphoric evocation of the perishable nature of 
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things is not yet played out by the speaker as he continues his walk and 
presents other details observed on his way – Victorian houses and “the 
tower” (CP 80). The mysterious dark realm beyond the reach of the 
lamplight, however, is not lifeless – darkness, at least in that domain, does 
not equal the absence of life.  
“Watcher in the tower, / Be with me now” (ibid) is the invocation to the 
spirit of the place and the ghost of Joyce now becomes a real and active 
participant of the poem. So far it has been implied by the method Kinsella 
takes in composing his poem, now there is an explicit calling upon Joyce to 
assist the poet in his attempt to grasp his vision. The subsequent details 
would not look out of place in “Circe” either as the mysterious creatures are 
evoked by the persona’s consciousness; the hauntingly Joycean description 
of a phantom horseman is followed by the excited exclamation of the 
speaker, “Father of Authors!” (ibid), to fully realise a dense pastiche-like 
paragraph with a cunning self-referential comment inserted towards the end 
of the passage: “Subjects will find the going hard but rewarding” (CP 81). 
The phantom vision recedes as “The soiled paper settles back in the gutter” 
(ibid), with its heading, “The New Ireland”, more than ironically suggestive. 
The thoughts of the speaker centre on the minister in his hunting suit, 
declaring him no worse than the former old ones in the position. The picture 
comes alive in the mind of the persona, the hunt begins, and the metaphoric 
transfer of the scene onto the level of politics offers a link with the first part 
of the poem.  
The foot of the tower is seen as a special place “where the darkness / Is 
complete” (CP 81). The peaceful harbour allows the speaker to become 
conscious of his physical state and the smell of his body plunges him into a 
memory of school years – Brother Burke and his harping on about the usual 
anguish of the Irish, the consequences of being subjected to a strong 
colonising power. The speaker cannot share the nationalist zeal of his former 
instructor as it is shown by his comparison of the statue of the Blessed 
Virgin to “young Victoria” (CP 82) and by the ironic comment on the sole 
achievement of the school, the abundance of civil servants for the country. 
The evocation of the legendary figure of Amargin provides a more elevated 
dimension yet this involves a more profound sense of loss as well: the 
persona’s quiet remark, “A dying language / Echoes across a century’s 
silence” (CP 83), achieves more sympathy than the bombast rhetoric of the 
recalled Brother Burke. The quotidian, however, intrudes again as the 
speaker contemplates shadows of domestic life thrown against curtains in the 
Dublin night.  
Finding the night-time Dublin short of further inspiration, the speaker 
fixes his gaze upon the Moon in the fourth section. The second stanza of this 
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section offers a recollection with near-epic overtones (with an eye on 
Kinsella’s later poetry it foreshadows the technique of later sequences – his 
frequent reliance on early Irish myths and stories can be arrested in allusions 
and quotations of such narrative material) – the picture, though, is general 
enough to lead to a somewhat out-of-place didacticism in the third stanza. 
There is a teleological vision of history shining through these lines:  
 
There are times it is all part of a meaningful drama 
Beginning in the grey mists of antiquity 
And reaching through the years to unknown goals 
In the consciousness of man, which makes it less gloomy. (ibid)  
 
The picture once again dissolves into images of the night scene but the items 
are no longer man-made ones – natural elements existing independently of 
humans (with the exception of the “odour of lamplight” (ibid), heavily 
dependent on human ingenuity) are registered, but it is still the Moon which 
is the principal agent of creativity: there is even an apostrophe and an 
invocation addressed to it.  
The transformation of the speaker seems complete in the last section; the 
short tercets of the passage support what the persona asserts in a figure: “I 
am an arrow / Piercing the void” (CP 84). The journey ends in an 
embarrassing recognition, not significantly different from the conclusion of 
Joyce in his Dublin short stories and this section also echoes T. S. Eliot’s 
postwar doom. Modernisation brings about similar conditions of sterility as 
conflict does, and the rise of living standards and comforts do not 
automatically produce a culturally vibrant world. The last stanza of the poem 
forges a picture the ambiguous nature of which shows the feeling of the 
persona’s being totally lost – the casually naïve “I think” introduces a 
metaphor which in turn is explained in a language compressing 
conversational and a kind of discursive style, crowning the night-walk in the 
proper fashion:  
 
I think this is the Sea of Disappointment. 
If I stoop down, and touch the edge, it has  
A human taste, of massed human wills. (ibid) 
 
Kinsella’s night time Dublin is strangely devoid of people apart from 
the mysterious laboratory personnel and the recollected characters of daily 
civil life. The city thus comes into its own, waking to a “life” beyond life, 
with occasionally bizarre details – of which the most bizarre is perhaps the 
lack of life itself. Kinsella’s persona basically becomes an alternative to 
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Joyce’s wished-for reader as he is an ideal walker with an ideal insomnia, 
and the partially conditioned eyesight of a day-time civil servant is modified 
by the effects of fatigue in the wake of his sleeplessness. The city is regarded 
with suspicion, the persona does not subscribe to a belief in the benevolent 
direction of the growth of the place; rather, he (and Kinsella principally) 
assumes an antagonistic position to the official ideology of economic growth 
yielding a better life.  
‘Phoenix Park” deals with the story of moving from one place to 
another, and its fourth section provides a short assessment of the city of 
Dublin similar to that of “Nightwalker’. Dublin is “the umpteenth city of 
confusion” (CP 92), with “Pale light” (ibid) over it, and out of the “faint 
multitudes” (ibid) “A murmur of soft, wicked laughter rises.” (ibid) The 
picture turns even darker as the city is seen as “A theatre for the quick 
articulate / The agonized genteel, their artful watchers” (CP 93), with the 
speaker perhaps belonging to this last group. There is nothing elevating 
about Dublin; on the contrary, it is a place where “dead men, / Half-hindered 
by dead men, tear down dead beauty.” (ibid) If this is what greets the 
speaker on arrival, he needs to forge his own approach to be able to handle 
all this: “Return by the mental ways we have ourselves / Established.” (ibid) 
This recalls “Nightwalker” with its aloof speaker, contemplating and 
describing but not engaging, remaining always careful to keep enough 
distance between himself and what is observed, with commentaries reserved 
for an antagonistic position rather than a supporting one.  
In the much later poem “One Fond Embrace” the meditative speaker 
involves also the city of Dublin in his reflection. The city has moved along 
the course of ‘development’ indicated in the earlier poems and it is now 
shown as a background to a resulting rigid social division into two groups of 
the rich and the poor where development occurs solely for the sake of profit 
for a small group:  
 
Invisible speculators, urinal architects, 
and the Corporation flourishing their documents 
in potent compliant dance  
 
– planners of the wiped slate 
labouring painstaking over a bungled city 
to turn it into a zoo. (CP 284) 
 
The contrast is made explicit in the juxtaposition of residential districts, with 
a “twinned experimental / concrete piss-tower for the underprivileged” (ibid) 
in one of them. The centre of the city does not fare any better: plans exist 
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and function until the money runs out, what is left is an unfinished 
‘memorial’, inducing the speaker to an angry wish: “May their sewers blast 
under them!” (CP 285) In spite of all its repulsive features the place is still 
one with a profound importance for the speaker: “I never want to be 
anywhere else” (CP 283). 
Kinsella’s renderings of Dublin reflect the stereoscopic vision of a 
person connected to the city by various ties yet retaining his critical faculties 
in spite of all attachment. In Kinsella’s voice the former civil servant, the 
poet, the translator of Gaelic poetry and the Dublin citizen meet and 
negotiate their different claims, thus the vision is a complex and challenging 
one. Limitations and shortcomings are not generously forgotten but the final 
verdict is a return to emotional categories and life-long attachment – that 
Kinsella considers Dublin his place is the confession of a rooted person.  
Though a poet of rural origins in County Kerry, Brendan Kennelly has 
long been a Dublin resident. His keen eyes for perception grant him a 
familiarity with the details of modern metropolitan life and his “Dublin: A 
Portrait” gives a vision of the city in which the least sympathetic aspects of 
modern Dublin are foregrounded and the finished picture is one that 
perfectly undermines any idealising attempt of the city. His attempt is 
radically different from that of Kinsella and his account does not involve 
self-reflexive or introspective elements but the city of his vision is also one 
dominated by the less attractive consequences of economic development and 
the concurrent rise of living standards. Though Kennelly is never explicit 
about his belonging to the city as a resident, there is a moment which 
approximates the confessional: the early Sunday morning walk of another 
poem opens up a city which he appears willing to embrace, yet not without a 
strain of ambiguity.  
Kennelly’s principal vision of Dublin is provided in the poem “Dublin: 
A Portrait.” A comfortably distant perspective is immediately established by 
the first word of the poem, “there”, which indicates the position of the 
persona as an observer detached from the scene. The deficient syntactic 
structure of the first sentence supports a panoramic technique of registering 
catalogue items – items which are supposed to be people of the city:  
 
There the herds of eloquent phonies, 
Dark realities kept in the dark,  
Squalor stinking at many a corner,  
Poverty showing an iron hand; 
There the tinker sprawls on the pavement. (ATFV 123)  
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Proper syntactic order appears from the second sentence on and the 
comments on the various catalogued items become more elaborate. The 
whole city becomes a hotbed of gossip and rumour, church towers serve to 
block out the light rather than guide the human glance skywards and 
religious ritual is reduced to bargaining with God for getting on, indicating 
the complete conquest of the spiritual by economic forces. The only real 
effort is reserved for the sea which is engaged in the next to impossible 
struggle of cleansing the city of its human load and filth.  
The “items” of Kennelly’s catalogue are people of different social 
positions yet the ironic distance reduces them to little more than vegetative 
beings. The listing begins with “the herds of eloquent phonies’, accompanied 
by the tinker, the typical Irish element, and the lunatic, then a brief glance at 
the suburban world introduces the prosperous “dead men’, just to return to 
the other extreme, the “defeated’, who “Makes a drunken myth of 
deprivation” (ibid). None of the registered representatives of Dublin life 
acquires any sort of dignity, all of them merit only the contempt of the 
observer, pointing to the repulsive and impersonal nature of city life. 
“Communal value” is dependent on social consensus which is not shared by 
the persona – the “eloquent phonies” are presumably fashionable in terms of 
city life, the “dead men” or “corpses” of the suburbs certainly are such 
creatures.  
The unfavourable portraits of typical characters give way to more 
general and at once more impersonal elements: gossips and “Rumours of 
rumours” fill the city, further reducing the personal dimension of the picture, 
just to come to a nadir in the oxymoron of the “Holy frauds” who “Bargain 
with God that they may get on” (ibid). The all-conquering merchant 
mentality noted by Kinsella is made manifest without any sense of shame. 
The poem closes with the image of the sea in its never-ceasing conflict with 
the shore. Though the sea is engaged in the activity of “Washing the feet of 
the stricken city, / Trying to purge its human filth” (ibid), the religious 
associations of the words do not create the corresponding atmosphere, and 
the progressive aspect clearly marks the futility and impossibility of ever 
completing the otherwise noble enterprise.  
The second part of the title of the poem, “A Portrait” indicates distance, 
the idea of recording details from an objective perspective – yet Kennelly’s 
persona cannot remain unengaged, even if it involves a rather obsessive 
exhortation of what he sees around himself. The repeated “There” points to a 
panoramic viewpoint but the picture is informed by the experience of the 
keen-eyed observer in close relation with what he is dealing with, a person 
with intimate and perhaps even immediate knowledge of these details. The 
technique of the poem reflects the ambivalence of the point of view of the 
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persona – the imposition of rhymes on the material suggests the apparent 
order of life but it does not guarantee anything below the surface, as the lack 
of stanza patterns or further division of the poem into sections also indicates 
this.  
Another Kennelly poem bears the emblematic title “The Celtic 
Twilight” – yet this title is followed by a demythologisation and desecration 
of a phrase with many literary resonances. Kennelly’s “Celtic Twilight” is 
what it primarily is, the late phase of the day in a “Celtic” location, Dublin, 
the modern city. The usual associations of the phrase in the title are 
immediately blocked as the first line of the poem opens the description of the 
twilight scene with “decrepit whores” (ATFV 119) and continues with 
corpses floating on the water of the Grand Canal. The corpses turn out to 
have been a dog and a cat, and the animal imagery is carried on as the 
women and men are seen as mutually intent on preying on one another. The 
prostitutes are “scavengers” (ibid) yet the not-so-muted sympathy of the 
speaker sees them as victims or preys as well, with “Dublin’s Casanovas” to 
blame, without question, for their misery.  
The second stanza focuses on one of these decrepit women and her 
desperation is portrayed. Demythologisation continues as echoes of Yeats 
haunt the poem – the shrill voice this time belongs to a prostitute who, 
having been cheated by a client, is “Preparing once again to cast an eye / On 
passing prospects” (ibid). The image of the “infested waters” (ibid) returns 
with the floating carcasses, to provide a fitting scenery for these “lurid 
women and predatory men / Who must inflict but cannot share / Each other’s 
pain” (ibid). The closing image of strangers locked into the same situation 
yet unable to recognise it casts a shadow over Dublin life and perpetuates the 
twilight – desecration is complete, the Celtic twilight returns to the common 
language to repossess its literal meaning and shed the old metaphorical, just 
to take on new figurative ones which are this time less noble than the 
previous one.  
“Clearing a Space” is a poem placed in the collection A Time for Voices 
right after the other two Dublin poems. The juxtaposition is certainly not 
unintentional as the poem contrasts with the former ones: it offers a 
somewhat Wordsworthian approach to the city as it is devoid of people, and 
by virtue of this the city is not itself, on the unusual occasion of a Sunday 
morning “about six o’clock” (ATFV 124) which is sleeping time for most 
people. At the unusual time of observation the city takes on a different 
image, it wakes to a life of its own, an existence independent of and 
indifferent to its human population. “The river is talking to itself”, “The city 
turns to the mountains / And takes time to listen to the sea”, there is a 
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“relaxed sky” (ibid) above. The buildings equally keep to their own counsel, 
the parks are allowed their due privacy.  
Yet the city, however empty of people it is, does not lose its human 
dimension – as an endless reservoir of nurturing and sustaining energies it is 
a “friend” (ibid) of the observer. The ambiguity of the first line of the last 
stanza, “I make through that nakedness to stumble on my own” (ATVF 125), 
suggests that the common feature of city and human being is that enigmatic 
“nakedness” which is discovered only when observed on a special occasion 
(and perhaps by an unusual observer too). The persona’s embracing of 
Dublin can occur only at such an hour, the true resemblance of the city to a 
man can, paradoxically, be understood only when the people are removed 
from it.  
Though Paul Durcan’s poem “Going Home to Mayo, Winter 1949” is 
concerned primarily with the West of Ireland, the starting point of the 
indicated journey is Dublin. By virtue of functioning as the place to escape 
from, Dublin is commented upon in a number of lines in the poem – “the 
alien, foreign city of Dublin” (ASIMP 34 ) is left behind in the first line, just 
to be addressed on return as “the daylight nightmare of Dublin City” (ibid). 
The city indeed casts a sobering sight to the returning travellers as suburban 
detached houses are quickly replaced by “blocks after blocks of so-called 
‘new’ tenements” (ibid) and all these houses remind the speaker of the 
damnation of modern city life: the houses and blocks of flats are “crosses of 
loneliness” (ASIMP 35) and gates solemnly parade as bells tolling the 
“mutual doom” (ASIMP 34) of the inhabitants – of whom the speaker and 
his father happen to be two representatives. Durcan’s Dublin is thus closely 
related to the versions of Kinsella and Kennelly in terms of its generally 
unfavourable atmosphere, yet Durcan goes one step further than Kennelly 
and Kinsella as his version of the city becomes a reminder of the 
transitoriness of human life, of its inevitable progress forward in time 
towards a closure without any reference to redemption, and it also expresses 
the failure of the city to provide some sort of shelter, let alone home, in the 
temporary world of human existence.  
Eavan Boland’s poem “The Huguenot Graveyard at the Heart of the 
City” introduces another, and comparably friendlier, aspect of Dublin City 
proper: apropos of the cemetery of refugees of religious persecution the city 
takes on the image of a safe harbour of tolerance. The abstract notion of 
religious persecution becomes a tangible practical term in the moment it 
receives a body in the form of an actual location. The sight of the cemetery 
“in the alcove of twilight” (IATOV 31) is set against the backdrop of busy 
urban life, “Car exhausts and sirens” (ibid) and buses passing. The names on 
the graves often ring familiar, they “have eased into ours” (ibid) and their 
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exile is modulated into something less explicitly alien as the persona 
acknowledges that “There is a flattery in being a destination. / There is a 
vanity in being the last resort” (ibid). The story of the refugees follows: they 
fled from France to complete their course of life in Ireland, following their 
faith which banished them from their homes and now this “faith lies low 
with the lives it /dispossessed” (ibid). They begin to appear strange and even 
exotic, the speaker considers them as these refugees might have thought 
about Ireland, contemplating also their addition of sounds to Dublin speech, 
thus becoming a part of the spirit of the place. There are haunting images of 
the moment before their departure from their native land, which then lead the 
speaker to look at Dublin in a different light: the city “which is dear to as 
and particular” (IATOV 32) was for these people “merely / the one witty 
step ahead of hate // which is all that they could keep. Or stay” (ibid). The 
conclusion somewhat undermines the otherwise generous-looking image of 
Dublin in the context of receiving such victims of religious persecution: its 
status is not particular, it is not in fact a destination but a next step which in 
time proves to be the only one, so the city acquires its privileged function 
only with hindsight, viewed from a later perspective. This notion perhaps 
explains why the title of the poem employs the preposition “at” instead of 
the more usual “in”.  
Boland’s Dublin, however, is not exclusively the busy urban world 
which still offers such places and instances of silent meditation as the 
Huguenot graveyard. Dublin also has suburbs, already noted by Kennelly, 
and such places require their representation too, especially if the point of 
view is a less usual one. “Suburban Woman” is set in such a modern frontier 
zone as the world of the suburbs, located at the meeting of city and country. 
The title immediately focuses on a rather unusual topic in Irish poetry, a 
suburban woman, representing a voice muted for several reasons. Partly in 
accordance with this sounding out of repression the poem is dominated by an 
imagery of conflict and fight: spousal disagreements become guerrilla fights, 
everyday routines are described as struggles, the evening moment of letting 
the blind down is the putting out of the white flag – all these create the 
image of a militant figure, the suburban woman of the title thus is one who is 
absorbed in a hard and long-lasting fight with the circumstances, as the 
frontier demands it. In the closing section the speaker explicitly allies herself 
to this woman figure, acknowledging the filter of writing between them.  
The urban frontier is further explored in “Ode to Suburbia”. Despite the 
claims of the title, the elevated style and subject matter are absent from the 
poem; this is one way of indicating the quotidian and undignified world of 
the suburbs. “No magic here” (SP 31) concludes the poem, after the often 
nerve-racking routines are enumerated in an environment which is 
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constricted and claustrophobic. Uniformity and physical proximity foster 
curiosity; this is also fuelled by the unexciting routines of one’s own life 
which leads them to seek something interesting or at least unusual or 
different in someone else’s life.  
What would normally be considered a sign of prosperity comes to be 
subverted, just as it happens in Kennelly’s world: the suburb, instead of 
signalling rising standards of living, is an “ugly sister” (SP 30), a place 
where life is seen as a “blister” (ibid) on the general dark, back gardens are 
claustrophobic and “varicose / With shrubs” (ibid), and windows have turned 
into “mirrors which again / And again show the same woman /Shriek at a 
child” and which “multiply” (ibid) the household chores among which not 
much difference is indicated between washing up and rearing a child. This is 
a world which destroys its inhabitants, principally the addressed female ones 
– women come to be distorted into shapeless masses of human flesh, in 
which state “human” is only felt and understood through the physical pain 
experienced by them. This disillusioned and unmagical place, however, is 
still capable of working miraculous transformations: this monotonous and 
self-annihilating routine yields changes and knowledge, a daily re-enactment 
of the general pattern of fall and salvation, of death and resurrection with 
something new added to it. The suburb thus recovers something of dignity, 
though not particularly because of its nature as location but by the fact that it 
is ‘home’, and home involves family, with the woman as its central force and 
source. This also implies, by a juxtaposition with the poem dealing with the 
Huguenot graveyard, that the source of regeneration and growth is the 
suburb rather than the centre of the city.  
Dublin’s old image as a city of beggars and poverty thus slowly 
changes yet what comes in the wake of the old is not enchanting for most of 
the poets either. Economic changes bring a general rise in the standards of 
living but they do not eliminate deprivation – in fact, they bring about new 
forms of it, proving that the idea of ‘general’ is a deceptive one. The 
inhabitants of Dublin may worry for a change as part of the 
internationalisation of the capital, which leads to a predictable decline in its 
‘Irish’ character and to the flourishing of criminal activities but at the same 
time it turns Dublin into a favourite destination for international tourism, 
which in turn means further income and prosperity. Change is never 
unequivocal, especially not in the world of modern cities, yet this is perhaps 
to the benefit of Dublin’s poets since it provides rich material for 
contemplation and at the same time assigns them the task of formulating 
their own relation to the city, which in all cases involves the element of 
belonging.  
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In Love with the Abject – John Cowper Powys’s 
Weymouth Sands1 
Angelika Reichmann 
 
“the man who hung there, like a cadaver in a 
straight waistcoat, was analysing Lucinda as if 
he were embracing a vivisected, half-
anaesthetized, snarling panther”2 
 
Jeremy Robinson in his introduction to a relatively new collection of articles 
on Powys’s novels, while enlarging on how much his oeuvre is neglected by 
major characters of literary criticism, casually remarks that “[o]ne could 
imagine essays on the Kristevan abject in Powys’s use of vivisection in 
Weymouth Sands” (“Introduction,” iv). His comment seems to be rather 
provocative and fanciful at first sight: vivisection, though a recurrent motif 
in the novel, is apparently located at its periphery. One of the major 
characters, Magnus Muir, is deeply concerned with the inhumanity of the 
vivisection of dogs going on in the local asylum called the Brush Home, and 
later on Sylvanus Cobbold, who is forced to become an inhabitant of the 
same institution, launches a heroic fight to stop it. However, the novel is far 
from being centred on the issue of vivisection – in fact, the notion of any 
centre seems to be hardly applicable to either its plot or the perspectives 
filtered through the narrative consciousness implied by the apparently non-
intrusive third person narrative voice. No wonder that Janina Nordius, an 
excellent expert of Powys’s novels, pushes aside the whole issue of 
vivisection with one passing remark, which relegates it to other images of 
“universal suffering” (Nordius 52–53) in Powys’s works: “But the more 
specific images of suffering seem to have been replaced by the frequent but 
fairly general references to vivisection said to go on in the Brush asylum” 
(132). On closer inspection, however, vivisection in Weymouth Sands proves 
                                                     
1 Research for the present article has been carried out with the assistance of the Eötvös 
Scholarship supplemented by a grant from the Hungarian Ministry of Education (OM). 
2 Powys, Weymouth Sands, 448-449. From now on all quotes from Weymouth Sands are 
indicated only by WS and the page numbers. 
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to be a highly significant metaphor for psychoanalysis and, by analogy, 
science, which underlies Powys’s vision of humanity in the novel. This, in 
turn, reveals a curious – perverted? – fascination with the abject, which 
might be regarded as the dominant shaping factor of Powys’s choice of 
characters, structuring of plot and narrative technique in Weymouth Sands. 
Vivisection and Psychoanalysis – Images of the Abject 
Though locating vivisection in an asylum might seem arbitrary today, it 
serves as a starting point for the gradually evolving identification of 
vivisection and psychoanalysis, which finally becomes a firmly established 
metaphor in Weymouth Sands. The originally – questionably – metonymical 
relationship of the two concepts acquires its metaphorical quality through the 
repeated comparison of the vivisected animals with the human patients of the 
institution, while the vivisector and the analyst are actually the same person, 
Dr. Brush. The association of the vivisected dogs with Dr. Brush’s mental 
patients is introduced by Magnus Muir: 
[…] he suddenly began telling himself a story about the spirits of the old 
tribes who had raised this huge earth-fortress [of Maiden Castle], and how 
the captive souls from the Brush Home might at least in the liberation of 
sleep come flocking out through the night to Maiden Castle and be there 
protected and safe, along with a great ghostly pack of crouching, 
whimpering, fawning, cringing, torture-released dogs, all crowding close 
behind these phantom-warriors, as wave after wave of their enemies poured 
up the slope, trying in vain to repossess themselves of them. (WS 115) 
This association is further underlined by Marret, who relates the impressions 
of an eye-witness of vivisection, and points out that the dog “screamed like a 
human being” (WS 401). The metaphor gains an almost authoritative power 
when the “vivisector”, Dr. Brush himself establishes the same analogy. He 
admits to himself that in the name of hunting for scientific truth he is a 
torturer, keeping dogs in utter pain on the verge of life and death, and 
figuratively doing the same to human beings like Lucinda Cobbold: 
“I don’t know which is the most exciting: cutting truth out of dogs or 
coaxing it out of men. But this I know: that I would help every dog in the 
world to die howling and reduce every woman in the world to a cold 
sepulchral pulp, like Mrs. Cobbold, if I could add only a page to the great 
Folio of verified and verifiable truth! How lovely, how exquisite are this 
man’s self-deceptions! God! I could watch him and experiment on him for 
a hundred years! Oh, how I wish I could buy a cartload of healthy 
Dogberries as easily as Murphy can buy healthy Dogs! And Murphy 
himself. How beautifully complicated his sadism is, with its delicate feelers 
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and its subtle arts of self-protective concealment! Murphy was drawn to the 
vivisection-laboratory as inevitably as […] those holy torturers to their 
castle-prisons.” (WS 440) 
In the same scene one of the narrator’s comments on Dr. Brush also 
underpins the metaphor: 
[…] that ghastly Lemur hanging there opposite him, that corpse-man, 
sweating the wise sweat of the cunning of corpses […] sat up so erect in his 
new over-coat, just as if he had a rope under his expressionless face […] the 
man who hung there, like a cadaver in a straight waistcoat, was analysing 
Lucinda as if he were embracing a vivisected, half-anaesthetized, snarling 
panther. (WS 448–449) 
Finally, at the very end of the novel, the metaphor is literally given by Dr. 
Brush himself, though he only poses it as the question of “whether in delving 
into [Lucinda Cobbold’s] secret life and humouring her morbidities, he was 
not practising vivisection upon her rather than psychiatry” (WS 566).  
To indicate the proper weight of the implications of this metaphor in 
terms of the Kristevan abject, first let me contextualise vivisection and 
psychoanalysis in Powysian art and highlight their relationship with thematic 
and narrative concerns in his texts. Vivisection is an obsessively recurring 
image of “Powys’s worst evil – scientific cruelty” (Knight 99–100), against 
which he launches an obstinate fight and formulates his Rabelaisian 
philosophy. It features as a more or less emphatic motif in three of his other 
novels (Morwyn – Knight 63; The Inmates – Knight 82; Up and Out – 
Knight 108) apart from Weymouth Sands as a form of the sadistic and thus 
the physically repellent in mankind (Knight 21). “Vivisectional” is almost an 
“epitheton ornans” of contemporary science, seen as fundamentally 
“inhuman” in his essay on Dostoevsky (Powys, Dostoievsky 189). Notably, 
vivisection also appears in his lengthy essayistic work on Rabelais, first 
published in 1948, fourteen years after Weymouth Sands: it is in Rabelais’s 
attitude to nature, including the most excremental aspects of human 
existence, that Powys detects an approach “diametrically opposed to the 
unphilosophical inhumanity of Vivisection” (Powys, Rabelais 42). In 
Powys’s reading of Rabelais this is the basis of “Pantagruelism”, the 
philosophy formulated in the books of Gargantua and Pantagruel, which he 
rather likes to read as a new “Gospel”. Though his treatment of the French 
writer, with special reference to such chapters as “Rabelais as a Prophet”, 
must be taken with certain reservations, his understanding of the 
Renaissance text, though far from being so academic, bears comparison with 
Bakhtin’s interpretation. Powys identifies roughly nine major components of 
Rabelaisian philosophy, namely “the ataraxia of the Stoics”, parody, 
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“farcical and sardonic humour”, “considerate humanity and pity”, 
“shameless realism and gross bawdiness”, a “Christian element”, a “magical 
and almost occult hero-worship”, “endurance, enjoyment, and unlimited 
toleration” and “a metaphysical element” (Powys, Rabelais 368-369). It 
must be noted that Powys, totally independently from Bakhtin’s train of 
thought3, emphasises some of the poetic dimensions of Rabelais’ works – 
parody (Bahtyin, François Rabelais 16, 19–22, Bahtyin, Dosztojevszkij 159–
160, 239–240), realism/materialism, sardonic humour and bawdiness/comic 
treatment of the excremental and sexual, carnivalesque laughter (Bahtyin, 
François Rabelais 27–34), tolerance/suspension of official hierarchy 
(Bahtyin, François Rabelais 30–37, 12, 18, 15–16) – which Bakhtin, on the 
one hand, brought in the foreground of analysis, on the other hand, used as 
points of reference for his concept of polyphony formulated in his 
interpretation of Dostoevsky’s poetics (Bahtyin, Dosztojevszkij 10–11, 159–
160, 239–240). Translated into Bakhtinian terms, Powys, expressing a 
distrust in science so typical of mythologically orientated Modernists, poses 
against the monological “truth” of reason a dialogic or polyphonic vision of 
his Rabelaisian “Multiverse” (Powys, Rabelais 370). Powys’s personal 
Rabelaisian philosophy, aiming at a “mastery of the repellent” which is “a 
step […] to a mastery of the horror of death” (Knight 85-86), on the one 
hand, is formulated in opposition to a crudely scientific approach manifested 
in such horrors as vivisection, on the other hand, it results in a pluralistic 
vision of the world (Knight 85)4. 
Just like the image of vivisection in his art, Powys’s idea of 
psychoanalysis, most directly elaborated in his essay Psychoanalysis and 
Morality, is also inseparably intertwined with his notions of ethics and his 
personal philosophy. The short text, traditionally published as a separate 
booklet since its first edition in 1923, preceded the publication of Weymouth 
Sands by eleven years, but – as its title itself also suggests – it gives a direct 
and actually often didactic elaboration of several issues related to 
psychoanalysis in the novel. In the essay Powys, who is conversant with the 
theories of Freud, Jung and Adler (9), hails psychoanalysis as the new 
                                                     
3 Jacqueline Peltier in her comprehensive study comparing Powys’s different interpretations 
of Rabelais, also emphasises that Bakhtin’s and Powys’s works were written approximately 
at the same time and that Powys would probably have been highly interested in the Russian 
critic’s interpretation, finding a kindred spirit in him. Though she follows the developments 
of Powys’s interpretation only in his non-belletristic works, she also takes it for granted that 
Rabelais’ extremely deep influence on Powys’s personal philosophy also surfaces in his 
novels (http://www.powys-lannion.net/Powys/LettrePowysienne/number7.htm). 
4 Cf. also Joe Boulter’s two comprehensive studies on pluralism in Powys’s Porius in his 
volume Postmodern Powys – New Essays on John Cowper Powys (Kidderminster, Crescent 
Moon, 2000). 
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science which is to liberate mankind from the burden of having to think of 
socially stigmatised sexual practices, such as homosexuality and incest, in 
terms of sin (10–11). Powys’s viewpoint is partly anti-Christian, partly 
feminist: he locates the source of the traditional attitude to sexuality in 
Western Christianity, more concretely the Christian notion of sin (13) and 
considers it a basically masculine innovation (20–22), a part of “man-made 
customs” (36). He even arrives at the point of criticising psychoanalysis 
itself for being a part of the establishment in a sense, since it remains within 
the boundaries of “man-made language” by relegating women exclusively to 
the role of the mother and not “articulating […] the real nature of woman’s 
un-hypnotised reaction to the mystery of life” (38). As it can be expected 
from Powys’s rejection of Christian morality, there is a strong metaphysical 
strain in his argument: with a rather Blakean turn he connects “ethical 
austerity in the matter of sex” with “philosophical austerity in the matter of 
the cosmic mystery” – with a restriction on the freedom of individual 
thought in the domain of the sacred (23). Psychoanalysis, by opening up the 
unfathomable depths of the human soul, seems to be liberating in this 
respect, as well: it facilitates pluralism, ironic criticism and “humorous 
indulgence” (23–32). Powys even comes to define art and literature in 
psychoanalytic terms when he claims that not only the creation of texts and 
their reception are erotic in nature (31), but also the individual’s attitude to 
the world, since he “possesses, devours, and aesthetically digests, as much of 
the unfathomable universe as he is able to appropriate to his desire” (33). 
The eroticism of this “aesthetic digestion”, however, is fundamentally 
Narcissistic, because everybody “seeks […] a diffused reproduction in the 
objective world of what they are subjectively in themselves” (33). In fact, 
Psychoanalysis and Morality suggests that psychoanalysis – and literature, 
being both its forerunner and the user of its achievements – facilitates an 
intrusion of the pluralistic (Rabelaisian?) vision of the world into such most 
hostile territories as science, Christian ethics and metaphysics. 
Far from intending to simplify the analysis of Weymouth Sands into its 
reading as a direct realisation of Powys’s sometimes vague and heuristic 
theoretical notions, let me use the two texts mentioned above as prioritised 
intertexts which throw into relief the subtleties of the metaphorical 
identification of vivisection and psychoanalysis. The first, most surprising 
and obvious superficial conclusion can be that the very identification of the 
two terms in Weymouth Sands is in fundamental opposition with Powys’s 
notions expressed in his essays. The fact that the metaphor evolves into a 
network of motifs which finely interlace the whole texture of the novel, 
encourages a reading which strives to go behind the passionate and suspect 
gospel of the two essayistic texts partly containing Powys’s own 
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interpretation of his writing practice via his personal philosophy. In 
Weymouth Sands both vivisection and psychoanalysis are instances of the 
abject, metaphorically linked to most characters in the novel and thus 
drawing into their field of force almost the entire text. Let me explore this 
network of images and characters to demonstrate how Powys’s “multiverse” 
is built on a simultaneous repulsion from and fascination with several 
aspects of human existence depicted as abject, not by any chance restricted 
to such particular phenomena as vivisection – or psychoanalysis, for that 
matter. Going beyond the platitude of repeating the Kristevan claims that the 
analyst “drawing perverse jouissance” from “displaying the abject” can 
easily confuse himself for it (210) and that if not all literature (207) than at 
least “[g]reat modern literature unfolds over [the] terrain [of the abject]” 
(18), one can claim that Powys’s position turns out to be a very special one 
in Modernist literature. His constant fight with “the repellent”, culminating 
in his Rabelaisian philosophy, in fact means consciously posing the 
carnivalesque spirit against abjection – two notions which are hardly 
separable, as Kristeva’s exposition of Céline’s oeuvre also indicates5. How 
far such a division is practicable remains one of the major dilemmas of 
Weymouth Sands. 
To demonstrate how the abject seems to be appropriate the whole 
texture of the novel, let me start with the core of the metaphorical network 
related to it, that is, with the metaphorical identification of vivisection and 
psychoanalysis revealing that both belong to the domain of the Kristevan 
abject in Weymouth Sands. For the sake of clarity two aspects of these 
phenomena can be differentiated and treated separately: the representation of 
the analyst as a vivisector and the analysand as a vivisected animal, with 
interwoven remarks on the relationship of the two. The related metaphors 
feature some of the motifs prioritised by Kristeva as appearances of the 
abject, such as the corpse (Kristeva 3–4), the living dead, the ghost6, the 
                                                     
5 Carnival and its related terms, such as the grotesque, ambiguity and the apocalyptic make 
repeated appearances in Kristeva’s analysis of Céline’s texts (especially 138-195), let alone 
the fact that most of the thematic elements she analyses in terms of the abject could be as 
handily interpreted within the scope of the carnivalesque. Unfortunately, she does not clarify 
the relationship of the two notions – carnival seems to be a facet of abjection in literature at 
best – though her theory draws on Bakhtinian notions quite obviously. Such an 
incorporation of the carnivalesque under the umbrella term of the abject deprives it of the 
liberating optimism not only Bakhtin’s more professional and Powys’s lay reading, but also 
Kristeva’s own early interpretations ascribe to it (Томсон 125). The clarification of the 
relationship of the two terms, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper.  
6 For an analysis of abject bodies, among them ghosts in fantastic, more specifically in Gothic 
stories cf. Réka Mónika Cristian’s “The Fantastic Abject as Bodies in Mirrors” 
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ambiguous border (Kristeva 4) and lead on to more general issues, such as 
abjection of the self (Kristeva 5–6), the ambiguous feelings attached to the 
abject (9–10), the ethics of psychoanalysis, the location of the speaking 
subject (Kristeva 11–12), the structuring of plot and the specific aspects of 
narrative consciousness in the novel. 
Dr. Brush, the analyst and vivisector, who is repeatedly described as a 
corpse, who despises himself, his own science and the whole of humanity, 
who feels unsurpassable pleasure while interminably experimenting with his 
patients without the faintest hope of cure, readily lends himself to 
interpretation as the psychoanalyst who not only “confuses himself for the 
abject” but in fact is abject. The first aspect of this complex phenomenon to 
be mentioned is that Daniel Brush is apostrophised as a corpse in various 
ways: he is a “corpse-man”, “a cadaver” and he is compared to a hanged 
man making love to a half-dead panther (WS 448–449)7. Julia Kristeva 
assigns a definitive role to the corpse (cadaver) as the embodiment of the 
border (death) against which the subject defines itself and to which all other 
forms of waste are related: 
The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to fall), that which has irremediably come a 
cropper, a cesspool, and death; it upsets even more violently the one who 
confronts it as fragile and fallacious chance. […] If dung signifies the other 
side of the border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the 
corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon 
everything. […] the corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the 
utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It is something 
rejected from which one does not part. Imaginary uncanniness and real 
threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing us. (Kristeva 3–4) 
Powys assigns to vivisection and the psychologist the role of the very border 
mentioned here that defines not only the individual human being, but, in the 
case of Weymouth Sands, humanity as such. It gains force partly through the 
spatial symbolism of the novel, partly through the more than questionable 
ethical stance embodied by Dr. Brush. 
While the location of the institution clearly situates it as a metaphorical 
border, the characters’ emotional reaction to the building, a metonymy for 
                                                                                                                            
(Proceedings of the 2nd Tempus Mini-Conference – English Studies and the Curriculum, 
Debrecen, Kossuth University, 1997), 94–107. 
7 The metaphor of the “ghastly Lemur” (WS 448) complicates the image by almost 
tautologically introducing the notion of the living dead: lemurs are actually ghosts, evil 
spirits in Roman mythology (Hamilton 48), and the etymologically related “ghastly” 
(Neufeldt 568) partly repeats and thereby emphasises the same information. Since the ghost 
is a common metaphor of both analyst and analysand in Weymouth Sands, let me return to it 
in the analysis of the latter. 
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vivisection and psychological treatment, interprets it more specifically as a 
psychological border – of horror, madness and death – against which the 
subject defines himself. Since “[w]hat was now the Brush Home was hidden 
away in so out of the world spot, that very few among what Homer calls 
‘articulately-speaking men’ who lived in Weymouth had ever been near it, 
though most people had heard of it” (WS 109–110), the institution is 
figuratively placed at the border of the (known) human world – in a 
horizontal dimension, it is like a terra incognita, in a vertical one, more 
specifically, it is like the underworld. Later the Brush Home is actually 
compared to Hades (WS 518). This is the psychological Hell’s Museum (WS 
86) against which characters in the novel, by rejecting vivisection and 
madness, can define themselves as live, sane and moral, thereby establishing 
their own identity and humanity. This is the case with such relatively less 
complicated minor characters as Marret (WS 401), Chant (WS 111–112) or 
even the neurotic child Benny Cattistock, who makes his first appearance in 
the novel with a dog in his arms just rescued from vivisection (WS 100). In 
fact, it is popular wisdom that has given the place the name “Hell’s 
Museum” (WS 111–112), which thus expresses the self-definition of the 
community of the people living in its vicinity through rejecting it and 
placing it beyond, or rather below the limits of the human world. It is only 
Dogberry Cattistock, “the man of action” (Knight 46), a representative of a 
spirit totally alien from Weymouth, who appreciates the scientific practices 
of Dr. Brush to the extent that he finances his “experimental laboratory”. 
Even he finds vivisection “devilish queer” (WS 437), though, when on his 
wedding day he ends up watching the doctor the whole day instead of 
making his appearance at church.  
However, in the exemplary cases of Magnus Muir and Sylvanus 
Cobbold vivisection, though clearly forming a border, also exposes 
something unbearable within the human psyche that actually threatens 
identity. Magnus Muir’s impressions play a definitive role in establishing the 
function of vivisection as border. Just like he finds it difficult even to look at 
Daniel Brush “without an obscure horror” (WS 102), and at the thought that 
“[t]his man is a vivisector […] a sickening sensation of anger and disgust 
[takes] possession of him” (WS 101), the sight of the very building provokes 
“sick aversion and distaste” (WS 110) in him. His emphatically bodily 
reaction is a perfect example of the “loathing” and “repugnance” one feels 
for the abject (Kristeva 2). His aversion soon takes on the form of the fear of 
death – he senses “an atmosphere of such horror that he fidgeted in his seat 
and felt sick in his stomach as if he were going to see an execution” (WS 
110) – and the fear of losing his sanity. The latter, however, becomes 
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intertwined with his desire for Curly, so that the two affects are intermixed 
in the same bodily sensation: 
“How can any one of us have a single moment of happiness […] when 
there’s such a thing as vivisection in the world? And yet would I, to stop it 
once and for all, and to burn all their operating tables and all their straps 
and all their instruments, be prepared to sacrifice Curly?” 
The coming together of these two electrified nerves in Magnus’ nature, 
his erotic passion and his sickening twinge over vivisection, threw him […] 
into a series of jumpy contortions. He kept experiencing a twitching in his 
long legs, and every now and then with a muscular contraction that 
corresponded to what he visioned was happening under Mr. Murphy’s 
devotion to science he would draw up one of his heels along the floor of the 
car. 
“I suppose,” he thought, “the only thing to do is to assume that life 
contains cruelties so unspeakable that if you think about them you go mad! 
That’s what it is! To think about Murphy and Dr. Brush’s dogs brings you 
into the care of Dr. Brush!” (WS 306) 
It is in combination with sexuality and unavowable pleasure that vivisection 
– and psychoanalysis – really play the threatening role of the abject, which is 
“[o]n the edge of non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I 
acknowledge it, annihilates me” (Kristeva 2). Sylvanus Cobbold undergoes a 
much more amplified version of a similar experience during his “analysis” in 
the asylum. When forcibly hospitalised in the Brush Home for the alleged 
seduction of young girls – a crude simplification of his mystical and 
physically asexual relationship with women – he undertakes something like 
a crusade against vivisection and to stop it he figuratively loses his life and 
becomes a Christ-like figure. Grotesquely, his reaching out to the Absolute 
via an embodiment of the feminine is replaced by the perverted eroticism of 
the analytical situation: the impersonalised, passive personality of the analyst 
makes the impression of his ideal listener, a woman on Sylvanus and he is 
“seized with a mysterious spasm of turbulent erotic emotion” (WS 537), 
which he consciously rejects as perverted. Desire, the need to fill in a lack, 
whether physical or metaphysical, and rejection are mixed in the characters’ 
attitude to vivisection and psychoanalysis, in their “fascinated start that leads 
them toward it and separates them from it” (Kristeva 2); it becomes an 
ambiguous, ever-moving border that forces the subject to keep “straying” 
(Kristeva 8). 
The intrapersonal tensions of such a “straying” subject reach a 
culmination in Dr. Brush’s abjection of the self generalised as misanthropy 
in Weymouth Sands: fully aware of the fact that his medical practices – both 
vivisectional and psychoanalytic – are morally unacceptable, he also admits 
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to finding his only pleasure in them, that is, he finds the abject, “the 
impossible within” (Kristeva 5), as the core of his very integrity. His notion 
of psychoanalysis – actually a crude version of Freudism – is briefly outlined 
at the moment of its dramatic change during his “treatment” of Sylvanus 
Cobbold: 
The grand difference between his old system and his new one lay in the 
hypotheses they respectively assumed with regard to the locality of all those 
dark, disturbing impulses, manias, shock-bruises, neuroses, complexes that 
he regarded as both the causes and the symptoms of human derangement. In 
his old system these volcanic neuroses were resident in an entirely 
subliminal region, a permanent underworld of the human ego from which 
they broke forth to cause unhappiness and anguish. This region was out of 
reach, and possessed locked, adamantine gates, as far as our ordinary 
processes of mental introspection went. To isolate and analyse these 
peculiarities as aberrations it was necessary to assume some kind of well-
balanced norm, some measure of well-constituted functioning, from which 
all such “complexes” could be regarded as lapses. (WS 513–514) 
In this concept of psychoanalysis the analyst identifies with the “norm”, the 
“measure” which “isolates” the abnormal from the normal. The full ironies 
of this stance can be realised through the representation of the self-same 
norm-giver as a corpse, quoted above. In the openly sexualised game of 
analysis with the doctor sitting as if he was wearing a “straight waistcoat” 
and indulging himself in his perversion of “embracing a vivisected, half-
anaesthetized, snarling panther” (WS 448-449), the erotic desire of the 
analyst is satisfied by an object kept constantly on the verge of life and death 
and the analyst is totally interchangeable with the analysand, whom he 
defines as aberrant. In Dr. Brush’s fundamental revision of his earlier 
scientific theories under the impact of Sylvanus Cobbold’s analysis he 
actually comes to redefine the conscious and the unconscious along a 
continuum (WS 514). What he does – in fact, still adhering to his role as a 
“norm-giver” – is a redefinition of the human norm based on the analysis of 
a “borderline patient”, whose speech “constitute[s] propitious ground for a 
sublimating discourse” - in this case rather ”mystic” than ”aesthetic”-, since 
he “make[s] the conscious/unconscious distinction irrelevant” (Kristeva 7). 
However, the only result is that the vivisection of dogs becomes redundant 
(he actually gives it up for financial reasons) when he has found a human 
being to “vivisect” in the person of Sylvanus, the ideal analysand, who 
seems to be in constant communication with his unconscious: 
Sylvanus had been in Hell’s Museum now for over three months and the 
diagnosing of his “case” had proved the most interesting piece of analysis 
that Daniel Brush, in all his long experience as a psychiatrist, had ever 
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undertaken. For one thing, Sylvanus turned out to be a well-nigh perfect 
patient. He became so interested in Dr. Brush’s de-personalised personality 
that he was ready to humour it to the utmost. And since the essence of this 
man’s identity was to eliminate his identity and to become a pure, unblurred 
mirror in which reality could reflect itself, what Sylvanus constantly aimed 
at was to furnish the doctor with an increasing series of new layers, new 
levels, new strata of his precious objective truth. As a result of this, Daniel 
Brush had never known such persistent, unalloyed mental excitement as he 
experienced during these autumn months. The more he analysed Sylvanus 
the more he found to analyse. And what was so extremely satisfactory 
about it, from Brush’s point of view, was that the question of cure never 
emerged at all. The Doctor could in fact drop the “doctor” and give himself 
up to experiment with Sylvanus as he had never dared to experiment with 
anyone, no, not even with Mrs. Cobbold! (WS 512) 
The effect of the doctor’s analysis is rather similar to that of vivisection, 
since under the figurative knife of the doctor’s cold-blooded irony Sylvanus 
stops being human: it “made him howl like a famished wolf” (WS 540) and 
he “gave vent to a cry that seemed hardly human” (WS 540). His “analysis” 
produces similar results as Mrs. Cobbold’s, whom, in Dr. Brush’s own 
words, he has “reduce[d] […] to a cold sepulchral pulp” (WS 440). The 
metaphor applied to her emphasises the condition of being at a limbo, stuck 
between life and death, but belonging more to the latter, like ghosts. The 
condition of these patients – metaphorically vivisected animals and living 
dead – is abject in itself because it represents an ambiguous, in-between 
situation, which “disturbs identity, system, order” (Kristeva 4) and “does not 
respect borders, positions, rules” (Kristeva 4). Their cases imply that if the 
psychoanalyst represents a border or measure, it is rather in the sense that 
like death, he “has encroached upon everything” (Kristeva 4) and assimilates 
his patients – his objects – to himself to make them abject. 
If there is one person in the novel who faces vivisection and 
psychoanalysis as abject in the novel, it is Dr. Brush himself: 
“When I hear my sweet hypocritical colleagues,” he thought, “like so many 
clever politicians, defending experimentation as a humane duty for the 
curing of disease, I feel that the human race is so contemptible that the 
sooner some totally different creation takes its place, the better for the 
universe! Man is a loathsome animal, prodigious in his capacity for a 
particular kind of disgusting cruelty, covered up with ideal excuses. If I 
were allowed – as no doubt we shall be in half-a-century – to vivisect men, 
I’d gladly let the dogs alone. Comical, comical! It’s comical but it’s also a 
little ghastly! I wonder if our sentimental devotees comprehend what we 
real scientists are like. Mad! That’s what we’re like. It’s a vice. I know what 
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it is. And I know what I am. I am a madman with a vice for which I’d 
vivisect Jesus Christ.” (WS 444–445) 
Dr. Brush’s clear-sighted and disillusioned vision of himself also widens the 
scope of abjection in the novel: psychoanalysis becomes generalised as 
science, and the vivisector-analyst becomes an exemplary representative of 
the human species which is abject exactly because of its ability to carry out 
such practices. He also emphasises the ambiguous nature of this practice, 
since, as an excellent example of the abject, it cunningly covers its 
inhumanity with the interests of the human kind (Kristeva 4). It questions the 
Enlightenment vision of the man of Reason, of which late 19th-century 
positivism generating outstanding scientific results and defining the basic 
approach of even such sciences as psychoanalysis was a logical continuation. 
Dr. Brush’s vision of psychoanalysis, thriving on the abject, and of mankind, 
loathsome for sanctioning it, is at the same time apocalyptic: full of 
pessimism, he predicts the well-deserved and unavoidable end of such a 
race. 
What offers an obvious but apparently weak counterpoint to this vision 
is the promise of a new kind of science – and morality – heralded by the 
arrival of the new physician at the end of the novel. The tentative indication 
of a new approach to science and life represented by Dr. Mabon is related in 
terms of the myth of the Golden Fleece and a retrieval of the Golden Age of 
mankind, though apart from Magnus’s intuitive attraction to the man there is 
not much else to support it. After the narrator’s introduction claiming that 
“this day there did happen to be a sort of oracle delivered, though its utterer 
[…] was a complete stranger to the town” (WS 499) it is the Latin tutor who, 
on their first meeting – and the new doctor’s last appearance in the novel – 
attaches outstanding importance to Dr. Mabon: “I’d like to know this chap’s 
philosophy. He’s in advance of all of us. He sees far. He’s like the Pilot of 
the Argo. God! I hope he stays here!” (WS 503) The doctor, the writer of a 
“purely biological” (WS 504) book on ethics, of which he thinks that it is 
“barbarous” (WS 502), is also a conchologist, who looks “as if he would 
willingly have exchanged his present incarnation for the life of a Solen [a 
species of shells]” (WS 502). He “seemed to have a special look for 
everyone, with its own humorous commentary upon the world, but a 
different commentary for each separate person in a group” (WS 503). It is his 
short dialogue with Magnus which gives the promise of a new science 
beyond psychoanalysis: 
‘[…] how do you go to work with your neurotic cases, now that you’ve 
dropped psychoanalysis?’ 
[…] 
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‘I do nothing but listen … and … move … perhaps … a few things that 
have got in the way!’ 
Having been persecuted till he uttered this oracle, Dr. Mabon did not retire 
into sulky silence the moment he had spoken. (WS 504-505) 
It is the slightly modified repetition of the expression “to utter an oracle” on 
the narrator’s part that underpins the exceptional importance of Dr. Mabon’s 
rather general comment. His whole personality and approach poses a sharp 
contrast to Dr. Brush’s: a lover and admirer of nature, he is an advocate of 
non-intrusion and benevolent, humorous, tolerant passivity. His “dropping” 
of psychoanalysis together with the representation of its practice in 
Weymouth Sands as vivisection marks Powys’s disappointment in his 
extremely optimistic expectations concerning psychoanalysis. What he 
presents here seems to be nothing else but the Rabelaisian alternative – in the 
Powysian sense outlined in his Rabelais – to the experimental cruelty and 
jouissance of psychoanalysis as abject. 
In the Lure of the Abject – the Speaking Subject, Characters and Plot 
If going beyond psychoanalysis as vivisection is represented directly in 
Weymouth Sands only as a passing glimpse of a Rabelaisian Golden Age, 
indirectly it permeates practically all the levels of the text, though 
inseparably tied to the abject. The tracking down of another facet of the 
original metaphor, the image of the ghost for the analysand reappearing 
throughout the text of the novel in a more generalised sense reveals that the 
fascination with the abject in the whole of Weymouth Sands is far from being 
restricted to Dr. Brush. In fact, abjection is the position from which the 
speaking subject seems to formulate an enunciation of being – the only 
proper location worth writing about at all. The novel is teeming with abject 
characters and scenes – psychic health seems to be the exception that proves 
the rule. Their treatment, however, is dominated by light-hearted indulgence 
and non-critical tolerance on the narrator’s part, resulting in a polyphonic 
multiverse of several colliding perspectives filtered through the narrative 
voice with equal power and “truth-value”. Last but not least, Powys’s 
fascination with the abject, this “’something’ that I do not recognize as a 
thing”, but which is “not nothing, either” (Kristeva 2) might shed light on the 
fundamentally bathetic nature of the plot of Weymouth Sands, the 
conspicuously empty centre of the novel. 
The metaphor of the ghost for the analysand mentioned above is merged 
in the text of the novel with the leitmotif of the “Homeric dead” applied to 
all the inhabitants of Weymouth – in fact, to the whole of mankind. While 
the patients of the Brush Home are, as mentioned above, associated with the 
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vivisected dogs from the very beginning, the metaphorical parallel for the 
condition of the suffering animals, neither dead nor living, is that of the 
ghost. Ghosts, as an extension of the notion of the corpse, are by definition 
abject. The patients of the asylum, the “brain-tortured unresting ghosts who 
could neither realise their dolorous identities nor forget them” (WS 518) 
become more specifically associated with the inhabitants of the Homeric 
underworld when they are compared to Sylvanus Cobbold: “And like 
Teiresias in Hades it seemed to be the destiny of Sylvanus to find rational 
articulation, if nothing else, for the blind gibberings of these poor ghosts” 
(WS 518). The context implies a connection of the unconscious, language 
and identity exemplified by the image of the Homeric dead, which, though 
the idea allegedly comes from Magnus Muir, is elaborated on by Sylvanus 
Cobbold8: 
“That tragic half-life of the dead in Homer, that I heard Mr. Muir talk about 
once at High House, lies behind everything. […] If you,” he went on, “take 
that half-life as if it were the bottom of the sea you give the sweet light of 
the sun its true meaning. Unhappiness comes from not realising that life is 
two-sided. The other side of life is always death. The dead in Homer are 
tragic and pitiful, but they are not nothing. Their muted half-life is like the 
watery light at the bottom of the sea. […] That Homeric death-life is 
tragically sad, but it has a beauty like the dying away of music when instead 
of becoming nothing music carries us in its ebb-flow down to this sea-
bottom of the world – […] – where it’s all echo and reflection, where it’s 
all memory and mirrors of memory and brooding upon what is and is not.” 
(WS 258–259) 
                                                     
8 It is at this point that the acknowledged autobiographical nature of these two characters (WS 
“Note by Author”) becomes rather obvious. Powys himself was fascinated with the motif of 
the descent to the underworld represented in “Book XI” of The Odyssey. His conclusions 
about the “pessimistic” Homeric attitude to death, which is “a pitiful half-life”, are strikingly 
similar to the more mystically elaborated notions of Sylvanus Cobbold: 
 
 Some would say, “Why should we try to realise and to appropriate to our imaginations 
this Homeric view, if it be so dark and tragic?” Because it is not the tragedy of the 
general human fate that debases our spirit and lowers the temper of our lives; it is the 
burden of our private griefs, our private wrongs, and the weight of ills “that flesh is heir 
to”. […] 
 Granting that the Homeric view of the fate of the dead is the darkest […] it remains that 
it saves a man from that irrational fear of vengeance of the Creator, which, while it has 
kept few cruel ones from their cruelty, has driven insane so many sensitive and gentle 
natures. 
 And what most of us suffer from is our absorption in our own cares and worries and 
afflictions, not any indignant spiritual protest against the general fate of the human race. 
(Powys, The Pleasures of Literature 73–74) 
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At this point the image of vivisection becomes related to the metaphysical 
dimensions of the novel: life and identity are defined and only definable 
against death, against nothing, while the Homeric dead become the image of 
the human condition of being at a limbo. It is not by chance that Sylvanus’s 
face becomes comparable to that of the Homeric dead, “who, while they can 
remember and forget, are completely deprived of all the creative energy of 
the power of thought”, as a “result of his metaphysical struggles” (WS 408). 
The rational language of science – the approach of the analyst comparable 
only to vivisection – is helpless in the face of the “ocean of human 
experience” (WS 514). Since the ocean, another leitmotif of the novel 
(Robinson, Sensualism 28), among other things, is also a metaphor for the 
psyche, Sylvanus’s mystical preaching can also be read as his definition of 
being – based on the constant awareness of nothing, of a lack, of death 
within. Thus the metaphor of the ghost for the analysand, on the one hand, is 
a perfect embodiment of the abject, since “all abjection is in fact recognition 
of the want on which any being, meaning, language, or desire is founded” 
(Kristeva 5). On the other hand, it is also an attempt to resolve the 
irresolvable dichotomy of life and death, being and nothing, and as such, it is 
positively opposed to the solution offered by psychoanalysis and science – 
the image of the vivisected animal. It is not Dr. Brush who can facilitate his 
patients’ (re)entrance into the Symbolic and self-definition but Sylvanus 
Cobbold, their “Teiresias”, “the ghost of the blind Theban prophet […] 
whose reason is still unshaken” (Homer). Sylvanus is different from the 
other patients, “the other ghosts [who] flit about aimlessly” (Homer), “the 
sad troops of the enfeebled Dead, who were sub-conscious, sub-sensitive, 
sub-normal, sub-substantial” (WS 479), exactly because of his ability to 
verbalise much deeper layers of his psyche and thereby to establish an 
identity of his own. In Weymouth Sands the hyper-consciousness of 
Sylvanus Cobbold – the “’mystical’ sublimating discourse” of the 
“borderline subject” (Kristeva 7) – embodies the most extreme potentials of 
the ghostly/ghastly human condition, a self-analysis and self-definition 
opposed to psychoanalysis represented as vivisection while carrying on the 
implications of the same metaphor. 
While the motif of vivisection, as outlined above, leads to a 
fundamentally misanthropic approach to mankind seen as abject, Weymouth 
Sands actually abounds in “ghosts” and in “improper/unclean” characters 
(Kristeva 2) who transgress officially accepted social norms usually because 
of their more or less serious psychic disturbances and/or unusual sexual 
inclinations and who are treated neutrally, in a lightsome manner or even 
with fascination. Let me give only a few examples in a rather sketchy 
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manner – relevant features are so abundant in Weymouth Sands that to do 
otherwise would amount to retelling the whole novel.  
Adam Skald is obsessed with killing Dog Cattistock, which he also sees 
as the only way to keep his personal integrity, as the core of his identity (WS 
360–361). This is exactly the reason for which his newly found love, Perdita, 
leaves him – she finds him abject. By the end of the novel the forsaken man 
is so devastated, both spiritually and bodily, that he becomes physically 
repulsive, looking as if “he had already joined the ranks of those Homeric 
[…] Dead” (WS 479). When the lovers are reunited at the end of the novel, 
after Perdita’s long absence, presumable mental breakdown and physical 
illness – her own special descent to hell –, both of them are described as 
“skeletons”, his face is “positively ghastly in its disfigurement” and hers is 
“the face of the dead come to life” (WS 577).  
Magnus Muir is haunted by the ghost of his dead father to such an 
extent that he sometimes ceases to have a separate identity of his own. 
During the lifetime of the elder Muir it was Magnus’s “fear of his father […] 
that made his love-affairs come to nothing” (WS 19). Weymouth Sands is 
partly about the forty-five-year-old tutor’s attempt to wrestle himself free 
from this fear five years after his father’s death. The interiorised prohibition 
on bonding with women reappears in a slightly veiled form as his fear that 
his marriage with Curly will force him to leave the security of the maternal 
lap/womb associated with Miss Le Fleau’s house [with its atmosphere 
dominated by the elder Muir’s furniture (WS 95)] and push him into the 
horrors of a life described in terms of a (vivisectional) industrial torture-
chamber: 
He felt it now as a menacing engine-house that he was entering – a place 
full of cogs and pistons and wheels and screws and prodding spikes – and 
full of people with bleeding limbs. A vague horror, like that of extreme 
physical pain, oppressed him. He felt as if all the hidden places where 
sensitive life was tortured had opened their back-doors to him, and the 
moans from within were groping at his vitals. (WS 95) 
Curly, standing for sexual relationship and the feminine, becomes the luring 
but also horrifying object of his desire. This contradiction surfaces in 
Magnus’s inability to consummate his desire and counteract Curly’s 
manoeuvres to postpone their wedding, and is sublimated in his positioning 
Curly against vivisection, as the sacrifice he could – or should? – make in 
the name of humanity to stop this unbearable cruelty (cf. the quote from WS 
306 above). Ironically, this is what literally happens at the end of the novel: 
Curly, cheating on both her lovers, leaves with the laughing third, Dog 
Cattistock for Italy, the expenses of which make the miser stop financing Dr. 
Brush’s laboratory and thereby bring vivisection to its end. Magnus goes on 
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heartbroken, but not without a sense of relief. His narrative lends itself up to 
interpretation most easily as a story of the feminine and sexuality treated as 
abject under the influence of the Law of the Father (Kristeva 2). His sacred 
horror of the feminine, based on the incest taboo, the prohibition on the 
maternal (Kristeva 71) might shed light on the conspicuous absence of 
mothers from the novel: Weymouth Sands is teeming with orphans (both 
infant and adult), childless mother-aged women and careless, malfunctioning 
mothers. Powys’s rejection of Christian morality is almost literally translated 
here into fictional terms, since his view of the punishing God with His ban 
on sexuality – “to each superego its abject” (Kristeva 2) – predestines the 
feminine as abject. It also explains to a certain extent why he finds the 
Christian notion of sin totally unsatisfactory in coping with the abject 
(Kristeva 90-112) and tries to come up with alternative solutions represented 
as the philosophies of the individual characters in the novel. 
Among the other characters, Dog Cattistock is a miser to a pathological 
extent, which makes him unable to bond with women (WS 446–448). 
Captain Poxwell and his daughter Lucinda play out a scenario of incest 
which drives the father practically mad (WS 302) and leaves the daughter not 
much saner, either. James Loder perversely theatralises his physical pain and 
tortures his children with his illness (WS 297). Rodney Loder consciously 
wishes his father’s death and is afraid of going mad like his uncle (178). 
Daniel Brush is probably a latent homosexual (WS 537) and definitely an 
overt misanthrope. Larry Zed is a charming fugitive from the Brush Home 
and not without a good cause. The sisters Tissty and Tossty have a most 
curious Lesbian and incestuous relationship with each other (WS 472). Peg 
Frampton has nymphomaniac inclinations (WS 476). The only proper mother 
in the novel, Ellen Gadget, is reputed to live in an incestuous relationship 
with her husband, who is also her half-brother (WS 249). Last but not least, 
almost every old family in Weymouth has had some member who was, is, or 
could have been a patient in the Brush Home (WS 487), among them the 
Loders (WS 178) and the Cobbolds (WS 270).  
The most conspicuous examples of abjection are the brothers Jerry and 
Sylvanus Cobbold. “The world-famous clown” (WS 8) of a thousand masks 
and the “born prophet” (WS 6) function as a pair of – sometimes 
interchangeable – carnivalesque doubles whose identity is defined along the 
lines of forming two seemingly diametrically opposed versions of coping 
with the abject. What they share, though, is their obsession with the 
excremental aspects of life and a more or less morbid femininity – the abject.  
In Jerry’s case this fascination is overtly connected to a Rabelaisian – 
carnivalesque? – attitude that is much more complicated than “subsuming 
Rabelais’ sex/excrement reverence” (Robinson, Sensualism 18): 
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Jerry had indeed something in him that went beyond Rabelaisianism, in that 
he not only could get an ecstasy of curious satisfaction from the most drab, 
ordinary, homely, realistic aspects of what might be called the excremental 
under-tides of existence but he could slough off his loathing for humanity 
in this contemplation and grow gay, child-like, guileless. (WS 217) 
His wife, Lucinda is one of Dr. Brush’s out-patients, the “vivisected, half-
anaesthetized, snarling panther” (WS 449), who has driven her father mad by 
making up a story – of course, with Powys one can never tell how fictitious 
– of their child born of incest. Jerry’s lover, Tossty, is fatally attracted to her 
own sister, the beautiful Tissty. The narrator’s comments place these 
relationships far beyond the limits of “normality”: “normal sex-appeals had 
not the least effect upon [Jerry]. What had drawn him to Lucinda […] was a 
queer pathological attraction; and the same was true […] of his interest in 
Tossty” (WS 218). At the end of the novel he establishes an adulterous – and 
in a sense incestuous – relationship with his sister-in-law. The tainted nature 
of this love is already predicted half-way through the plot, much before 
Hortensia Lily is actually jilted on her wedding-day by Cattistock, when 
Jerry imagines that he would respond to her love for him only if “Cattistock 
ill-used her” and “if she were outraged and abject” (WS 219, italics mine).  
Sylvanus Cobbold’s fascination with excrement is part of his ritualistic, 
mystical adoration of every aspect of nature, and is probably best 
exemplified by his kissing the prongs of a fork freshly taken from a dung 
heap (WS 529). Though women are mysteriously attracted by his preaching, 
and he even shares his house (and bed) with two of them in the course of the 
novel, he does not have a sexual relationship with them. His “friends” (WS 
489) are queer figures themselves: social outcasts (Gipsy May and Marret, 
the Punch-and-Judy girl); neurotics, Peg Frampton, and the hysterical Gipsy, 
who symbolically castrates (WS 412, 416–417) Sylvanus by cutting off his 
moustaches in his sleep out of jealousy; or somehow even not totally human 
(Marret is like a puppet, a long broomstick in black with the head of a china 
doll). But while Jerry’s loathing is directed against others – he is a 
misanthrope – Sylvanus feels “spasmodic body-shame” (WS 385), he is 
repelled only by his own body and sees himself as abject.  
Their abjection results in two different “sublimating discourses”. 
Though Janina Nordius claims that “[Jerry Cobbold’s] misanthropy is not 
there to shield some precious thought-world; it is only cynical and full of 
contempt, devoid, it seems, of any redeeming features” (124), in the novel 
his abjection is sublimated in his clowning, his “artistic discourse” (Kristeva 
7) that is not bound by the limits of the stage: 
[…] Jerry’s loathing for humanity was even deeper than that of Mr. Witchit 
[…] and the only pleasure he got from his fellows was a monstrous 
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Rabelaisian gusto for their grossest animalities, excesses, lapses, shames! 
These things it was, the beast-necessity in human life, that he exploited in 
the humours of his stage-fooling; and because he loathed his fellow-men he 
was able to throw into his treatment of their slavery to material filth an 
irresistible hilarity as well as a convincing realism, a combination that 
always enchanted the crowd. (WS 218) 
His “acting sans cesse” (WS 204), also continued in the conspicuously 
theatrical environment of his private life (WS 41), even seems to serve 
“humanitarian” purposes for example in Perdita’s eyes, who “saw the man as 
a sort of fragile Atlas, perpetually holding up the weight of other people’s 
destinies and aiming above all, as he did with Lucinda, at keeping people 
from going mad, by an everlasting process of distraction!” (WS 218) In 
contrast, Sylvanus Cobbold’s “mystical sublimating discourse” (Kristeva 7) 
is embodied in his rather vague philosophy of the Absolute. His efforts to 
come up with an acceptable version of the unbearable contradictions of the 
human condition demonstrate how death, cruelty and the repellent are just 
different facets of the abject against which the individual tries to enunciate 
his identity in Powys’s art: “his mind gave up the struggle to reconcile his 
Absolute with the cruelty of things, for this began to seem beyond his power; 
and in place he wrestled with the Spirit in a frantic effort to make it include 
the Gross, the Repulsive, the Disgusting” (WS 384-385). His personal 
philosophy results in such grotesque phenomena, as his calling himself 
“Caput-anus” in his dialogues with the Absolute, while he carefully avoids 
any references to himself as “I” (WS 385). His idealisation of femininity – 
the sublimation of the abject he cannot handle – brings his relationships with 
both Gipsy May and Marret to a crisis since he manages to ignore their 
personal feelings totally. As opposed to the professional jester, it is, 
however, Sylvanus who can produce “a fit of Gargantuan laughter” when 
facing such an ironic twist of fate as Cattistock’s risking his life to rescue a 
probably empty cask in a storm at sea and thus to become the local hero 
instead of Adam Skald (WS 285–286). At the end of the novel both 
Rabelaisianism without indulgence and the vision of a carnivalesque 
Absolute without a proper incorporation of femininity – sexuality – fail to 
prove satisfactory alternatives: Jerry’s scheming is unmasked in the face of 
“authentic passion” (WS 570) and Sylvanus, locked up permanently in Hell’s 
Museum, is brought to such a breakdown by Dr. Brush’s cold-blooded irony 
and his final loss of Marret that his Absolute has to struggle back to life in a 
phoenix-like manner (WS 542). 
Even such a sketchy overview of the novel’s cast seems to justify A. N. 
Wilson’s ironic summary of the case of Weymouth Sands: the novel “had to 
be retitled Jobber Skald since the mayor and the good people of Weymouth 
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threatened legal action at [Powys’s] depiction of the genteel seaside town as 
seething with evil, populated by brothel-keepers, vivisectionists and 
lunatics”(3)9. The new title is especially misleading because it veils one of 
the most important features of the novel: if it has a main character at all, it is 
definitely not the Jobber – however “impressive” he is (Knight 43) – but 
Weymouth itself, with all its symbolic dimensions. Though Weymouth Sands 
has, by necessity, more and less elaborated and complex characters, the 
major ones – Magnus Muir, the Jobber, Dog Cattistock, Perdita Wane, Jerry 
and Sylvanus Cobbold, Richard Gaul, Rodney Loder, Daniel Brush etc. – are 
so numerous, that it is hardly possible to identify one main plot with a 
restricted number of major characters. What Weymouth Sands provides 
instead, is a collection of snapshots – of personal philosophies and visions of 
the world, as if to demonstrate Powys’s utterly subjectivist10 standpoint that 
“the thing that conceives life and absorbs life, is nothing less than the mind 
itself; the mind and the imagination!” (Psychoanalysis 28) Though there is 
an omniscient third person narrator in the novel, his all-knowing reveals 
itself rather in an ability to enter all the characters’ consciousness – and 
letting their different perspectives collide. It becomes most obvious in such 
instances when the same event is interpreted from two different characters’ 
viewpoint, but always without the intrusion of the narrator’s “final” 
judgment. For example, in the ominous case of Sylvanus Cobbold’s kissing 
the fork out of a dung heap, the narrator’s comments, dominated by 
Sylvanus’ perspective and permeated by his ritualistic and pathetic nature-
worship, are suddenly interrupted by the rather disillusioning remark that “it 
would have fatally lent itself to Perdita’s impression of him, as one who, 
even when alone, was forever acting and showing off. Perdita’s view of his 
character, and indeed the Jobber’s view, too, would have been accentuated 
had they witnessed the sequel” (WS 529). The more complex characters are 
introduced through each other’s perspectives, which often contrast each 
other – most notably in Sylvanus’s case, but even the “villain” of the novel, 
Dog Cattistock is totally humanised through Magnus Muir’s vision of him 
and through a glimpse into his self-reflections on his disastrous wedding 
day. The result is a typical Powysian “multiverse” of different 
consciousnesses, which are in dialogic11 relationship with each other – a 
                                                     
9 The novel has been released with the original title since its 1963 edition (Nordius 103). 
10 On subjectivist pluralism in Powys’s Porius cf. Joe Boulter, Postmodern Powys – New 
Essays on John Cowper Powys, 8–9. 
11 In Joe Boulter’s analysis of pluralism in Porius, whose many aspects and conclusions are 
also highly relevant in terms of Weymouth Sands – cf. the collision of different 
perspectives (32–33), the representation of different consciousnesses on equal footing as 
“many world versions” existing independently from each other (e.g. 28–30) - his 
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“dehierarchised” (Boulter 13), polyphonic, amoral multiverse, in which the 
repellent, the abject is shown through an indulgent, humorous narrative 
voice, as if Dr. Mabon was listening with his own “humorous commentary 
upon the world” (WS 503) while his patients reveal themselves as abject. 
In comparison with this multiverse of subjective visions the relative 
insignificance of the plot is probably indicated by its bathetic nature, so 
characteristic of Powys (Robinson, “Introduction,” v). The focus on 
characters and symbolic locations is well-reflected in the chapter titles: out 
of the fifteen all but one are nominal, containing mostly either simply a 
character’s name (5) or a place-name (4), as if nothing actually happened in 
the novel. The plot lines seem to converge in Dog Cattistock and Mrs. Lily’s 
wedding day, the day when the Jobber intends to kill Cattistock. The 
description of the wedding, however, is substituted on the one hand by the 
stories of Sylvanus and Marret’s breaking up and of the man’s symbolic 
castration, on the other hand by the meeting of the old gossips of Weymouth, 
who try to puzzle together the story of Hortensia Lily’s jilting – an event of 
which none of them were eye-witnesses. It is only casually related that the 
Jobber could not carry out his murderous intentions because Cattistock, to 
run away from his bride in time, left his house at daybreak and the Jobber 
was simply too late – ironically, jilting Hortensia Lily maybe saved 
Cattistock’s life. The day, which Cattistock has spent watching vivisection 
instead of consummating his desire for Captain Poxwell’s younger daughter, 
culminates in the horribly shaken father’s “abject confession”12 of 
(fictitious?) incest with his other daughter and Lizzy Chant’s passing out 
allegedly at the sight of the late Mrs Cattistock’s ghost. The two chapters 
covering the day of the cancelled wedding thus actually abound in moments 
of castration in the epistemological sense of the word (Weber 1111–1112): 
moments, when not exactly nothing happens, but something which 
fundamentally undermines the subject’s position by questioning the 
possibility of believing his eyes and revealing the gap between the signifier 
                                                                                                                            
philosophical conception of pluralism adopted from postmodernist theory for the purposes 
of analysis (7) actually excludes the notion of any dialogue (25–30). Probably for this 
reason he does not incorporate in his studies the Bakhtinian approach, though he makes a 
reference to his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics by applying the term “’double-voiced’ 
style” to Powys’s text (34) without any sense of running into a self-contradiction. He also 
discards “carnival” as a relevant term in his frame of reference relying on Juliet Mitchell – 
but not on Bakhtin – who associates it with simple inversion instead of dehierarchisation 
(13–14). My reading, rather moving in the frame of reference of Bakhtinian poetics than 
postmodernist philosophy, obviously diverges from Boulter’s at this point. 
12 I have borrowed the expression form Peter Brooks, who uses it to describe Fyodor 
Pavlovich Karamazov’s “whole mode […] of both calculated and uncontrollable self-
abasement” (Brooks, Troubling Confessions 73). 
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and the signified, thereby shaking forever his trust in signification. Sylvanus 
Cobbold experiences his symbolic castration as a moment of utter shame, 
after which he needs to redefine his identity (WS 418–419). Captain 
Poxwell’s madness is the result of his inability to decide whether his 
daughter really had a child fathered by him – a story that is tentatively 
represented through Lucinda’s consciousness as a malicious attack against 
her father’s masculinity (WS 144–145): castration. The Jobber’s inability to 
carry out the intended murder, talk of which has already come to be the 
narrative of his identity, results in his rapid physical and spiritual 
disintegration and calls for a fundamental redefinition of his identity which 
only becomes possible after his reunion with Perdita. And last but not least, 
the experience of the uncanny, exemplified by the appearance of Mrs. 
Cattistock’s ghost, is actually built on the moment of castration (Weber 
1111–1114). The anticlimactic structure of the plot opens up the 
epistemological and ontological uncertainties behind the Powysian 
multiverse built on ironic twists of fate, uncertainties, which are just as 
directly related to the problematic nature of the speaking subject enunciating 
his being from the ambiguous position of abjection. If the dynamics of plot 
are really structured by desire13, a plot structured around the ambiguous 
affects surrounding the abject – a simultaneous fascination and repulsion – in 
fact, can hardly be anything else but bathetic: repeating the constant “placing 
and displacing [of] abjection” by laughter (Kristeva 8) it does not really 
proceed, but rather “strays” (Kristeva 8) in permanent fear of and constantly 
desiring the end of the journey, the abject. 
 
In conclusion, in Weymouth Sands the fascination with the abject has 
proved to be a dominant shaping factor of the novel’s extremely rich and 
complicated system of metaphors, its characters and themes, and its plot. It is 
not only Dr. Brush “embracing a vivisected, half-anaesthetized, snarling 
panther” (WS 448–449) who seems to be “in love with the abject”, but the 
whole text revolves around formulating sublimating discourses of the abject 
– the “artistic” sublimating discourse realised in the narrative of Weymouth 
Sands probably being the most successful one of them. Rabelaisianism and 
carnivalesque laughter – with or without the optimism both Bakhtin and 
Powys attach to them in their non-belletristic works – are unalienable 
elements in either the philosophical solutions or the narratological approach 
to the problem. Consequently, its representation in Weymouth Sands, though 
it ambitiously includes epistemological and ontological aspects sometimes 
beyond Powys’s potentials, is both free from the sometimes didactic one-
                                                     
13 Cf. the chapter “Narrative Desire” in Peter Brooks’ Reading for the Plot (37–61). 
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sidedness of Powys’s critical essays, and is at least far from being tragic. 
Janina Nordius points out the “divided response” to Weymouth Sands in this 
respect: “While some critics are anxious to state that they find this a 
predominantly ‘happy’ book [among them Wilson Knight (47)], others, on 
the contrary, find it permeated with a sense of loss and failure” (105). Its 
ambiguities, however, can be easily linked with the fascination with the 
abject dominating the themes of the novel and Powys’s bias for a 
Rabelaisian, carnivalesque approach to literature – and life. 
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“(T)he (Devil) who dwells in flaming fire” – 
Blake’s Apocalyptic Irony in The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell 
Éva Antal 
 
All Genius varies Thus. 
Devils are various. 
Angels are all alike. 
(Blake) 
 
The mind is its own place, and in itself 
Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n. 
(Milton, Paradise Lost I. 254–5)  
 
The title of my paper comes from Blake’s prophecy, The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell (1790–1793), and it refers to a ‘corrected’ mistake in the 
text. According to Geoffrey Keynes, Blake changed the expression as in its 
own context he had “found it redundant to name him again, the description, 
‘he who dwells in flaming fire’, being all that was needed” (Keynes xxii). 
What’s more – as Keynes goes on - (t)his (whose?) error could easily be 
corrected on the copperplate by deleting the letter ‘t’ of the article, ‘the’, and 
the word, ‘Devil’. And later the gap is “filled with a flame touched with 
gold” (Ibid). Closely regarding the expression, with this deletion Blake 
eliminated half of this striking alliteration-complex destroying the sounds of 
‘the devil who dwells’ while leaving (him) ‘in flaming fire’ (see Fig. 1). 
Otherwise, due to this alteration His/his living-space is emphatically damned 
to be fire and now the expression can be compared with the Biblical phrase 
when the Lord, our God, is named “consuming fire” (Deuteronomy 4:24 and 
Hebrews 12:29). 
Actually, the broader context of the expression gives one of the most 
complicated argumentation in the ironical-satirical work as it contrasts 
Blake’s ideas on the Devil and Christ with the Miltonic conception – more 
exactly, with Blake’s interpretation on the Miltonic conception – of Satan 
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and the Son (Messiah). In these short paragraphs the points of view are 
suddenly shifted producing such difficult sentences as the one containing our 
expression (lines 3-6 on Plate 6) and the one before (starting at the bottom of 
Plate 5 and going on in the first two lines on the next Plate): 
It indeed appear’d to Reason as if Desire was cast out; but the Devil’s 
account is, that the Messiah fell, & formed a heaven of what he stole from 
the Abyss.   
This is shewn in the Gospel, where he prays to the Father to send the 
comforter, or Desire, that Reason may have Ideas to build on; the Jehovah 
of the Bible being no other than [the Devil del.] he who dwells in flaming 
fire. (Blake 150, afterwards MHH. Italics are mine)  
I cannot promise that by the end of my paper the Blakean-Miltonic 
conception can be totally understood but at least we can learn more about 
him ‘dwelling in flaming fire’ – toning with the Blakean irony. I suppose 
that being the only and quite spectacular correction in The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell it reveals (cf. apokalupsis) the truth of the tone of the 
work, the artist’s way of thinking and also of his working process. This 
correction can be regarded as a visible – or, being engraved, a tactile - 
expression of Blake’s irony, an ironic undercut expressis verbis. The present 
paper is concerned with the possible interpretations of the ironical-satirical 
context of the apocalyptic work and, while paying attention to the figures of 
the text, it will basically focus on three facets of the tone – which I call the 
apocalyptic, the ironic and the satirical.  
Apocalypse Here and Now 
Derrida thematises the problem of the textual complexity of the apocalyptic 
tone relying on the original meaning of the Greek word apokalupsis as 
“disclosure, uncovering, unveiling” (Derrida 119).1 Consequently, he 
basically tries to reveal the meaning, the truth of the tone, accepting the 
definition of the Greek tonos (viz. ‘pitch’, ‘tension’) as “first signified the 
tight ligament, cord, rope when it is woven or braided, cable, strap – briefly, 
the privilaged figure of everything to strict-ure” (127). Moving away from 
the obvious musical associations of strict tonality, Derrida claims that the 
analysis of the tone in a writing should be done “in terms of contents, 
manners of speaking, connotations, rhetorical staging, and pose taken in 
                                                     
1 Although Derrida’s quoted essay “On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy” is 
supposed to be a “transformative critique” of Kant’s enlightened writing on tone (see “On a 
Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy”), he deals with the question of tone and 
apocalypse in general and his ideas greatly influenced my analysis. 
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semantic, pragmatic, scenographic terms” (127). In the complex truth-
revealing tone, the writer makes the voice of the other (in us) audible – and 
in Blake’s case also visible -, which inevitably results in delirium, that is 
derengement, or rather out-of-tune-ness (désaccordement) (132).  
Although the Blakean vision operates with a disturbing multiplicity of 
voices – namely, Rintrah, the Devil, the I persona, Ezekiel, Isaiah, the Angel, 
and the illustrator - the first striking impression is the assured clear-
sightedness which characterises all of them. On the one hand, while an 
apocalyptic writing always keeps some mystery in the core, the clear tone 
desired for revelation deconstructs the speculative and visionary discourse 
itself (Derrida 148). Edward J. Ahearn in his Visionary Fictions also calls 
the attention to the rhetorical confidence of such writings displayed “to make 
us experience what we think to be impossible” (11). On the other hand, this 
polytonality and the sudden change of tone seems to reveal “the disorder or 
the delirium of destination” (Derrida 150). In an apocalyptic discourse the 
destination, the end is (its) truth itself, and the text becomes – and actually 
every text is always already – apocalyptic: 
And the genre of writings called ‘apocalyptic’ in the strict sense, then, 
would be only an example, an exemplary revelation of this transcendental 
structure. In that case, if the apocalypse reveals, it is first of all the 
revelation of the apocalypse, the self-presentation of the apocalyptic 
structure of language, of writing, of the experience of presence, in other 
words, of the text or the mark in general: that is, of the divisible envoi for 
which there is no self-presentation nor assured destination. (Derrida 157, 
italics in the original)    
In his essay Derrida mainly discusses the characteristics of the ‘apocalyptic 
discourse’, not dealing with the problems of the genre, and he refers to such 
a work as a conservative and apocryphally coded mixed form of writing 
(159). He also claims that “among the numerous traits characterising an 
apocalyptic type of writing, let us provisionally isolate prediction and 
eschatological preaching, the fact of telling, foretelling, or preaching the end, 
the extreme limit, the imminence of the last” (144). Tracing the sources of 
apocalyptic literature, attention is paid to its links with eschatology, 
millenium and with a possible holy utopia (Paley 3), or the utopian myths of 
the lost Golden Age, Atlantis; moreover, with some gnostic, hermetic or 
esoteric ideas (Ahearn 2–7). Certainly, the prototype – and also the 
namegiver – of the genre is John’s Book of Revelation, but in the New 
Testament other descriptions of the so-called little apocalypse of Matthew, 
Peter, Daniel and Isaiah should also be mentioned (Paley 8).  
In his book, Apocalypse and Millenium in English Romantic Poetry, 
Paley collects and analyses the possible apocalyptic writings in English 
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literature elaborating on their political, scientific and social connections. At 
the end of the 18th century the radical thinkers of the age were greatly 
influenced by the ideas of the Swedish visionary, Emanuel Swedenborg, and 
joined the Swedenborgian New Jerusalem Church. The Church was “a 
gathering-ground for a miscellany of seekers after mystic experiences” from 
Behmenists and Rosicrucians, through masons to enthusiasts for mesmerism 
and magnetism (Thompson 135). Blake and his wife were sympathisers of 
the New Church in 1790 when he started to compose The Marriage and 
Swedenborg’s figure, or rather ‘Swedenborgianism’, is presented in the work 
(on Plates 3 and 21–22). Blake did not only read but also annotated the 
English translations of Swedenborg’s apocalyptic and millennial prophecies 
titled “Wisdom of Angels concerning Divine Love and Divine Wisdom”, 
“The Wisdom of Angels concerning Divine Providence” and “Heaven and 
Hell” (Blake 89-96, 131–133 and 929), in which the mystic published his 
conversations with angels. In his remarks Blake welcomed the visionary’s 
expressive language and his way of differentiating between man’s natural, or 
rational understanding and spiritual understanding, or wisdom, which were 
originally joined by Love, or the Will (Blake 93–95).  
As it is recorded, in 1790 the master first taught the doctrine of 
concubinage, namely that the Swedenborgian married man can engage in 
adulterous relationships in case of the wife’s disease, insanity, or difference 
of faith (Paley 36).2 It cannot exactly be said that Blake rejected the idea of 
free love and sexual liberation but in his eyes such disputable doctrines made 
Swedenborg the figure “barring the way to the millennium by blocking the 
improvement of sensual enjoyment” (Paley 37). As Foster Damon 
summarises, Blake was inspired by his “divine teacher” but he found that 
“Swedenborg’s greatest error lay in his not understanding the real nature of 
‘evil’, and therefore accepting conventional morality”.3 Thus, opposed to 
Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell prophesying the start of the New Heaven in 
1757, Blake in his Marriage of Heaven and Hell, due to his birth in the same 
year and now reaching the age of thirty-three, claims that new Hell has 
arrived pronouncing Swedenborg’s heaven to be his own hell (see Plate 3).  
After this shockingly and negatively positive – let us say, ironic - 
introduction it becomes obvious that Blake represents the true (Christian) 
wisdom contrasted with the “old falshoods” (MHH 157) of Swedenborg’s 
                                                     
2 See also Thompson about the doctrine in the chapter titled “The New Jerusalem Church” 
(129–145).   
3 Damon 392–394. Damon’s conclusion is also not without irony. In The Marriage with 
Blake’s re-interpretation of good and evil, as he says, “the dreadful dichotomy of official 
Christianity, which Swedenborg had accepted, was healed; the universe was one again; and 
a new period of human thought was inaugurated” (394).  
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New Church. Here referring to the apocalyptic prophecy of Isaiah about the 
fall of Babylon (Isaiah: 34–35), Blake – like John in ‘his’ Book of 
Revelation – reverses the pattern of the prophecy as The Marriage starts 
with the announcement of Swedenborg’s false new heaven and ends with the 
portrayal of Nebuchadnezzar displaying the logical consequence of false 
reasoning (Wittreich 192–193). The chosen ironic title of the work criticises 
not only Swedenborg’s inability of vision but also attacks his ideas on 
marriage as Blake’s Marriage displays a sexually active spiritual union. 
Moreover, he does it engraving and illustrating his work on his own, that is, 
protesting against the ‘mass produced’, printed doctrines of 
Swedenborgianism by refusing to have his work printed (Paley 34, Ahearn 
13). 
In the work the apocalyptic tone is introduced by Rintrah’s voice who 
“roars & shakes his fires in the burden’d air” (MHH 148). The very first 
voice introduces his apocalyptic vision of the topsy-turvy world where the 
true prophet, “the just man rages in the wilds” while the false prophet as “the 
sneaking serpent walks in mild humility” (Wittreich 194). “The Argument” 
can be taken as “a miniature emblem of human history” (Ahearn 27) 
showing up the continuous fight between the villain and the just; that is, 
right in the introduction the primary rhetorical force of the work is displayed 
in the dialectic of opposites. Here the villain as a mild Angel usurps the just 
man’s place, so,4 Rintrah, “the wrathful spirit of prophecy” is forced to 
become the Devil (Bloom 75). Thus, the narrator uncovers the truth (of 
apocalypse) in an ironic mock-argument referring to the danger of reasoning, 
which also becomes a characteristic feature of The Marriage.  
Consequently, the first voice after introducing the irony of mock-
reasoning logically goes on heralding the ironic Eternal Hell instead of the 
promised new heaven on plate 3, where Swedenborg is the ‘mild villainous’ 
Angel and the speaker – together with Isaiah – takes the role of the ‘devilish’ 
just man. In his Angel of Apocalypse, Wittreich, who reads the work as a true 
prophecy and the formation of the prophetic character, claims that the real 
dialectic of The Marriage can be found “in the antagonism Blake establishes 
between it and its prospective audience” (195). It is true that the text wants 
to inspire its readers and wants their active response – whether its writer is a 
prophet or not. The dialectic of the text is “figured by Rintrah and the I 
persona, who identifies so closely with the voice of the Devil” (Wittreich 
                                                     
4 Consequently and obviously, but this time it is expressed without using the famous Blakean 
‘so’, which mocks (false) reasoning in other places, for example, in the “Memorable 
Fancies” of The Marriage, or in his Songs.  
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196); that is, in “The Argument” besides the roaring true prophet, the 
devilish I persona is introduced – ‘he who dwells’ in irony.  
The Infernal Ironist 
The introduction of the prophetic voice opens up its whirlwind and its 
“overlordly tone detones” (Derrida 133). As Wittreich remarks: “The voice 
of indignation (Rintrah’s voice) is a complement, a prologue, to the voice of 
the Devil, critical of Milton, and to the I persona, derisive of Swedenborg” 
(Wittreich 198, italics are mine). However, the first person singular speaker 
is really close to the Devil in his ideas, the two voices have different butts: 
the Devil’s voice ironises Milton while the I persona satirises Swedenborg 
(Wittreich 200) – and later the Devil’s voice. Opposed to this, according to 
Bloom, the overwhelming tone of The Marriage is ‘devilishly’ ironic as 
right from the very beginning, the Devil’s voice can be heard (78–79). 
Although the Devil’s voice is put in the centre, not much is known about his 
figure. In the work the names of the Devil and Satan are used together and 
regarded as synonymous on plate 5 (cf. “call’d the Devil or Satan”), but they 
are not identified. The word devil comes from the Greek diabolos (indirect 
derivation) meaning ‘accuser’ or ‘slanderer’, while the word satan is of 
Hebrew origin meaning ‘adversary’ (Frye 65). In Blake’s later prophetic 
works instead of the word, devil (or devils), Satan is used to name the selfish 
“Evil One” (Milton) and he is also called the God of Men, Jehovah, who 
arrives with flaming fire.5 
But in this early prophecy it is emphasised that the two words, Devil 
and Satan, with their quite close meaning both signify that they differ, 
criticise or rebel against something. As negative power they cannot exist in 
themselves: their contrary force is needed. For Blake the devils – often in 
plural – present a more universal force, a principle of creative energy, which 
is related not only to the soul/spirit but also to the body: “Energy is […] 
from the Body; and Reason is the bound or outward circumference of 
Energy” (MHH 149). It is usually understood that the Devil stands for bodily 
and sexual energy, or the id, while the Angel represents the reasonable soul, 
or the superego. But it provocatively also means that the devil stands for the 
union of the body and the soul; more exactly, questioning and criticising the 
usual categories, the Devil wants the reader to re-define these contraries. 
That is, the Devil, re-valuating the conventionally accepted assumptions, 
deconstructs the apparent contradictions and reveals “their primordial unity 
                                                     
5 See, for example, in Milton Plate 14 line 30: “I in my Selfhood am that Satan: I am that Evil 
One!” and Plate 38 lines 50-51: “Satan heard, Coming in a cloud, with trumpets & flaming 
fire,/ Saying: ‘I am God the judge of all, the living & the dead” (Blake 496 and 530).   
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of the mind” (Cooper 47). Consequently, opposed to the usual meaning of 
the body, for the visionary “it is a portion of Soul discern’d by the five 
senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this age” (MHH 149). And it is not by 
chance that the Devil is introduced as a great rhetorician using here the 
argumentative tone of his voice and relying on the reader’s common sense. 
As on Plate 3 it is stated: 
Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason 
and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence. 
From these contraries spring what the religious call Good & Evil. Good is 
the passive that obeys Reason. Evil is the active springing from Energy.  
Good is Heaven. Evil is Hell. (MHH 149) 
Although here the opposion of good and evil is given religious denotation, 
their sign(ification) is not obvious. In his Annotations to Lavater’s 
“Aphorisms on Man” Blake remarks on aphorism 409 that “Active Evil is 
better than Passive Good” (Blake 77). On the basis of the Blakean 
conception, hypothetically, the angelic restraining minus can be corrected by 
the devilish revolutionary minus – so, the double negation results in 
positivity.  
But such a ‘reason-able’ reading of the Devil’s logic shows the Angel’s 
viewpoint and whereas the Devil’s voice is fully developed through his own 
statements, his antinomian proverbs and the I persona having been converted 
to his party, the Angel who stands for the reader’s ideas is less described. 
Blake putting on the Devil’s mask, aims at the devaluation of reason, where 
the reader is offered to “apprehend truth discursively, reasonably, like the 
Angel”, or “intuitively, energetically, like the Devil” (Wittreich 206, italics 
in the original). Actually, heaven vs. hell and angels vs. devils only exist 
separately from the angelic point of view. Let me mention a great example 
of the ‘black or white’ typed angelic thinking. In the fourth ‘apocalyptic’ 
“Memorable Fancy” the angel wants to show Blake his “eternal lot” saying 
that it is “between the black & white spiders” (MHH 156). It can refer to 
Blake’s and the Devil’s obsession with contraries and to the fact that the 
‘normal’ way of thinking in black or white terms can obstruct the 
understanding of the work. This fancy ends in quite a postmodern fashion 
stating that all of us (readers, critics, angels or devils) impose upon each 
other our own ‘phantasy’ “owing to our metaphysics” (MHH 156–7). But 
the devils at least can reflect on it: they represent an intellectually higher 
level as they are able to see things in greater contexts and in more universal 
connections – due to their ironic ability of shifting points of view. As 
Derrida says about the apocalyptic tone, it “leaps and rises when the voice of 
the oracle, uncovering your ear, jumbling, covering, or parasitizing the voice 
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of reason equally speaking in each and using the same language with 
everyone, takes you aside, speaks to you in a private code, and whispers 
secrets to you” (Derrida 132). Nevertheless, I would like to emphasise that in 
The Marriage the devilish needs the angelic so as to function, and the truth is 
being formed in their (ironic) ‘mental fight’. 
In the work, as Wittreich points out, the devilish-angelic contraries are 
historically represented by Milton, the true, and Swedenborg, the false 
prophet. Accordingly, in the argumentation the work operates with a double 
strategy in order “to expose the false prophets, eliminating the negation they 
represent; and to accomplish through prophecy the struggle of contraries by 
which the organs of perception are cleansed and the apocalypse finally 
achieved” (Wittreich 199). We should admit that Blake’s work was greatly 
influenced and liberated by Milton’s radical ideas. Searching for Miltonic 
sources, in his “The Reason of Church-Government” we can come across the 
idea of contraries, marriage and excess – the latter is one of the main topics 
in the “Proverbs of Hell” (Wittreich 206, Bloom 83). On the whole, the 
direction of Milton’s and Swedenborg’s thinking and oeuvre can be 
contrasted since in his writings Milton moved away from orthodoxy whereas 
Swedenborg starting from a radical view, reached orthodoxy (Wittreich 
201). More exactly, referring to Bloom’s remark, in The Marriage 
Swedenborg is shown as the ex-prophet, a priest, but he originally was a 
reasoner (a scientist) who could become a visionary and sect-founder 
(Bloom 70); that is, in his career Swedenborg displays the rise and the fall of 
the visionary.  
While the I persona mainly mocks Swedenborg’s ideas, the Devil 
ironises Milton as Blake puts his Milton-criticism into the Devil’s mouth. On 
the one hand, the Devil’s voice criticises Paradise Lost aesthetically, on the 
other hand, it ironically attacks his theology (Wittreich 211, Bloom 80). In 
The Marriage the Miltonic Satan, the unironic “hero of Romantic rebellion” 
(Rawson 112), is put in the centre and ironised by/in Blake’s Devil. But, as 
Wittreich calls the attention, the Devil being a ‘partisan spokesman’ “who 
never exhibits the same largeness of mind as the figure with whom he is 
identified [viz. Blake’s I persona, Blake, or Milton’s Satan, or Milton]”, 
misreads Milton (215). Likewise, the Devil’s idea that in Milton “the Father 
is Destiny, the Son a Ration [cf. Reason] of the five senses, & the Holy-
ghost Vacuum” (MHH 150) is true only in an ironic sense. We cannot forget 
that besides criticising Milton, the Devil’s main task is to ironise reasoning 
by expressing distorted views and by the sudden changing of perspectives. 
The illustration of Plate 5 depicts a naked male figure and his horse falling 
into the flames of fire but turning the page upside down, as the Devil wants 
us to see the world, the figure is seen to be in exaltation with his stretched 
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arms (Keynes xxi). The ironic shifting of viewpoints culminates in the 
complicated sentence already quoted in my introduction, where the Devil’s 
name is deleted as in the work his name equals the evasive tone itself. 
Opening up the vortex of contraries, he would rather let the reader find out 
that the devilish Jehovah of imagination, or the Biblical creator “dwells in 
flaming fire” (MHH 150, Bloom 81). Finally, the Devil, or the ‘converted’ I 
persona in his ironic awareness notes on Plate 5 that  
The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels & God, and at 
liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because he was a true Poet and of the 
Devil’s party without knowing it. (MHH 150. Italics are mine)   
 
In this statement we should pay attention to the opening word of ‘reason’ 
associated with the angelic principle which is opposed to the energy of the 
devilish irony expressed here; due to the ironic tone, reason is put in 
antinomy with freedom and truth in the rhetoric.6 
On Plate 16 another “portion of being” and its (ironic) opposite is 
revealed: the Prolific and the Devouring. According to Bloom, “if ever Blake 
speaks straight, forgoing all irony, in The Marriage, it is here” (90). I think 
that without using the ironic tone, the statement - “to the devourer it seems as 
if the producer was in chains; but it is not so, he only takes portions of 
existence and fancies that the whole” (MHH 155, italics are mine) - cannot 
be uttered. More exactly, only from an evasive (betwixt and between) 
viewpoint and in an atonal/atoned voice can such a statement be uttered. 
These two classes – the imaginative, creative artists and the Reasoners, the 
ones of limited knowledge – should be enemies because on the basis of the 
main principle, their opposition and fight means the essence of human 
existence. As David Erdman sees: “Blake rejects [Swedenborg’s] ‘spiritual 
equilibrium’ between good and evil for a theory of spiralling ‘Contraries’ 
that will account for progress” (Erdman 178). Though the interaction of 
contraries regarded eternal, their unique ‘union’, their marriage – promised 
and illustrated in the work - can be achieved.  
The interaction is figured by the dynamic vortex as in Blake’s visions it 
symbolises the essence of imaginative activity and “serves as an image of 
the gateway into a new level of perception” – quoting Professor Mitchell 
(73). Here this whirlwind is created by the devil and his attribute, his ironic 
                                                     
6 Wittreich remarks that the expression of ‘the devil’s party’ was used to signify the royalists 
in the Civil War and later they used it to refer to the revolutionaries, while the diabolical 
party meant the Whigs. “When Blake’s Devil adopts this vocabulary and introduces it into 
his critique of Milton, he is, in effect, transforming a rhetoric of abuse into a rhetoric of 
praise” (Wittreich 214). 
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attitude – his ‘flaming fire’. In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell fire is the 
main, the first principle: it is clearly associated with (devilish) desire, 
consummation and sexuality as “the word ‘consummation’ […] refers both 
to the burning world and the sacred marriage” (Frye 196).7 It is not only the 
means of the ‘devouring’ purification (apocalypse) and prohibition (the 
cherub’s flaming sword), but also of the ‘prolific’ creation and artistic 
imagination (see Plate 14). Moreover, fire symbolises inspiration as 
Northrop Frye says “imagination cannot be consumed by fire, for it is fire” 
(Frye 196). In the first “Memorable Fancy” a mighty devil writes the infernal 
“Proverbs of Hell” using “corroding fires” (MHH, 150) and later the 
‘devilish artist’ calls his own working method infernal: 
[…] I shall do by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, which in 
Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, and 
displaying the infinite which was hid. (MHH 154) 
Practically, with his ‘corrosive method’ Blake invented a new technique of 
engraving which Anthony Blunt describes as below: “Blake first took an 
ordinary copper etching plate. On this he drew the outlines of his decorative 
design in a varnish resistant to acid. The effect of this was that, when the 
plate was immersed in the acid, the unprotected parts were bitten away, 
leaving the parts painted out in a varnish in relief. This is roughly an inverted 
form of the ordinary process of etching, or a transference of the process of 
wood engraving to a copper plate” (Blunt 128). That is, this process does not 
only imply the use of the corrosive and purifying acid bath but also the 
working out of the design backwards while the text has to be written in black 
surrounded by a thin white line in the overall darkness of the space. It can be 
said that in this way Blake made darkness visible as the process of engraving 
produces such a visual paradox. It is another ironic game with the contrary-
complementary points of view in our perception, meaning another challenge 
for our senses. As the apocalyptic and Platonic conclusion states on Plate 14:  
If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to man as 
it is, infinite. 
For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro’ narrow chinks of 
his cavern. (MHH 154) 
                                                     
7 Frye also emphasises that the marriage of heaven and hell is given by “the union of heat and 
light” because heaven is taken as the eternal world of golden light, while hell is 
characterised by the eternal heat of passion or desire. Actually, Blake - quoting Henry 
Summerfield – borrows “the opposition between the Fire of the Father and the Light of the 
Son” from Jakob Boehme and also under Boehme’s influence he regards fire as the First 
Principle (70).  
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Blake thinks that the divine (or diabolical) imagination is locked in the 
Platonic cave of the human skull or body which is lit by the sensory organs: 
nostrils, ears, eyes, tongue, and skin, or genitals. The purifying and energetic 
flames of imagination used by Blake, metaphorically and literally, can free 
our perception and open the way towards infinity.8 In The Marriage, the 
other prophetic figures, Isaiah and Ezekiel, also want to raise men into “a 
perception of the infinite” with their strange ‘corroding’ behaviour (MHH 
154). Similarly, Blake tries to show the power of the “Poetic Genius” in his 
“fire of intellect and art, which must begin ‘by an improvement of sensual 
enjoyment’” (Bloom 88). According to Wittreich, “the true prophets must 
employ the devices of satire and irony” (207) – that is, following the devilish 
ironic logic, they can pretend to be false prophets. I would rather accept the 
Bloomian infernal, or poetic meaning of the work that the creative Devil is 
the artist Blake’s ironic mask and “the corroding fires refer metaphorically 
both to his engraving technique and the satiric function of the Marriage” 
(Bloom 83).    
The Acid Test of Satire 
The Blakean ‘corrosive method’ with the Devil’s flaming fire as a metaphor 
works on another level referring to the “deeply acid bitten” tone of the work. 
As Northrop Frye remarks, “[s]atire is an acid that corrodes everything it 
touches” and he compares The Marriage of Heaven and Hell to the great 
English satirical works created by Swift, Fielding, Sterne or the painter, 
Hogarth, calling the work “the epilogue to the golden age of English satire” 
(200–201). In his apocalyptic vision the Blakean I persona, as a great satirist, 
uses the Devil’s infernal irony. Moreover, the “visionary satirist” (Bloom 
88) does not only verbalise and visualise the divine visions with the use of 
‘hell’s fire’ but also promises the Bible of Hell based on its reading in the 
“diabolical sense” (MHH 158).  
In the starting point of his analysis, Wittreich states that a critic should 
decide whether to regard The Marriage as a satire or a prophecy and he 
obviously reads it as a ‘true’ prophecy showing the formation of the 
prophetic character (189), while, in a lengthy endnote, he mentions other 
critics – mainly, Bloom and Frye – who read it as a Menippean satire (306–
307). However, in the ending he admits that the work “like Milton’s 
pamphlet [cf. “The Reason of Church-Government”], has all the hallmarks 
                                                     
8 It is remarkable that Blake frequently and deliberately uses the images of the human senses 
– e.g. eye-globes, vaults of nostrils, S-line of the tongue appear in his paintings, drawings 
and texts -, while the mysterious fifth sense of touch remains closely related to sexuality and 
imagination in his vision.   
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of reason and order, concepts reinforced by the theme of satire that pervades 
the work and by the strict organization evident on its surface. Its initial 
argument is developed by the voice of the Devil, by the proverbs of hell, and 
by the amplifications of each of the memorable fancies” (207). It shows that 
reading the work, Wittreich himself has realised that though the work is a 
prophecy, it cannot help using the ironic corrosives of satire. It rather means 
that while ironising logic and reasoning, Blake overcomes satire and displays 
its inadequacy. In my reading The Marriage is a satirical work where the I 
persona, similarly to Blake in his marginalia, uses not only the ironic tone of 
the Devil but also the satirical and doctrinal tone of opposition (Erdman 
177).  
The form of the work, following the structure of a prophecy and 
revelation with intertextual commentaries on Swedenborg’s Heaven and 
Hell, Milton’s Paradise Lost and Biblical prophets’, Isaiah’s and Ezekiel’s 
vision, shows up the characteristic feature of the Menippean satire being a 
mixture of forms, that is, it is ‘mixed’ or ‘medley’ – satura (Guilhamet 5, 
Relihan 13). Nevertheless, this vague definition of the Menippean, or 
Lucilian (or Varronian) satire is also questionable and the usual discussions 
of Bakhtin’s not necessarily satiric “menippia” or Frye’s “anatomy” are 
rather misleading in this sense (Griffin 32 and Relihan 4–5). For instance, in 
his Satire and the Transformation of Genre, Guilhamet does not regard this 
kind of satire as a form at all claiming that in a Menippean satire “the 
rhetorical structure or logical sequence of a satiric speech or discourse is 
excessively disrupted by fictive techniques, […] Such techniques include 
irony, genre mixing, the use of a persona. An abundance of such strategies 
causes a malformation or deformation of the text” (12). Following this 
definition which is not without any reminiscent of Frye’s and Bakhtin’s 
ideas, Blake’s Marriage can definitely be read as a satire – definitely, but not 
convincingly.  
In Ancient Menippean Satire Relihan, quoting Frye’s famous statement 
– namely, “the Menippean satire presents us with a vision of the world in 
terms of a single intellectual pattern” –, makes his own quite similar 
definition that “it seems that the [Bakthinian] menippea can be viewed as an 
intellectual attitude adopted toward the value of truth and the possibility of 
meaning, a particular world view, that may show up in a number of different 
genres” (6).9 Besides having the most important features of the Menippean 
                                                     
9 Then he summarises the 14 features of the Bakhtinian menippea which – with the exception 
of the elements of a social utopia – are present in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. That is, 
regarding the Menippean features of the work, there is (1) the satirical I persona using 
exaggerated humour; (2) “freedom of plot”; (3) “extraordinary situations” with “journeys to 
heaven and hell” and apocalyptic visions in the “Memorable Fancies”; (4) “slum naturalism” 
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satire, The Marriage also displays the essence of generic satire: the freedom 
of individual fantasy in presenting a universal world view in mixed forms, 
tones and split personality. Relihan points out that “the genre is primarily a 
parody of philosophical thought and forms of writing, a parody of the habits 
of civilised discourse in general, and that it ultimately turns into the parody 
of the author who has dared to write in such an unorthodox way” (Relihan 
10). Reading The Marriage, we can feel that Blake is exactly such an author 
who, in his satire, satirises reasoning and “opposes the word-centered view 
of the universe” and “denies the possibility of expressing the truth in words” 
(Relihan 11) – doing it not only in words, but also in pictures. According to 
Relihan, Menippean satire is a parody of traditional satire having ironic 
overtones and its basic features are: a mixture of disparate elements, 
fantastic settings of a topsy-turvy world, intertextuality, and a “self-
parodying author/narrator” lacking a consistent authorial point of view (17–
24). Blake’s Marriage with its central idea of the mixed contraries, puzzling 
commentaries on other texts and its own visions, with the figure of the ironic 
Devil, and its ‘devilish’ I persona is satirical. Thus, referring to Blake’s 
work, the name, satura, is its appropriate/proper label, of which “essence is 
the shocking juxtapositions of irreconcilable opposites” and in which 
“literary impropriety, self-parody, and the mockery of standards of judgment 
are all intertwined” (Relihan 15).  
Following Relihan’s ideas, the Blakean Menippean satire parodies other 
genres, and literature making a joke on authorship, unity, genre, and style; it 
is an antigenre, or a burlesque, a burlesque of literature (34). Relihan also 
emphasises that in the work “fantasy serves not only to undermine other 
forms of cultural and literary authority, but also to undermine the importance 
of the particular Menippean satire itself” (Relihan 22). Moreover, what he 
adds, is particularly true with regards to The Marriage:  
It is too modern to say that Menippean satire champions the eternal search 
for truth by a refusal to be limited by straitjacket of reason and propriety, 
though certainly the genre is refreshing for its indulgence in fantasy […]. 
Menippean satire rises through time to philosophical formulations of the 
                                                                                                                            
mixed with the elevated, or mystical elements especially in the fourth “Memorable Fancy” 
in the description of the seven houses of monkeys; (5) “ultimate questions” of good and evil 
and philosophical universalism; (6) three levelled structure in the division of hell – earth – 
heaven; (7) “experimental fantasticality” with flying and burning figures; (8) “representation 
of abnormal psychic states” exemplified with the duplicity of the Devil’s and the narrator’s 
split voice; (9) “violations of the established norms of behavior”, for instance, by the 
prophets, or the Devil calling Christ a murderer; (10) “love of sharp and oxymoronic 
contrast and abrupt transitions”, e.g. Angel vs. Devil, falling vs. rising; (11) a mixture of 
genres and forms; and (12) “a mixture of styles and tones” (quoting Bakhtin in Relihan 6–
7).  
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inadequacy of human knowledge and the existence of a reality that 
transcends reason […]. (Relihan 29, italics are mine)  
Regarding the tone, Griffin argues that the Menippean satirists from Lucian 
to Blake “sustain complex ironies” (54). He mentions the early Blakean 
mock-symposium An Island in the Moon and analyses The Marriage as a 
Menippean satire which works largely by means of provocative paradox and 
wit (57). He sees that “[t]he satire in Blake’s Marriage lies primarily in its 
continuous irony […]. If we consider the rhetoric of provocation and 
paradox, then Blake stands in a long line of satirists – from Lucian through 
Erasmus, Fontenelle, Swift, and others – whose satire works not by drawing 
a clear line between ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ but by teasing readers with the play 
of ‘contraries’” (Griffin 59–60). Griffin discusses the problem of satiric 
irony which is unstable and does not operate as a binary switch with which 
the reader can simply reconstruct the author’s meaning (65). In a satiric 
complexity the degree of irony should also be taken into consideration and 
the danger that the irony of the satiric genius can run away with the satirist 
himself.  
While the Devil’s irony seems to be controlled - as he is still a reasoner 
though a false one – the I persona is likely to be taken away by his irony. In 
the last “Memorable Fancy”, in the description of the parallel visions of the 
orthodox Angel and the heretic, with the abundance of figures the same story 
is told from two opposite viewpoints – with understanding shamefully 
“imposed upon” each other (MHH 157). First, the Angel shows his fantasy 
about eternity with the symbols of Christ’s life (the stable, the church, the 
vault), of the institutionalised Church (mill, cave), and finally with the 
apocalyptic pictures of the black tempest, the fiery cataract of blood and 
Leviathan in the black sea (Summerfield 382–3). Afterwards the I persona 
displays ‘his’ visionary story of Christianity flying with the Angel towards 
the Sun reversing Satan’s journey through chaos described in Paradise Lost. 
Then descending into the abyss of the Bible, they reach the seven houses of 
the Church where monkeys live quarelling, copulating and devouring each 
other “by plucking off first one limb and then the another, till the body was 
left a helpless trunk; […] one savourily picking the flesh off his own tail” 
(MHH 157). In this section, as Bloom remarks: “Swift himself could not 
have done better here, in the repulsive projection of the incestuous warfare 
of rival doctrines, ground together in the reductive mill of scholastic 
priestcraft” (93). I think, toning with his most disgusting and animalistic 
criticism of the Church, Blake uses such a tonality that recalls Swift’s 
sarcasm. 
In his analysis of the Swiftian irony, Leavis hints at the possible 
parallelism or connection between Swift’s and Blake’s satirical style stating 
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in his promising final sentence that “we shall not find Swift remarkable for 
intelligence if we think of Blake” (29). Comparing Swift’s and Blake’s 
satires, I can start with Bloom’s ironic remark, namely, in The Marriage 
Blake is like Swift as their satires survived its victims (71). But to give a 
serious tone, it is not by chance that the Swiftian irony is called negative, 
intellectual and instrumental (Leavis 16) as it is based on ‘cold’/angelic 
rationality. Contrasted with Blake, Swift could not escape from the ‘mind-
forged manacles’ though in his great satires (in Gulliver’s voyages to Laputa 
and to the land of the clever horses) he was capable of highlighting the limits 
of reason. At his best his imagination starts with a parody and “takes fire 
from mad elaborations of metaphor” (Traugott 115, italics are mine) 
liberating himself from Augustan decorum. Traugott also remarks that Swift, 
unlike the visionary Blake, understood that “God and the devil are ordinarily 
reversed by the pretense of reason” (109). Whereas Blake’s works especially 
display a harsh criticism of reason written against Locke’s rationalist 
sensualism which “mock[s] Inspiration & Vision” (Damon 245).  
However, on the basis of the strongly attacking tone and the satirical-
ironical context, some parallels can be found between The Marriage and the 
Swiftian tone used in his prose writings, for example, in the one discussing 
religious problems titled “An Argument Against the Abolishing of 
Christianity” (1708). In this essay the false persona suggests that true 
Christianity should be annihilated while ‘nominal’ (false) Christianity should 
be maintained. With the usage of ironic betrayal and the emphasis of the 
false opinion it is revealed that the very opposite is meant, namely, only the 
‘nominal’ and superficial religous ‘belief’ should be abolished, while true 
Christianity must definitely be defended. In Swift’s satire complex irony is 
used with a reformative intention and the tone itself is turned into a weapon.   
In the opening paragraph it is stated: “I am very sensible what a 
Weakness and Presumption it is, to reason against the general Humour and 
Disposition of the World. […] In like Manner, and for the very same 
Reasons, it may perhaps be neither safe nor prudent to argue against the 
Abolishing of Christianity, […]” (Swift 225, italics are mine). Then the 
persona questions the necessary abolishing of Christianity, which sounds 
paradoxical “even for [the] wise and paradoxical Age” (226). From the 
beginning – from the long ironic title, “An Argument to prove, That the 
Abolishing of Christianity in England, May, as Things now Stand, be 
attended with some Inconveniencies, and perhaps, not produce those many 
good Effects proposed thereby” - the reader is trapped into following the 
logical though false reasoning of the work so as to realise that the displayed 
opinion of the persona is negatively emphasised; that is, its opposite is 
meant. 
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On the one hand, due to the ironic intensity aimed at the defence, 
quoting F. R. Leavis’s expression, “the positive itself appears only 
negatively” (Leavis 17). Bullitt says about the technique based on 
enthymemes: “Swift frequently tended, then, to adopt indirect refutation as 
the most persuasive form of demonstrating the logical absurdity of his 
opponents. Instead of refuting directly the arguments of an antagonist, 
Swift's enthymemes were constructed in such a way as to display them, if 
possible, as ridiculous, and in the process of doing so, of course, to imply the 
affirmation of his own opposed premises. […] It is only a short step from 
this method of introducing his arguments to that adopting those arguments as 
his own – in short, to using irony, as the vehicle for his refutative 
enthymeme” (96, italics in the original). One of the best examples is when 
the persona, realising that the nominal Christian will lose their truly 
Christian allies, suggests that they should “trust to an Alliance with the 
Turk”, but he admits that the Turk, opposed to the nominal Christians, 
“believe a God” (237). 
On the other hand, the persona’s argumentation is shockingly logical 
operating with abstract rationality and the “position is defended ironically by 
a logic so patently false that we are almost laughed into agreement with 
Swift” (Bullitt 98). I think that similarly to Swift’s conception it could also 
have been Blake’s mission to lead men in such an indirect way beyond 
reason towards the experience of true Christianity – even if he had to use the 
destroying fire of irony in his satire. This central idea is not only expressed 
in the Devil’s ironic statement and the proverbs, but also in the I persona’s 
Swedenborg-critique. On Plate 21 the master is mentioned together with the 
Angels who “have the vanity to speak of themselves as the only wise; this 
they do with confident insolence sprouting from systematic reasoning” 
(MHH 157). In his satirical tone, the persona blames Swedenborg for only 
conversing with the religious Angels and “not with Devils who all hate 
religion” (Ibid) where religion – similarly, to Swift’s attack – refers to the 
institution of the Church, nominal Christianity and the rational religion, 
Deism.   
In his Marriage the rational ‘either-or’ typed point of view is attacked: 
if devils and angels separately exist in our world the persona deliberately 
acts for the devil’s party. In this (ironic) sense he can be said to be the 
devil’s advocate who puts not only the ‘case of reason’ but also the 
reasonable (Swiftian) satire to the acid test. As Relihan remarks, “the 
anatomy of folly can only be ironically performed” (30); that is, irony is 
used upon irony, or the technique of betrayal with a false persona. The 
ending is not satiric but ironic and can be taken as an imaginative poetic 
ending, not a reasonable one where the “fiery polemic uttered for its fire and 
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not its light” (Bloom 94). But after the promise of “The Bible of Hell” 
another shock awaits the reader: the warning of the ’devilish’ illustrator who 
shows us the repressive and degenerate state of Nebuchadnezzar. That is, the 
final ‘word’ is uttered by the illustrator putting up the Devil’s/his complex 
ironic mask.  
The (An)ironic Vision 
While the textual ending of The Marriage describes the Angel’s enlightened 
consummation, the last illustration on the same plate shows the biblical 
Nebuchadnezzar’s degenerated state which can be taken as “the ironic 
emblem of Reason losing his reason” (Erdman 194, italics in the original). In 
his essay “Irony and False Consciousness” Andrew Cooper emphasises the 
overwhelming ironic tonality of the work which he compares to the 
Romantic hovering of the Schlegelian irony. In his repetition of self-creation 
and self-destruction, due to his masks used in his works, the ironist is able to 
free himself from the limitations of self-consciousness (Cooper 37). Besides 
referring to the famous “doors of perception” as revolving doors, Cooper 
also claims that Blake’s irony is aimed at “[the] antinomian striving to 
transcend ’the Body’ and identify the indeterminacy of rhetorical self-
consciousness with the unshackled energies of a genuinely world-consuming 
apocalypse” (46).  
Actually, regarding the different and intertwined voices of the work, the 
very first and very last voice – before and after Rinthrah, the I persona, the 
Devil and the Angel - is the voice of the illustrator.10 From the starting plate 
of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, from the title and its first 
‘illumination’ of the title-page, the reader is contrasted with a Blakean 
twofold or more exactly ‘threefold vision’: the union of two contrary 
forces.11 If we want to understand, or rather imagine its meaning, we should 
                                                     
10 In his reading, Eaves introduces the central voice and character of God though he is mostly 
deus absconditus. Consequently, the missing or hidden centre is displayed in the 
multiplicity of voices as humanity, more exactly, human imagination which encloses 
Blake’s divinity (23). 
11 In Blake’s own mythology there is a place where the contraries are equally true and live in 
peace. This is the land of sexual harmony and dreams lighted by the Moon (the realm of 
the Subconscious) which Blake calls Beulah in his late prophecies, while it is named 
Innocence or the Vales of Har in the early works (e.g. in The Book of Thel). Its name 
means ‘married’ referring to the restored happy relationship, the reconciliation, between 
God and Palestine (See Damon 42–43). In his ‘cosmology’ Beulah is also the world of 
creative energy and poetic inspiration characterised by the imaginative ‘threefold vision’, 
where the contraries live side by side in harmony. See more about it in my paper “William 
Blake’s Visions of Vision,” in Alternative Approaches to English—Speaking Cultures in 
the 19th Century, ed. Séllei Nóra, Debrecen: Printing Press of KLTE, 1999, 206–215.  
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go beyond and accept the challenge of what the whirlwind of these apparent 
‘contraries’ indicates. Having analysed the work, I should realise that even 
from the very beginning in the satirical-ironical context Blake acts as the 
devil’s advocate, the advocatus diaboli representing a higher state of 
imaginative vision. If the reader can accept the illogical though imaginative 
marriage of good and evil, then (s)he can see the contraries already united – 
in its double negative, assertive way. We have an artist who works with 
‘flaming fire’, what’s more, uses its power in the creation of the “great 
synaesthesia” of his art. As Professor Mitchell sees, “Blake’s pictorial style, 
like his poetic form and the total form of his composite art, is organised as a 
dramatic, dialectical interaction between contrary elements” (Mitchell 74). 
In his ‘illuminated’ works, in his artistic threefold vision, words and pictures 
– and the sculpture-like letters, motifs of the relief etchings - are composed 
to show the synaesthetic presentation of sensory elements, so as to open the 
dynamic vortex of imagination. In this sense his illustrated/illuminated prints 
do also function as windows, as sensory openings, and through his pictures 
the spectator’s sensual enjoyment can be improved by “designing visual 
illusions which continually demand and imply [all] the other senses in their 
structures” (Mitchell 74).  
I cannot agree with Erdman that the usage of the word ‘marriage’ in the 
title of the work – on the basis of Blake’s aversion of this institution - can 
only be taken as a ‘half-jest’. In Blake’s poetic and prophetic works marriage 
has different meanings, from the burdensome bondage of loveless and forced 
marriages, through the happy sexual union, to the spiritual wedding between 
God and Man. According to Wittreich, “[i]f Milton thought that the marriage 
of truth would not occur until the Apocalypse, Blake thought the Apocalypse 
would not occur until such a marriage had been accomplished” (203). 
However, the argumentation of the work fails to show up the promised 
‘marriage’ as the Devil’s voice is fully developed through his utterances, 
proverbs and the I persona having been converted to his party, but the 
Angel’s figure is less described. That is, the text of the Blakean Marriage 
presents the weak and unbalanced union between the fully described figure 
of the Devil and the flat reasoning character of the Angel – consequently, the 
true expression of marriage should be looked for in the illustrations.   
The title of the prophecy – written to the experienced living in di-vision 
– clearly refers to the world of ‘threefold vision’ and sexual unity. In the 
work it is visualised in the titlepage, in its illustration and typography, and 
verbalised in the last “Memorable Fancy” (see Fig. 2). The title-page can be 
taken as an illustration to the section where all the voices are present: the I 
persona records the conversation between an Angel and a Devil which is 
finally/originally depicted by the illustrator on the title-page. In the textual 
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vision, the devil in flaming fire addresses an angel sitting on a cloud and 
questions the ancient traditions of orthodox Christianity, while putting 
emphasis on Christ’s humanity instead of his divinity. As the angel fails to 
defend his own ideas he “stretched out his arms, embracing the flame of fire, 
& he was consumed and arose as Elijah [viz. the prophet, or John the 
Baptist]” (MHH 158).  
Although in the text the two figures are masculine (referred to as ‘he’) 
or can be taken as androgynous, in the title-page below the level of the 
ground or consciousness we can see an embracing love-couple: the devil is 
characterised with flames of fire and a nice feminine bottom, and the angel’s 
masculine nude is shown reclining on a bluish cloud. The harmonious 
moment of their kissing is made dynamic by the moving fiery flames and the 
other embracing couples flying above the central one. The whole picture 
shows the whirlwind of ecstasy rooted in and raised by the union of the two 
main principles. That is, the main schematic form dominating the entire 
space of the design is the vortex, which can be “the configuration of [the 
Blakean] ‘progression’” and “the focus of the encounter between conflicting 
forces” (Mitchell 70). Besides the vision of the whirlpool, there is another 
little vortex coiling around the uniting conjunction, ‘and’, which looks like 
going into the space of the drawing. Above the ground in accordance, or 
toning, with the visionary scene we can notice that the branches of the trees 
move towards each other in the wind (of passion) and as if the word, 
‘marriage’, had united “the abstraction of typography [of HEAVEN and 
HELL] with the flowing, organic forms of Blake’s pictorial style” (Mitchell 
75).  
Finally, after regarding the ironic, satiric and apocalyptic tone of the 
other voices, we should pay attention to the illustrator’s attitude and the 
Blakean irony. In his Horizons of Assent Alan Wilde distinguishes mediate, 
or primitive; disjunctive, or modern; and suspensive, or postmodern ironies 
(9-10). He argues that all irony – or rather the mediate and disjunctive ones – 
“regarded as a perceptual encounter with the world, generate[s] in response 
to [its] vision of disparity (or in some cases is generated by) a 
complementary, more conceptual vision of wholeness or singleness”, which 
he calls the anironic (30). Being taken not as “anti-ironic” but a 
complementary countervision, this anironic vision accompanies irony and 
the absolute ironist is capable of the intertwining of the ironic and the 
anironic so as to hover “folding back on himself in the sanctuary of his art” 
(34). I think, opposed to the hovering of modern irony, in Blake’s ‘primitive’ 
irony the anironic apocalyptic vision about the realm of fantasy ironises the 
Devil’s ironic tone. It means that the Devil’s irony is “Blake’s vehicle for 
carrying reason to excess, making it undermine itself and become energy” 
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(Cooper 48), which is displayed in the illustrator’s (an)irony. In this sense, 
marriage can refer to the intertwined unity of the different tones which are 
tensed then braided. Thus, The Marriage does not only mean the Devil’s and 
the Angel’s spiritual union but also the marriage of satire and irony in a 
prophetic/apocalyptic ending-beginning.   
According to Wittreich, the work’s final irony  
[l]ies in the fact that what is true from the human perspective is not true 
from a demonic one, just as what the Devil says in The Marriage of Heaven 
and Hell may be true from the perspective of history, but it is not true from 
the perspective of eternity that the prophet enjoys. The irony […] [of] 
Blake’s Devil lies in the fact that Blake [is] in possession of a larger 
consciousness and thus aware of subtleties that his devil does not perceive 
[…]. (215)  
I agree with Wittreich’s calling Blake a “supreme ironist” but ‘the irony lies 
in the fact’ that while in the final irony he sees “the formation of the 
prophetic character” I would rather see the illustrator and the engraver’s 
perspective here. I think, supreme irony is expressed in the annihilation of 
the tones in the fiery ending and also in the illustrations where the artist 
represents his anironic vision of prophecy. The illustrator’s “spiritual eye” is 
truly meant to be “the eye through which the rest of the world might see” 
(Wittreich 218) and in this sense ironically the cover-page is rather an 
uncovering, apocalyptic page.  
In his essay on the apocalyptic tone, Derrida refers to a flower of 
rhetoric, the eucalyptus, which, as the ironic flower of revelation, after 
flowering remains closed, “well hidden [cf. the Greek word, eu-kaluptos] 
under the avowed desire for revelation” (Derrida 149). In The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell, besides the puzzling multitonality, the author’s ‘true’ 
voice remains concealed – like the Derridean apocalyptic flower of rhetoric, 
the eucalyptus. Moreover, the eucalyptus is also remarkable for its cleansing 
and healing oil, which can be associated with the corroding acid of Blake’s 
irony. In his writing Blake ‘argues’ against all restraints, limitations and 
bondage, and he is capable of loosening the strict tension of the tonos, due to 
the elasticity of his ironic tonality. In spite of my first satirical remark on 
Professor Keynes’s explanation, I should accept that instead of ‘the devil’ 
this ‘he’ is “all that was needed”. Regarding the conception, context and 
tonality of The Marriage, the ‘pronoun’ – with the Greek anto-nymia 
embracing its own opposite denomination – and, what’s more, its hiatus/gap, 
is definitely enough. As He in his mask/incognito says in the “Proverbs of 
Hell”: it is “more than enough”, or “too much” (MHH 152). The ironically 
apocalyptic work marks not the ending but the beginning of Blake’s 
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prophetic career where heaven and hell, angels and devils do not exist – 
there is no reason for their existence.   
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• What is the difference between the following linking adjuncts often 
used in academic language: on the contrary, by contrast, on the 
other hand? 
• What is meant by hiya, wassup, tarra luv, sloooooooow dn and; - in 
internet discourse? 
• Is the prepositional phrase in Just don’t lose your belief in his talent 
a modifier or a complement in the noun phrase? 
• What do native speakers of English express with the interjection tut-
tut? 
• How can ’hedging’ (expressing a viewpoint more assertively) and 
‘boosting’ (making a proposition less assertive) be achieved in 
academic writing? 
• How do you disagree politely in English? 
The Cambridge Grammar of English (CGE) written by Ronald Carter and 
Michael McCarthy and published by one of the largest and most prestigious 
academic publishers gives you answers to these and hundreds of similar 
questions. This excellent book is a major new reference grammar which has 
been designed for anyone with a serious interest in the grammar of English. 
While previous grammar books have given greater attention to the 
written language, CGE offers a more balanced approach, and devotes as 
much attention to the spoken language as to the written one. Many of their 
examples are taken from the 700 million-word corpus of spoken and written 
English called the Cambridge International corpus, which is composed of 
real texts taken from a great variety of sources. 
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As far as the arrangement of the material is concerned, GCE is 
organised differently from other contemporary grammar books. Its 
introductory chapter is concerned with the parts and basic principles of 
grammar in general, the peculiarities of CGE, the relation of grammar and 
corpus data and includes the organisation of the book. It is followed by a 
unique section called A-Z, in which the lexico-grammar properties of 
frequent words are described. Since these lexical items are often polysemous 
and individual in some way in their grammar, they are known to be difficult 
for learners and often lead to errors. Consider ’quite’ in the following 
examples (cf. pp. 126–27): 
Things began to get worse quite quickly. (rather, fairly) 
It was quite impossible to have a conversation with him. (totally, 
completely) 
You’ve got quite a garden here. (a noteworthy example of) 
I thought he was quite a nice person. (a rather nice person) 
The section A-Z is followed by the topic chapters which include the 
following: introduction to grammar and spoken English; from utterance to 
discourse; from discourse to social context; grammar across turns and 
sentences; grammar and academic English; introduction to word classes and 
phrase classes; the noun phrase; nouns and determiners; pronouns; verb 
phrase 1: structure of verb phrase; verb phrase 2: tense and aspect; types of 
verbs; adjectives and adjective phrases; adverbs and adverb phrases; 
prepositions and prepositional phrases; word structure and word formation; 
introduction to sentences and clauses; verb complementation; clause types; 
clause combination; adjuncts; present time; past time; future time; modality; 
speech acts; questions; negation; condition; comparison; word order and 
focus; the passive and speech representation. As evident from the above list, 
the second section, which makes up three-fifths of the book, covers the 
traditional categories most grammar books deal with. 
The final section of the book consists of the appendices, which give 
detailed information on punctuation, spelling, irregular verbs, number, 
measurement, time, nationalities and countries, as well as important 
differences between British and North American grammatical usage. Besides 
the appendices, there is also a glossary which contains brief definitions of all 
the key grammatical terms used in the book. 
R. Carter and M. McCarthy use familiar terminology, relying basically 
on the framework and categories of Quirk et. al. (1985). Overlapping 
between categories and gradedness are the major reasons why classification 
is not an easy issue, yet the authors manage to keep a delicate balance. They 
try to eliminate terms which were rather problematic and confusing in A 
Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. As far as modality is 
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concerned, they avoid using terms like ’intrinsic’ vs. ’extrinsic’. Instead, 
they provide clear explanations of the different meanings of modal verbs. In 
fact, the authors refer to ’deontic’ vs. ’epistemic’, but only in the glossary 
(cf. pp. 900, 902). It is pointed out that terms such as necessity, permission 
and obligation are used in preference to deontic, while terms, such as 
certainty, probability or possibility are used in preference to epistemic in 
their book. Unlike in Quirk et al.’s grammar (1985), be, do and have are not 
called primary verbs any more in this book, they are simply discussed among 
auxiliary verbs, which are followed by model verbs under a different 
heading (cf. pp. 424–425). 
In my experience, it is rather difficult for students to understand the 
distinction between finite and non-finite verb forms. CGE introduces new 
terms for them, i.e. tensed and non-tensed. It is argued that tensed verb forms 
indicate whether a verb is present or past tense. The s-form and the past form 
of the verb are tensed forms. The -ing participle and the -ed participle are 
non-tensed forms. The base-form may be tensed or non-tensed. When it has 
a subject, it is tensed (and it is called the present form), when it is used as the 
infinitive form (with or without to), it is non-tensed (cf. p. 198). I find it a 
more user-friendly explanation. The terms of finite and non-finite clauses 
are, however, kept in the chapter on clause types (cf. pp. 532–551). They are 
defined like this: A finite clause contains a verb which is inflected for tense 
(present or past), while non-finite clauses contain a lexical verb which does 
not indicate tense. 
Unlike Quirk et al. (1985), the authors of CGE make a distinction 
between modifiers and complements in noun phrases. While modifiers 
indicate qualities and attributes of the noun head (e.g. subjective qualities, 
physical attributes, such as size, colour, material, location in space and time, 
restricted reference to a particular entity), complements complete the 
meaning of the noun head (cf. p. 323). Thus the prepositional phrase and the 
that-clause in  A rise in interest rates is inevitable and The claim that he was 
innocently involved was not accepted by the judge, respectively are regarded 
as complements. 
The classification of adverbials into adjunct, subjunct, disjunct and 
conjunct is also avoided. The term is carefully explained as follows: “The 
adjunct is the fifth major clause function, the other four being subject, verb 
object and complement. Adjuncts modify, comment on or expand in some 
way the meaning of the clause in terms of manner, place, time, frequency, 
reason, intensity, purpose, evaluative, viewpoint, linking, etc.” (cf. p. 578). 
Thus Carter & McCarthy classify adjuncts on the basis of their semantics. 
A unique feature of this grammar book is the chapter on grammar and 
academic English. Although academic writing and speaking, e.g. students’ 
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essays, presentations, dissertations and theses, lectures, conference papers, 
books and articles, all have different conventions, they have a great deal in 
common in terms of grammar. This chapter (cf. pp. 268–294) focuses on 
items and structures which are common in academic language. The authors 
give us useful guidelines about how information is packaged (typically in 
rather dense noun phrases), how tense, aspect, voice and modality are used 
to structure and signpost text, how pronouns create an appropriate 
relationship with the listener/reader, how sentences are typically linked, and 
how specific conventions are used (e.g. citing and abbreviations). I am sure 
that this chapter will be of great help to both students and teachers at 
colleges and universities. 
Another merit of CEG is that a special chapter is devoted to speech acts 
(cf. pp. 680–713), which also tend to be neglected in other grammar 
references. Speech acts, such as informing, directing, questioning, 
requesting, offering, apologising, complaining, suggesting, promising, 
permitting, forbidding, and predicting, etc. regularly occur in everyday 
written and spoken interactions, therefore they are an essential prerequisite 
of a good command of a language. Besides focussing particularly on 
directives and commissives, the authors also describe how clause structure 
contributes to different kinds of speech acts and the role of modal verbs and 
speech act verbs in constructing them. 
It is also noteworthy that in the chapter ‘From discourse to social 
contexts’, the authors refer to swearing and taboo expressions and non-
standard spoken and written grammar, which students often meet (cf. pp. 
225, 235–36). They, however, warn learners that they should exercise great 
care concerning such usages. For these non-standard varieties of 
grammatical forms, five levels of acceptability are outlined: 1. wide-spread 
use in both spoken and written language 2. wide-spread use in both written 
and spoken language but not approved in more prescriptive grammar books 
3. rare in writing but normal in spoken language (e.g. I don’t know how but 
me and my sister got lost in the market.) 4. regionally or socially marked (I 
know something. That ain’t the answer.) 5. non-occurring and unacceptable 
in all varieties of British English. 
In summary, we can say that CGE is a valuable contribution to the 
description of the grammar of English, and therefore it is a ‘must-have’ for 
anyone who aims to acquire a thorough knowledge of the major areas of 
English grammar. The user-friendly lay-out, the wealth of examples taken 
from spoken and written English, the clear explanation of grammatical terms 
and concepts make it an excellent book. I am convinced that by this new 
grammar book Ronald Carter and Michael McCarthy have opened the door 
to success in English for millions of learners. 
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